Rationality Quotes July 2012
Here's the new thread for posting quotes, with the usual rules:
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- Do not quote comments/posts on LW/OB
- No more than 5 quotes per person per monthly thread, please.
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Posted to wrong month, moved.
An excerpt from Wise Man's Fear, by Patrick Rothfuss. Boxing is not safe.
Eric Beinhocker, The Origin of Wealth
This piques my curiosity on a certain point of interest: Has the argument "It's just an algorithm" ever been used as a counter to the claim that Evolution as a biological phenomenon should not be conflated with "Technological Evolution", "Corporate Evolution", "Personal Evolution", etc.?
More importantly, would there be an efficient way of defusing this potentially mind-killer-route argument without misleading the other party into thinking their assumption is correct when the inferential distance is too large for a technical explanation of the misuse of categories and labels (AKA They're not even aware of Lesswrong's existence and are not trained in scientific thought or rationality)?
Can you be more clear about what types of conflation you find problematic?
If I do a better job representing my clients, then when new lawyer hiring decisions are made, I expect to receive additional clients. Do you feel it is unclear to call that natural selection, or evolution?
I agree that using "evolution" as a synonym for change (i.e. Personal Evolution vs. Personal Self-Improvement) is problematic, but I'm not sure that the quote under discussion helps that issue.
I can certainly try to!
Well, I do find problematic any types of conflation that lead to incorrect assumptions and unreasonable predictions, but that's a little unclear too. In general day-to-day interactions, the most common problematic is where someone with whom I'm discussing will know of "darwinian evolution" and, of course, the phrase "Survival of the fittest!", but will have no technical understanding of the actual algorithm.
Thus, what they see is that when a species lives where there are a lot of large, tough, and highly nutricious hard-shelled nuts, that species will gradually get longer beaks or stronger claws to pierce through the shell and get at the tasty bits. They don't see how all kinds of other possible variations also get tried, and get rejected because they die and the ones more adapted keep reproducing. Thus, in their model, it's as if the entire membership of the species suddenly started growing longer beaks. The approximate generalization is fairly accurate on evolutionary timescales, but misrepresents the cause of the change, which is where things start going wrong.
They then translate it to being the same in, say, better lawyers, to steal your example. The misunderstanding often mixes with hindsight bias, in my experience, to produce beliefs that lawyers who fail to survive in a fictive environment where clients like cookie-bribes are incompetent by property of being unable to evolve and adapt. Those lawyers were clearly incompetent. It's simple Evolution theory that you should be more adapted and provide cookie-bribes to your clients if the environment is like that. That was obvious.
Beyond this, however, I now notice that something is wrong because I'm unable to clarify the exact issue further, which suggests that I may mentally be myself wrongly unifying or inferencing several things in my mental model and in my memory of related events. Perhaps if I re-read (once I find it) the article by Eliezer that talked about something similar, I might clarify my thoughts. I've had no luck finding it so far, however.
EDIT: With a bit of self-reviewing, I've noticed that that last paragraph above somewhat feels like an applause light. It was an obvious statement where the opposite is clearly not what we want here. I'm also gradually updating towards the idea that the initial spark to my question was in fact either a cached idea or an error in belief propagation; I felt like I knew that there were cases where "such conflations" were problematic, and so I skipped over that part to go directly to asking the question. I knew that I knew, so I didn't bother to verify the low-level knowledge, but the low-level knowledge may not have been there and I might have failed to update the meta-knowledge. I shall allocate more brainwork on this after I've eaten and made myself more apt to think clearly.
--"The Exposed Nest", Robert Frost; I googled some interpretation & discussions of it after reading, and was surprised to see I seem to be the only person to take it as a discussion of ethics.
– James Baldwin
The obscure language was likely due to the political context of the original; try substituting 'identified' for 'faced'.
Or acknowledged, or accepted. I don't see facing an issue as obscure language, but this is a good aphorism. Upvoted.
Another Goethe quote, whilst on that tack; seems appropriate for disciples of GS.
-- Johann Wolfgang von Goethe
There's one (okay, more like 1.6) major problem with that quote, everything else being otherwise good:
The implicitly absolute categorization of "love" as "ideal", and the likewise-implicit (sneaky?) connotation that love is not as real as it is ideal or marriage as ideal as it is real.
Love is a very real thing. There are very real, natural, empirically-observable and testable things happening for whatever someone identifies as "love". However, further discussion is problematic, as "love" has become such a wide-reaching symbol that it becomes almost essential to specify just what interpretation, definition or sub-element of "love" we're talking about in most contexts if ambiguity is to be avoided.
