Rationality Quotes July 2012
Here's the new thread for posting quotes, with the usual rules:
- Please post all quotes separately, so that they can be voted up/down separately. (If they are strongly related, reply to your own comments. If strongly ordered, then go ahead and post them together.)
- Do not quote yourself
- Do not quote comments/posts on LW/OB
- No more than 5 quotes per person per monthly thread, please.
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--A.L. Kitselman
See also Paul Graham's essay Keep Your Identity Small, on the same subject.
-- RStevens
-Rob DenBleyker
Ha! I was in a checkout at the mall and pulled up a science blog to see the developments on the Higgs-Boson. When I heard the 99.9999% proof I literally could not hold in my verbal amazement. Well no one around me (mother, sister, scared check-out girl) had the slightest clue what it was about and explaining only led to resentment and confusion (despite using an apologetic light tone i.e. leaving out the "God Particle" association.)
I'm betting on psychotic episodes. Any way to settle it?
Induce psychotic episodes in some people, explain Higgs boson to others, compare outcome religiosity.
Now I'm reminded of when my mother phoned me asking me “what's about this God particle they've found and everyone's talking about? does it prove that God exist, or that God doesn't exist?” and I told her not to mind journalists as they don't understand a thing and they're just trying to sell newspapers, and to look at the cover picture on my Facebook profile instead. (It shows the Lagrangian of the Standard Model before symmetry breaking.) She was a bit disappointed by that. ;-)
-- Theodore Dalrymple, article in "Library of Law and Liberty".
It's strange that we have many phrases like "on the one/other hand", "pros and cons", and "both sides of the story", then.
These phrases are mainly used in near mode, or when trying to induce near mode. The phenomenon described in the quote is a feature (or bug) of far mode.
Not wanting to take a principle to heart is not the same thing as denying that's the way things work, though. I think most people acknowledge (or at least give lip service) that being able to be objective is virtuous and often important. Even the ones who are rubbish at actually being so in real life.
And of course it's entirely possible to be blatantly one-sided about capital punishment, but still want to hear both sides of the story when your kids are having an argument.
And of course it's also entirely possible to realise you should be objective, even if that's more difficult and disturbing and less satisfying. You can just grit your teeth and tell your need for one-sidedness to shut up and let you think properly.
True, though we're still treating objectivity as fairness in arguments rather than even-handedness in truth inquiries. All these phrases refer to two sides, not more.
No, those phrases exist to help patch the flaw in human reasoning the parent describes. In fact it would be strange that we had those phrases and the corresponding flaw didn't exist.
— Ty Cobb
I wonder if he let his teammates know this at the time. They are unlikely to approve and then what would he do. I'd wager this was more about creating drama around him and his team than studying the opponent. I've done this kind of thing in online multiplayer contexts, and the feedback you receive from this is substantially more weighted to your own team than the opponents.
— Philosophy Bro summarizing Wittgenstein's "On Certainty". (I'm not sure the summary is very true to the original but it's interesting nonetheless.)
If you doubt there is a hand, I'll use it to smush a banana on your face. If you end up looking ridiculous with banana on your face, then there was in fact a hand and my foundation is better than yours. If I end up looking ridiculous trying to grab a banana of doubtful existence with no hands, I promise to admit your foundation is better than mine. If we disagree on what happens, why am I even aware of your existence?
In grade school, I recall there being more than one occasion when I slapped a friend in the back of the head for such instructional purposes when he became too solipsistic. (this wouldn't disprove solipsism, of course, but it would imply a "masochistic solipsism", and it turned out he strongly preferred realism over that)
In hindsight I wonder why he remained such a steadfast friend, and now I wonder whether, if I had ever had a banana handy, that would have been the last straw.
People who are experiencing scepticism should have bananas smushed in their faces, is what you're saying? And apparently that's worth 12 upvotes.
It's a reasonably accurate translation of the spirit of the original into colorful English.
From Sid Meier's Alpha Centauri
--Dan Dennett, Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology
That's one of my favorite Dennett passages. A similarly great anthropological metaphor is his tale of the forest god Feenoman and the "Feenomanologists" who study this religion. I have not been able to find it online, but it is in the essay "Two approaches to mental images", in the same book.
– CEO Nwabudike Morgan in Alpha Centauri
I find it troubling how much I want to upvote you just beause you're quoting SMAC.
I finally wikipediaed this and see you are talking about a Sid Meier video game. I played Civilization once for about an hour (where I was amazed when my 10 year old consultant on the game told me I was an idiot for going democratic, that I would have had a much better military if I'd gone communist and then built a statue of liberty, or something like that). I have spent countless hours on Railroad Tycoon back before Steve Jobs got fired.
Do I want to get SMAC and risk ruining my life? Perhaps have myself lashed to a mast before I try it?
Is SMAC addictive?
SMAC is my favorite of the Civilization series for two reasons:
The first is that it's just a very well-made game- it has lots of features and internal mechanics which took Civilization over a decade to catch up to (and still doesn't do as well).
The second is that it starts at slightly-future tech, and proceeds to singularity. I find that way more satisfying than starting at agriculture and proceeding to slightly-future tech, partly because I like sci-fi more than I like history, and partly because it lets you consider more interesting questions.