Goethe is writing in a time influenced by German Romanticism (for which he was partly guilty); it would not be amiss if one were to capitalize love there as 'Love' - an abstraction, not some empirical neural correlates.
I'm not quite sure what this abstraction would even correspond to. In fact, when I ask myself what abstract meaning 'Love' could possibly have, I find myself confused. It seems there might be some 'Love' somewhere that feels like it is the ideal, abstract 'Love', but no matter where I search I cannot find it on my map.
I'd like it if you could help me map this "abstract ideal" in my conceptspace map, if that's possible.
When mapping labels (symbols) to their underlying concepts, look for the distinction, not the concept. Distinctions divide a particular perspective of the map; each side of the distinction being marked with a label. In early Greek philosophy the opposites were: love and strife (see empedocles.)
(An abstraction corresponds to a class of distinctions, where each particular distinction of the class, corresponds to another abstraction.)
Oh! That makes a lot more sense. It doesn't seem like the most reliable technique, but this particular term is now a lot clearer. Thanks!
Of course, this seems to me like 'Love' is then merely a general "Interface Method", to be implemented depending on the Class in whatever manner, in context, will go against strife and/or promote well-being of cared-for others.
Which is indeed not something real, but a simple part of a larger utility function, in a sense.
A good resource on distinctions (if you are not yet aware of it), is George Spencer-Brown's Laws of Form. These ideas are being further explored (Bricken, Awbrey), and various resources on boundary logic and differential logic, are now available on the web.
I'm not really sure Laws of Form is a good resource, and I'm not sure it's good at all. A crazy philosophy acquaintance of mine recommended it, so I read it, and couldn't make very much of it (although I was disturbed that the author apparently thought he had proved the four-color theorem?). Searching, I got the impression that one could say of the book 'what was good in it was not original, and what was original was not good'; later I came across a post by a Haskeller/mathematician I respect implementing it in Haskell which concluded much the same thing:
It's not worth trying to understand beyond Goethe having fun at some idealists' expense. I took a course on Romanticism, and came out with little better understanding than you have now.
-- Johann Wolfgang von Goethe
(re-posted on request.)
-- Johann Wolfgang von Goethe
That sounds incredibly deep. (By which I mean it is bullshit.)
For some reason, this thread reminds me of this Simpsons quote:
"The following tale of alien encounters is true. And by true, I mean false. It's all lies. But they're entertaining lies, and in the end, isn't that the real truth?"
Upvoted for correct usage of a technical term. :-)
My favourite technical term out of all the technical terms!
Not necessarily deep; a couple of concrete interpretations:
There is often much hidden wisdom in interpretation of aphorisms, which perhaps explains my preference for the poetic turn of phrase.
No, there are intentionally vague deep sounding comments to which wisdom can be associated. You've just given multiple meanings to the same words. Those other meanings may be useful but the words themselves are nonsense.
That pretty much describes any proposition. If you wish, substitute the word 'noise' for the word 'symbol, then the paragraph describes an utterance.
There is a good resource on semiotics here.
No it doesn't. Not all propositions are intentionally vague and deep sounding.
Were I inclined to substitute in 'noise' it would be as a contrast to 'signal'.
-- Johann Wolfgang von Goethe
This is an excellent quote and belongs at the top level.
(I downvoted it here because the point you are trying to make by replying with it is approximately backwards. An intended insult which would make more sense as a compliment.)
And there you have it: symbols (or strings of symbols) have different sense in different contexts.
One of the contexts in which I found this aphorism insightful, was in certain interpretations of quantum physics.
I think it is intended to mean "If you want to accomplish impractical things, work on practical subtasks."
I don't see what's wrong with that.
That's an excellent quote. Let's find an impressive external source who says that and quote them!
Or, failing that, pick an impressive external source and ask them to write back to you saying that, so you can subsequently quote it attributed to "Impressive Source (private communication)"
Excellent idea. I used to do this on certain assignments at times.
As a variant: Introduce some freeloader code in Watson to have it randomly blurt out quotes from a list of quotations sent to a specific email address each time it appears in public.
This gives you both the Impressive Source criterion and a public statement of the quote.
Niccolo Machiavelli
As well they should.
Stephen Jay Gould
Albert Einstein
(Quoted here but not in any LW quotes thread.)
Arthur Schopenhauer
If that's how it works, then I suspect paranoia is the same thing, but with fear instead of desire.
A perennial favourite: "If you torture the data enough, they will confess."
Often attributed to Ronald Coase, however this version was likely: "If you torture the data long enough, nature will confess" - perhaps implying a confession of truth. Another version, attributed to Paolo Magrassi: "If you torture the data enough, it will confess anything" - perhaps implying a confession of falsehood.