For example, the seven factions in the game aren't split on racial lines, but on ideological lines: there are seven competing views for how society should be organized and what the future should look like, and each of them has benefits and penalties that are the reasonable consequences of their focuses.
SMAC is deeply flawed for three reasons:
The AI is over a decade old, and so it's difficult to be challenged once you know how the game works. (This was also before they had figured out a good way to hamstring ICS, and so ICS is the dominant yet unfun strategy.)
The multiplayer code is over a decade old, and so not only are the AI difficult to play against in a fun manner, other people are difficult to play against for frustrating technical reasons.
The factions are tremendously unbalanced. While this is a neat statement about social organization- no, fundamentalism is a worse idea than an open society, unless you want to rule over a world of ash- it makes it a somewhat worse game, because single or multiplayer games are tainted by the tier rankings. Similarly, in single-player games you are always playing with the same seven factions, unlike in Civ games where you're able to play with a varied host (and as many or as few opponents as you want).
It is worthwhile to see the whole tech tree a few times; it is worthwhile to learn how the game works; it is possible to nod contentedly and walk away from SMAC, saying "I am done and this was a good experience."
It's also possible to play it for hundreds of hours (I certainly did), and it's the sort of game that I dust off every few years to play a game of. I would recommend playing it, but I would also recommend lashing yourself to a mast if there's something else you need to get done.
This is making me feel old. Me and a few college mates had a SMAC multiplayer game running for the better part of a year. If someone told me now that I could have a multiplayer game experience by taking my turn, zipping up the game file and emailing it to the next person in the cycle, I would laugh in their face.
Alien crossfire added 7 more civilizations, two of which are even more imbalanced than University. Which I wasn't sure was possible.
Right- I tended to play SMAC instead of SMACX because of the balance issues (or, at least, play it with just the original 7 because it did add new buildings and secret projects) and the new 7 had weird divisions. The Corporation and the University seem like natural divides- but, say, the Angels were just odd ("We're super hackers!" "Wouldn't that make sense for a gang inside another civilization, rather than a full civilization?").
It's also worth noting that the game allows for creating custom factions... the faction definitions are just parameters in a text file. So one can self-medicate the balance issues if desired.
Yeah, I tend to agree. My favorite mix is playing as University, with the Gaians, Peacekeepers, Cybernetic, Planet Cult, and Believers, with one of the progenitor factions to make things interesting.
SMAC is the crown jewel of the series, if you ask me. The expansion, Alien Crossfire is almost impossible to find legally though, and adds a lot to the game.
Is it addictive? I don't know, largely because it's difficult to specify what is "addictive" and what isn't. The best answer I can give you is yes, in bursts. I'll play it for eight hours in a row one day and then not touch it for a month.
I got the original SMAC and SMAX in one set on Amazon a few years ago.
A quick google reveals it's still available. Less than $5.
That's good. I heard somewhere it was really rare. Guess it's not.
I don't know about "addictive", but I can tell you that playing SMAC with 5 to 7 human players, and no AIs, will definitely have a... transformative... effect on your life. You will be amazed at how quickly things go from
to
Trust no one.
I've successfully played diplomacy games with friends without it ruining any friendships.
Alpha Centauri is much more conducive to abject paranoia than Diplomacy, though -- at least, the way we played it. We would start a game by taking turns on the same machine, for the first 10 turns or so, during lunch. Then, we would go back to work, and take our turn on that machine when it came up (we'd VNC into it). This way, the game doesn't disturb our actual work too much, and each player can take as long to micromanage his cities as he wants.
Thus, all the player-to-player interaction takes place on back channels -- through email, or clandestine meetings. This fact, combined with the knowledge that one tech advance, or one airstrike at the right time, could shift the entire balance of power, results in truly Cold War-grade levels of paranoia. It is an exhilarating experience, in a way.
I should probably mention that no relationships were ruined by our games, either, as far as I can tell. A game is still only a game, after all.
The diplomacy games I'm referring to were also played one move a day.
Yes to all of those questions.
Yes.
I recently rediscovered it and realized how many quotes fit into LW memes. And apparently there was an expansion too. I never knew that until about a month ago.
Another amusing one from Alpha Centauri:
This actually seems wrong. Clicking "retry" seems to map to "make the same attempt, in the same way, and hope things go better". It's worth trying once or twice, but eventually you have to update towards the possibility that the strategy you're trying is fundamentally flawed, that it will never work, abort, and come at things from a completely different angle.
Doing the same thing over and over again in the hopes of eventually getting a different result is, I'm told, one definition of insanity.
It is also, in my experience, an important aspect of physical therapy.
I've never understood that saying. Most real life actions are practically speaking nondeterministic. I've often found it worthwhile to test each course of action 10 times and keep track of what fraction it worked (if the course of action is quick and easy to test).
Right, which is why sometimes you need help -- sometimes a domain expert tells you that yes, you might naively think that, having tried the same thing 25 times, you can reasonably give up, but that's not true in this case because of these biological mechanisms.
In lieu of (and in most cases in precedence over) biological mechanisms I would take testimony from the expert that, for example, "30 of the 50 people I have seen learn this took 30 or more attempts and I don't know of a better way to try than what you are doing".
If you really did the same thing in the same environment and expected a different result it would be insane, realistically I never expect the world to respond to my actions the same way twice so that saying holds about as much weight as any other truism.
-Marvin Minsky
Thinking of your brain (and yourself) like an instrument to played might be useful for instrumental rationality.
Commentary: Reading this made me realize that many religions genuinely are different from each other. Christianity is genuinely different from Judaism, Islam is genuinely different from Christianity, Hinduism is genuinely different from all three. It's religious people who are the same everywhere; not the same as each other, obviously, but drawn from the same distribution. Is this true of atheistic humanists? Of transhumanists? Could you devise an experiment to test whether it was so, would you bet on the results of that experiment? Will they say the same of LessWrongers, someday? And if so, what's the point?
Now that I think on it, though, there might be a case for scientists being drawn from a different distribution, or computer programmers, or for that matter science fiction fans (are those all the same distributions as each other, I wonder?). It's not really hopeless.
I don't think that the claim is really supported by the observations that he made in the article.
In Buddhism lying isn't as bad as it is in Christanity. Using violence is more accepted in Christian culture than in Buddnism. As a result the followers do act differently. They are less likely to use violence against him but more likely to lie to him.
Why do you think that people are the same everywhere? And what do you mean with "the same"?
How much of this difference can actually be attributed to the followers attempting to obey religious precepts, and how much is simply floating in the sea of cultural memes in the parts of the world where Buddhism and Christianity respectively happen to be common? Would you expect practicing Christians in Japan, Korea, China, or India (and who are ethnically Japanese, Korean, etc.) behave more like your model of "Buddhists" or "Christians"?
Religion is more than obeying general precepts. During the time my Catholic grandmother was in school she wanted to read some book. Before reading it she asked her priest to allow her to read it because it was on the Catholic census. Following the religion seriously and not reading anything that's on the census has an effect that goes beyond the general precepts.
A lot of Buddhists are vegetarians. A lot of Buddhists mediate. Those practices have effects.
Your question assumes that people in Japan can be either "Christians" or "Buddhists" but can't be both. Even when the Chrisitans in Malta pray to Allah you can't be Muslim and a Christian at the same time. There no similar problem with being a Zen Buddhist and being Christian at the same time.
I think that there a correlation but I'm not sure about the extend to which Far East Christians resemble Western Christians. Making a decision to convert to Christianity when you live in China has a lot of apsects that don't exist when someone who lives in a Christian town simply decides to stay Christian.
I'm not sure I understand your response. Let me restate what I was getting at above, in responding to this assertion:
This claim makes a prediction regarding the rates of lying and violence among "followers" of Buddhism and Christianity. But what counts as a data point for or against this claim depends on what could be meant by "the followers" of these religions. Two possible interpretations:
For instance, I consider myself an atheist, but I was raised in a Christian family and live in a society where Christianity is the predominant religious influence. I have read the Gospels (and most of the rest of the Bible); by contrast I have not read the Qur'an, the Tripitaka, the Vedas, or the Talmud. I don't pray, attend church, or listen to the teachings of priests or pastors.
By interpretation 1, I am not a Christian; and whether I happen to lie or do violence would not count for or against the claim above. (It would also not count regarding Buddhism; although I've done Zen meditation more recently than I've done Christian worship ...) By interpretation 2, my cultural background counts me as a Christian; and my tendencies to lie or do violence would count for or against the claim above.
So, I'm asking: What would count as evidence for or against the claim regarding the rate of lying and violence among Christians and Buddhists?
That's evidence that the religion does not change people too much.
Which might be a good thing. Religious cults do change people. An average Scientologist does not behave the same way as an average Christian. You could measure the influence of the religion by measuring how the distribution of personalities changes.
On the other hand, let's not reverse stupidity here. Changing personality is generally a bad thing, but that is not necessary, just very probable.
It's also evidence that religion may change people in the same way regardless of details.
I don't his comment about Buddhist people being not different is even true. They are, for example, on the average, less violent than Muslims. They're simply not different to the extent he expected them to be.
If LW-rationality goes mainstream, it's followers will then be drawn from the same distribution.
<pseudo-math> You could define equivalence relations on the set of religious people (RP) and the set of atheistic humanists (AH). In most cases, the people in the sets only interact with (or at least influenced by) other members of the same or similar sets. Turn these interactions into operations on members of the set (a,b in RP, a*b = "a makes b feel awkward/scared/unhappy around a" or maybe something based on social relationships between members). These operations would create new "people" whose characteristics are similar to that of the person who has been molded by the defined social interaction(s).
Starting from a certain subset of RP, these operations could possibly generate the entire set of members (i.e a*b = c in RP, where c has the equivalent disposition as someone who has interacted with b under some applicable equivalence relation). Do the same for AH (using the same equivalence relation), and compare the structures. Under different types of interactions between members, this could reveal some interesting group-theoretical properties. Maybe there is a generating set for RP and not for AH if we keep the equivalence relations from getting too specific. </pseudo-math>
I guess what I'm getting at is that the structural elements of a certain set of people could tell us something about the distribution that the set was pulled from, or even invalidate the need to look at the distribution at all. Maybe the structure is even more important; these sets could pull from the same distribution, but the ideologies that formed these sets could result in drastically different results from operations (social interactions or relationships) between members of the set. Or we could see if only the generating members of the set were pulled from the same distribution, but the social interactions between them created a set member not from the original distribution, resulting in the set having to pull from that distribution also.
Anyway, this is probably not coherent or useful at all, but if nothing else it did lead me to the work of Harrison White on mathematical sociology:
This was particularly interesting:
-Daniel Kahneman, winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics
– Bill Maher, Real Time with Bill Maher, 6/8/2012
video article
(An important lesson, but I wonder if it's wise to teach it in the context of politics. Among other things, I worry that the messages "boo religion!", "yay updating on evidence!", "boo religious conservatives!", "yay pointing out my enemies are inferior to me!", "yay rationality!", "yay my side for being comparatively rational!", &c. will become mixed up and seen as constituting a natural category even if they objectively shouldn't be. (Related.))
Sure. But if I handle snakes to prove they won't bite me because God is real, and they don't bite me -- you do the math.
More seriously, though: the sentiment expressed in the quote is flawed, IMHO. Evidence isn't always symmetrical. Any particular transitional fossil is reasonable evidence for evolution; not finding a particular transitional fossil isn't strong evidence against it. A person perjuring themselves once is strong evidence against their honesty; a person once declining to perjure themselves is not strong evidence in favour of their honesty; et cetera.
I think this might have something to do with the prior, actually: The stronger your prior probability, the less evidence it should take to drastically reduce it.
Edit: Nope, that last conclusion is wrong. Never mind.
Right. Sensitivity does not equal specificity. Maher makes the mistake of assuming the rate of false positives and false negatives for the 'snakebite test for god' are equal. The transitional fossil test for evolution and the perjury test for honesty both have high false negative rates and low false positive rates.
Strictly speaking, the bible says of Jesus's followers "they will pick up serpents." It doesn't say "they will pick up serpents and not get bitten."
Of course, it does also say they can drink deadly poison without being harmed.
As it happens, I am related to and share my last name with this guy.
It is promised that "these signs will follow those who believe". So if they do bite you, then God is still real, but you didn't have enough faith.
Just doing this.
Why does this have 12 upvotes? The fact that this is slightly funny and for our "side" doesn't make it good logic. We've no reason to think snakebites and deities ought to be correlated at all. Reversed stupidity is not intelligence and all that. This ought to be below the visibility threshold.
But if you do think that snakebites and deities are correlated, then the correlation has to run both ways.
I didn't upvote since it's more politics than rationality, but there is a useful lesson there.
--John Stuart Mill (1854).
Peter Singer
Reminds me a little of Avicenna.
-- Clay Shirky
From the same page:
This gives me a new perspective on human insanity, or more positively, on how much relatively low-hanging fruit is out there.
This seems ridiculously low. That's an average of less than one minute per person worldwide.
Most people don't contribute to Wikipedia.
I think I've spent about a minute contributing to Wikipedia - and I'm one of those rare humans with access to a computer and clean water.
EDIT: Wait, including talk pages... probably several minutes.
--Steve Pavlina
Or, because running into heavy objects is a good intuition pump:
I think this was in a book by James P. Hogan, but a bit of Googling only reveals one or two other people quoting it but not remembering where it came from.
– Chairman Sheng-ji Yang in Alpha Centauri
While this is in some sense true, it doesn't add up to normality; it is an excuse for avoiding the actual moral issues. Humans are chemical processes; humans are morally significant; therefore at least some chemical processes have moral significance even if we don't, currently, understand how it arises, and you cannot dismiss a moral question by saying "Chemistry!" any more than you can do so by saying "God says so!"
I don't think it's an excuse - it's an aside from the rest of the quote. If you take out that sentence, the quote still makes sense. I think the moral question (from a consequentialist point of view, at least) is put aside when he assumes (accurately, in my opinion) that the tool is "useful". It's usefulness to humans is all that matters, which is his point.
In-game, Yang does view it as an excuse, though, because he's more or less a totalitarian, nihilistic sociopath.
"It is every citizen's final duty to step into the Tanks, and become one with all the people."
-- Recycling Tanks, Chairman Sheng-ji Yang, Alpha Centauri
Great quote, especially the last line should be emphasised. Awesome audio of Yang quotes. The comments are also surprisingly entertaining and interesting especially consider this is on YouTube.
...
...
...
-- Chairman Sheng-ji Yang, "Essays on Mind and Matter"
This argument may have influenced my thoughts several years later.
I love the Alpha Centauri quotes, the game probably infected me with lost of the memes that made LW appealing. For the longest time I couldn't see any virtue or weirdtopia in the Yang's Human Hive society, but I eventually came to saw the dystopian possibilities of it are no greater than that those of the other factions. Also in the context of the difficulty of a positive singularity (transcendence in the game) it has pragmatic arguments in its favour.
Susan: Oh that's just --
Death of Rats: WHAT DO YOU MEAN, 'JUST'?
--Terry Pratchett, Hogfather, tweaked for greater generality
In the original, Susan finishes her line with "an old story", but by having DoR cut her off she could just as easily have said "chemistry" or "data" or something like that.
Technically, he just said SQUEAK. Which is even more general.
Lineage has been considered sacred since before it was known what chemicals made it up - think royal families, horror at the idea of racial intermixing, etc. And I don't see why that should change because we know what it's made of - for other reasons maybe, but not that.
--Prime Function Aki Zeta-5, Sid Meier's Alpha Centauri
--Titus Livius
From Paleohacks.
It seems like the author is defying the common usage without a reason here. The common usage of edible is "safe to eat", or more precisely "able to be eaten without killing you", and I don't see what use redefining it to mean "able to be swallowed" is. It just seems like a trite, definitional argument that is primarily about status.
I agree with the sense of your comment but wish to nitpick - I think "nontoxic" means you can eat it without it killing you. Crayons fit this definition, but are not properly called "edible"; many flowers can be eaten without killing you but "edible flowers" are the ones you might actually want to eat on purpose. "Edible" is narrower.
Nonetheless, the sentiment "You can do X, but only once" seems broadly useful.
Can you explain how so? This does not seem obvious to me. It seems broadly true, but not broadly useful. (And I'm not really sure what you mean by useful anyway.)
My model of Eliezer says: "You can launch AGI, but only once."
I think I get it. If you have a big weapon of doom that will ruin everything, it's not useless; you can use it when you're absolutely desperate. So options that sound completely stupid are worth looking at when you need a last resort.
Having a scary desperate option, along with clear, publicly-known criteria which will trigger it, can prevent things from deteriorating to the point where you'll be tempted to use that desperate option. A honeybee will die if it stings you, but it will sting you if it feels too threatened, so people try to avoid antagonizing honeybees, and the bees don't end up dead because people didn't antagonize them.
Related: Thomas Schelling's "Strategy of Conflict".
Just because you can do something doesn't mean the price for doing it is acceptable.
Just because the price for doing something is your own death (or consignment to non-volatile ROM) doesn't mean the price is unacceptable.
I take "All mushrooms are edible. But some of them you can eat only once." to be a useful warning, hopefully made more memorable by being framed as a joke.
Apart from the hilarious joke, this quote makes the point that "will kill you" is not actually the same as impossible to eat, which more generally generally points out that impossible is often used in place of "really bad idea."
I read edible as a synonym for eatable. Poisonous mushrooms: edible. rocks, not edible. That's how that word is attatched in my head. I assume you read it as non-poisonous/fit to eat so it feels like a crass and overt redefinition. If the guy who wrote that reads that word the same way I assume you do it's a really cheap joke. If he doesn't the quote makes a lot of sense.
Sure. It's really an amusing play on words more than a rationality quote.
You and Alicorn are confusing denotation and connotation here. "Edible" simply means "able to be eaten"; it is used instead of "eatable", because the latter is for some reason not considered a "standard" or "legitimate" word. As such, it possesses exactly the same semantics as "eatable" would; in fact, a sufficiently supercilious English teacher will correct you to "edible" if you say "eatable". (Similarly "legible" instead of "readable", although "readable" seems to be increasingly accepted these days.)
Yes, it's true that people only usually apply the word to a more restricted subset of things than those which won't kill the eater; but such a behavioral tendency should not be confused with the actual semantics of the word.
The sense of the quote is exactly the same as if it had been:
In this case, it would hardly be legitimate to complain that "can be eaten" means "safe to be eaten". The fact is that the phrase is ambiguous, and the quote is a play on that ambiguity. Likewise in its original form, with "edible".
You've just provided a reasonable first-approximation analysis of wit!
Something "illegible" cannot have its component characters distinguished or identified. Something that is merely "unreadable" might just have ridiculously convoluted syntax or something.
Of course 'edible' does literally mean 'can be eaten', and equally of course, it is normally interpreted as 'fit to be eaten'. That's why paleohacks writes it that way. It's a joke!
When did this turn into the jokes thread?
If you're not having fun, why bother?
The standard definition of edible is fit to be eaten, not "able to be eaten".
Indeed. Given people like Monsieur Mangetout or disorders like pica, it's hard to see why we would even bother using the word 'edible' if it didn't mean fit to be eaten.
I've seen a distinction being made between “legible” applying to typography etc. and “readable” applying to grammar etc., so that a über-complicated technical text typeset in LaTeX would be legible but not readable, and a story for children written in an awful handwriting would be readable but not legible.
To claim that the actual semantics of a word can be defined by anything other than the behavioural tendencies of its users is, at best, highly controversial. Whatever you or I may think, "irregardless" just is a (near) synonym for "regardless" and, to judge from my own experience (and the majority of comments from native speakers on the thread) "edible" actually means "safe to eat" (although, as Alicorn says, it's a little bit more complicated than that).
Words mean exactly what people use them to mean - there is no higher authority (in English, at least, there isn't even a plausible candidate for a higher authority).
I'm advisedly ignoring the original context, but I'm curious about the idea that your behavioral tendencies in particular (and mine) with respect to the usage of "irregardless" don't affect the actual semantics of the word. At best, it seems that "irregardless" both is and is not a synonym for "regardless"... as well as both being and not being an antonym of it.
Unless only some usages count? Perhaps there's some kind of mechanism for extrapolating coherent semantics from the jumble of conflicting usages. Is it simple majoritarianism?
On the contrary, it's trivially true. If semantics depended exclusively on behavior patterns, then novel thoughts would not be expressible. The meaning of the word "yellow" does not logically depend solely on which yellow objects in the universe accidentally happen to have been labeled "yellow" by humans. It is entirely possible that, sitting on a planet somewhere in the Andromeda galaxy, is a yellow glekdoftx. Under the negation-of-my-theory (I'll try not to strawman you by saying "under your theory"), that would be impossible, because, due to the fact that humans have never previously described a glekdoftx as "yellow", the extension of that term does not include any glekdoftxes. Examples like this should suffice to demonstrate that semantic information does not just contain information about verbal behavior; it also contains information about logical relationships.
Guess what: I agree! Here, indeed, is my proof of this fact:
See how easy that was? And yet, here I am, dealing with a combinatorial explosion of hostile comments (and even downvotes), all because I dared to make a mildly nontrivial, ever-so-slightly inferentially distant point!
Insert exclamation of frustration here.
Yes, that thought is in my cache too. It doesn't address my point, which is more subtle.
It's reasonable to play with the expected meanings - but playing with the expected meanings in this case seems inconsistent with applying the label "Rationality Quote."
The quote is isomorphic to "Don't eat poisonous things - and some things are poisonous." That quote won't get upvotes if posted as a Rationality Quote - why should its equivalent?
Upvoted for this.
Reminds me of advice to people who want to know if they can sue someone: You can always sue. You just can't always expect to win.
Similarly:
The Seventy Maxims of Maximally Effective Mercenaries
I don't really see the point of either of these quotes.
Edit: Fixed. Thanks.
Its not air-droppable if there's no aircraft capable of lifting it!
Because Markdown renumbers numbered lists for you (making it easier for you to re-order them). Prevent it with a backslash before the period:
Are the maxims actually collected somewhere, or just referenced piecemeal in the comic?
Wikipedia has them.
-Chinese proverb
-- Thomas Sowell
Without having a date on the quote, it's hard to know exactly which three decades he's referring to, but we certainly seem to be in a better position regarding crime, housing and race relations than three decades ago. Education, probably not so much. This sounds to me like just a meta-contrarian longing for a return to the imagined "good old days".
He published that in 1993, which was about at the historic peak of violent crime in the US since 1960. The situation has improved a lot since then, but through the decades of 1960-1990, things looked pretty grim.
Good to know. Updated.
In the US at least the murder rates today are comparable to those of the 1960s only because of advances in trauma medicine.
Another important reason is that Americans have in the meantime embraced a lifestyle that would have struck earlier generations as incredibly paranoid siege mentality. (But which is completely understandable given the realities of the crime wave in the second half of the 20th century.)
Yet another reason is, of course, the draconian toughening of law enforcement and criminal penalties.
To clarify I was commenting on murder rates specifically in light of how trauma medicine has reduced the fraction of violent assaults that cause death. The factors you describe seem more along the lines of avoiding violent assault in the first place.
Controlling for improvements in trauma medicine, today's murder rate would be three times that of the 1960s, but the numbers would be better than the controlled for medicine 1990s numbers, which where five times 1960s levels.
In other words yes in the past 20 years Americans seem to be getting assaulted less and I think all of what you describe played a role. There is also the unfortunate problem of police sometimes having nasty incentives to misclassify crimes so some of the drop might be fictional.
Interesting. Where did you find this fact? Are there others like it there?
Murder and Medicine: The Lethality of Criminal Assault 1960-1999
To be clear there are other possible explanations for why violent assault as recorded has become less lethal, I just think this one is by far the most plausible.
I always think it's weird on cop shows and the like where an assaulter is in custody, the victim is in the hospital, and someone says "If he dies, you're in big trouble!". The criminal has already done whatever he did, and now somehow the severity of that doing rests with the competence of doctors.
Indeed, this seems to be an area where the legal system opts for a consequentialist approach; no surprise, then, that you would find it weird.
Um, I thought consequentialism was about evaluating the goodness of a course of action based on its probable consequences. If all it amounts to is hindsight then it's not much use for making ethical decisions about future actions. But I think that would be a straw man.
If you apply that crazy approach to consequentialism then I should be allowed to stand on a roof heaving bricks out into the street, and I'm not doing anything wrong unless and until one of them actually hits somebody.
Consequentialism is about deriving the ethical value of actions from their consequences. If someone thinks that the badness of an action is not determined until the consequences are known (like the police in Alicorn's example, or more to the pont the legal system they represent), then, necessarily, they are applying consequentialist moral intuitions, and not deontological moral intuitions.
No one said anything about "all it amounts to" being "hindsight". Your second paragraph is a straw man. While it is true that if someone believes that, they must be a consequentialist, it does not follow that a consequentialist must necessarily believe that.
I did say that it would be a straw man version of consequentialism. But I think I misunderstood what you were saying, or at least where your emphasis was, so I was kind of talking past you there :(
Thankfully in other areas the law is not concerned only with the contingent consequences of actions in general. Conspiracy to commit a crime is a crime. Attempted murder is a crime. Blackmail is a crime even if the victim refuses to be bullied and the blackmailer doesn't follow through on their threat. Kidnapping isn't considered to be babysitting if the victim is released unharmed.
So yeah. I think anyone could find it a little weird with or without calling it consequentialist.
It makes sense as an interrogation tactic, at any rate. If you're going for a confession and the person is distraught (either by what they did or by getting caught doing what they did) then it's a variation on "confess now or you'll get a worse sentence" with the added bonus that the timeline on the "confess" is both out of the interrogator's hands and it doesn't seem artifiical to the suspect.
Well, I suppose it's easier to prove that the victim could have died from the violence inflicted, if they do actually die.... but yeah, on the whole I agree.
If we're relying on doctor competence anyway here, we could see about getting official professional opinions on to what extent the injuries could have been lethal. Like retroactive triage.
I can see the logic of treating the severity of the crime as contingent on the actions (and perhaps intentions) of the criminal rather than the actual results, such that the fact that someone dies as a consequence of my battering them doesn't make it an act of murder.
But that also applies to shorter-window consequences, like when I shoot someone and they dodge to the left and the bullet hits them in the shoulder vs. I shoot someone, they dodge to the right, and the bullet hits them in the throat.
Treating the severity of the crime as contingent on consequences in the firing-a-gun case and contingent on actions in the battering-someone case would seem equally weird to me.
I've no idea of the data's provenance, but this table claims aggravated assault rates of 86/100,000 in 1960, 440/100,000 in 1993, and 252/100,000 in 2010 if I've got my math right. Murder rates are 5.08/100,000, 9.51/100,000, and 4.77/100,000 respectively. So the decline in murder since 1993 has outpaced the decline in assault (it also rose less steeply between '60 and '93), and trauma medicine's a plausible cause, but both declines are quite real: I wouldn't say the comparison to the 1960s is valid only because of medical improvements.
In any case, 1960 was more like fifty years ago. The per-100,000 aggravated assault rate in 1980 was just under 300 -- substantially over the 2010 numbers.
-- Thomas Sowell
Depending on the speaker, this quote has the potential for reinforcing substantial status quo bias, since taking it serious would dramatically reduce the frequency of truly attempting to speak truth to power. In other words, the quote seems tailor-made for justifying a generalized counter-argument to all speak-truth-to-power actions.
— Epimenides the Cretan
Niccolo Machiavelli
As well they should.
"A good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan executed next week."
General Patton
Obviously not true in all cases, but good advice for folks that have trouble getting things done despite being extremely intelligent (which this community has more than its fair share of).
John Ioannidis Why Most Published Research Findings Are False
Combining the two statements, many research findings are inaccurate measures of the prevailing bias.
I'd like to propose a new guideline for rationality quotes:
I enjoy the Alpha Centauri quotes, but I think posting 5 of them at once is going a bit overboard. It dominates the conversation. I'm fine with them all getting posted eventually. If they're good quotes, they can wait a couple months.
-- Brandon Watson
Rational politician:
Dilbert blog
I don't see the implied link between
... and
The fact that appealing to emotion works to get elected doesn't mean that elected politicians have any incentive one way or the other towards educating voters.
"Man's unfailing capacity to believe what he prefers to be true rather than what the evidence shows to be likely and possible has always astounded me. We long for a caring Universe which will save us from our childish mistakes, and in the face of mountains of evidence to the contrary we will pin all our hopes on the slimmest of doubts. God has not been proven not to exist, therefore he must exist." Academician Prokhor Zakharov, Alpha Centauri
– Commissioner Pravin Lal in Alpha Centauri
--From the introduction of Frederic Bastiat's "That Which is Seen, and That Which is Not Seen".
--"The Exposed Nest", Robert Frost; I googled some interpretation & discussions of it after reading, and was surprised to see I seem to be the only person to take it as a discussion of ethics.
-- Louis C.K.
–John Stuart Mill
Stephen Jay Gould
Arthur Schopenhauer
If that's how it works, then I suspect paranoia is the same thing, but with fear instead of desire.
Walter Isaacson, Einstein (quoting Aaron Bernstein's People's Books on Natural Science)
-- Bill Bryson
I think this is a bad principle to try to uphold. It means you have to understand the motivations behind all your principles, rather than just knowing that they are good principles. Which may be valuable for a small class of philosophers, but it's wasted effort for the general population.
Eric Beinhocker, The Origin of Wealth
-- Johann Wolfgang von Goethe
(re-posted on request.)
A perennial favourite: "If you torture the data enough, they will confess."
Often attributed to Ronald Coase, however this version was likely: "If you torture the data long enough, nature will confess" - perhaps implying a confession of truth. Another version, attributed to Paolo Magrassi: "If you torture the data enough, it will confess anything" - perhaps implying a confession of falsehood.
Personally, I find the ambiguous version of greater interest.
But if you torture them too long, they will confess falsehoods.
Interesting that you should prefer 'they', referring to the plural data; some versions of the aphorism also use this form - in retrospect, I prefer this form.
Torturing data is a common problem in my field (geophysics). With large but sparse datasets, data can be manipulated to mean almost anything. Normal procedure: first make a reasonable model for the given context; then make a measureable prediction based upon your model; then collect an appropriate dataset by 'tuning' your measuring apparatus to the model; then process your data in a standard way. In the case that that your model is not necessarily wrong; then make another measureable prediction based upon your model; collect another dataset by an independent experimental method; then ...
Even when following this procedure, models are often later found to be wildly erroneous; in other words, all of the experimental support for your model was dreamt up.
What I was thinking about when typing that was indeed a model by some geophysicists. They had found some kind of correlation between some function of solar activity and some function of seismic activity, but those functions were so unnatural-looking that I couldn't help thinking they tweaked the crap out of everything before getting a strong-enough result.
Kij Johnson, "The Man Who Bridged the Mist"
nominated for this year's Hugo
-- Thomas Sowell
Retracted, because it's a duplicate.
--Dr. Samuel Johnson; "The Life of Cowley", Lives of the English Poets (1781)
Susan B. Anthony
That is not always true.
Mortification of the flesh is at least a mixed case. Delicious kinky endorphins.
— Cormac McCarthy, No Country for Old Men
--- the character Chigurh, from the same novel and author.
It's almost like a koan for me - thinking about what in my history I have lost on a coin toss is a great jumping point into more introspection.
--The Ones Who Walk Toward Acre
--Seneca
– James Baldwin
The obscure language was likely due to the political context of the original; try substituting 'identified' for 'faced'.
Albert Einstein
(Quoted here but not in any LW quotes thread.)
Another Goethe quote, whilst on that tack; seems appropriate for disciples of GS.
-- Johann Wolfgang von Goethe
There's one (okay, more like 1.6) major problem with that quote, everything else being otherwise good:
The implicitly absolute categorization of "love" as "ideal", and the likewise-implicit (sneaky?) connotation that love is not as real as it is ideal or marriage as ideal as it is real.
Love is a very real thing. There are very real, natural, empirically-observable and testable things happening for whatever someone identifies as "love". However, further discussion is problematic, as "love" has become such a wide-reaching symbol that it becomes almost essential to specify just what interpretation, definition or sub-element of "love" we're talking about in most contexts if ambiguity is to be avoided.
The Last Psychiatrist, at http://thelastpsychiatrist.com/2011/11/judge_beats_his_daughter_for_b.html
Minor spoiler alert. (I think you know the drill.)
Game of Thrones (TV series), episode S01E06
(Rational agents should WIN.)
I like the quote, though really there's no particular reason to put it in rot13.
Minor point: The character's name is spelled Oebaa
...huh. Well wow. I'm going to remember that trick, that's clever. I had no idea you could do that here.
Also, noted, and fixed.
If those four people who downvoted this would enlighten me as to why this is a bad quote, that would be much appreciated.
I have a general policy of downvoting anything in rot13. No, I'm not going to work to read your comment!
Instead, put your spoiler text in the hover text of a fake url, like this
Syntax:
First, it is an appeal to consequences against honor. Worse, it is an appeal to fictional consequences.
Second, honor is not the opposite of rationality. Just making an argument against honor would not automatically be a rationality quote even if it was a good argument.
Third it was encrypted which made me waste more than three times the amount of time reading it that I would have if it was in plain text. When it turned out to be bad this made the disappointment much worse.
Jeez, you guys. You miss the point.
-
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-- Eliezer Yudkowsky
The point isn't that honour is bad, the point is (much more generally) that rational agents shouldn't follow the Rules and lose anyway, they should WIN. Whether the Rules are the rules of honour, of mainstream science or of traditional rationalism, or whatever, if they don't get you to win, find a way that does. And it's futile to complain about unfairness after you lost, or the guy you were rooting for did.
The only part that appeals to fictional consequences is the additional implication that oftentimes, an ounce of down-to-earth pragmatism beats any amount of lofty ideals if you need to actually achieve concrete goals.
I thought adding that "rational agents should win" reference would make the intended idea clear enough. But I'll take my own advice and just make a mental note to be clearer next time.
I dunno, I think all of that is overstated. I mean, sure, perfectly rational agents will always win, where "win" is defined as "achieving the best possible outcome under the circumstances."
But aspiring rationalists will sometimes lose, and therefore be forced to choose the lesser of two evils, and, in making that choice, may very rationally decide that the pain of not achieving your (stated, proactive) goal is easier to bear than the pain of transgressing your (implicit, background) code of morality.
And if by "win" you mean not "achieve the best possible outcome under the circumstances," but "achieve your stated, proactive goal," then no, rationalists won't and shouldn't always win. Sometimes rationalists will correctly note that the best possible outcome under the circumstances is to suffer a negative consequence in order to uphold an ideal. Sometimes your competitors are significantly more talented and better-equipped than you, and only a little less rational than you, such that you can't outwit your way to an honorable upset victory. If you value winning more than honor, fine, and if you value honor more than winning, fine, but don't prod yourself to cheat simply because you have some misguided sense that rationalists never lose.
EDIT: Anyone care to comment on the downvotes?
To the extent honor encodes valid ethical injunctions, ignoring it will cause you to loose in the long run.
Exactly-- compare Protected from Myself to "rationalists should win!".