Personally, I find the ambiguous version of greater interest.
But if you torture them too long, they will confess falsehoods.
Interesting that you should prefer 'they', referring to the plural data; some versions of the aphorism also use this form - in retrospect, I prefer this form.
Torturing data is a common problem in my field (geophysics). With large but sparse datasets, data can be manipulated to mean almost anything. Normal procedure: first make a reasonable model for the given context; then make a measureable prediction based upon your model; then collect an appropriate dataset by 'tuning' your measuring apparatus to the model; then process your data in a standard way. In the case that that your model is not necessarily wrong; then make another measureable prediction based upon your model; collect another dataset by an independent experimental method; then ...
Even when following this procedure, models are often later found to be wildly erroneous; in other words, all of the experimental support for your model was dreamt up.
What I was thinking about when typing that was indeed a model by some geophysicists. They had found some kind of correlation between some function of solar activity and some function of seismic activity, but those functions were so unnatural-looking that I couldn't help thinking they tweaked the crap out of everything before getting a strong-enough result.
You were likely referring to some of the recent work of Vincent Courtillot. A video summarizing some of his work here.
The most interesting aspect of this work, is that Courtillot did not start out with any intention of finding correlations with climate; his field is geomagnetism. Only after noticing certain correlations between geomagnetic cycles and sun spot cycles, did suspected correlations with natural climate cycles become evident.
Walter Isaacson, Einstein (quoting Aaron Bernstein's People's Books on Natural Science)
The Last Psychiatrist, at http://thelastpsychiatrist.com/2011/11/judge_beats_his_daughter_for_b.html
"A good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan executed next week."
General Patton
Obviously not true in all cases, but good advice for folks that have trouble getting things done despite being extremely intelligent (which this community has more than its fair share of).
Consider Eisenhower:
Other humans must be interacted with in real-time. Consider a non-military analogy: a good comeback confidently issued now is better than a perfect comeback issued next week.
It also works for computing. Consider languages which have a REPL to those that don't: for many applications, good code executed now is better than perfect code executed next week. This is often because requirements change over time, and the future cannot be predicted- the customers won't know what module they want next until they've used the current module.
A fellow director is fond of saying, as she puts together rehearsal plans for the show she's about to direct, that while 95% of what she ends up doing in rehearsal is pulled out of her ass rather than planned, rehearsal plans are nevertheless an indispensable part of preparing her ass for rehearsals.
Dr Frank Mandel from Suspiria by Dario Argento
--Dan Dennett, Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology
That's one of my favorite Dennett passages. A similarly great anthropological metaphor is his tale of the forest god Feenoman and the "Feenomanologists" who study this religion. I have not been able to find it online, but it is in the essay "Two approaches to mental images", in the same book.
--From the introduction of Frederic Bastiat's "That Which is Seen, and That Which is Not Seen".
"Man's unfailing capacity to believe what he prefers to be true rather than what the evidence shows to be likely and possible has always astounded me. We long for a caring Universe which will save us from our childish mistakes, and in the face of mountains of evidence to the contrary we will pin all our hopes on the slimmest of doubts. God has not been proven not to exist, therefore he must exist." Academician Prokhor Zakharov, Alpha Centauri
Wasn't a temporary moratorium called on smac quotes recently? I have to admit this was one of my favourites from it though.
Oops. I didn't see anything about a moratorium.
Ah. I see what my mistake was now. It was just a recommendation by AngryParsley. It wasn't anything official. As I'm still something of a newbie here, I figured it was said by someone with a bit more clout.
Commentary: Reading this made me realize that many religions genuinely are different from each other. Christianity is genuinely different from Judaism, Islam is genuinely different from Christianity, Hinduism is genuinely different from all three. It's religious people who are the same everywhere; not the same as each other, obviously, but drawn from the same distribution. Is this true of atheistic humanists? Of transhumanists? Could you devise an experiment to test whether it was so, would you bet on the results of that experiment? Will they say the same of LessWrongers, someday? And if so, what's the point?
Now that I think on it, though, there might be a case for scientists being drawn from a different distribution, or computer programmers, or for that matter science fiction fans (are those all the same distributions as each other, I wonder?). It's not really hopeless.
I don't his comment about Buddhist people being not different is even true. They are, for example, on the average, less violent than Muslims. They're simply not different to the extent he expected them to be.
I don't think that the claim is really supported by the observations that he made in the article.
In Buddhism lying isn't as bad as it is in Christanity. Using violence is more accepted in Christian culture than in Buddnism. As a result the followers do act differently. They are less likely to use violence against him but more likely to lie to him.
Why do you think that people are the same everywhere? And what do you mean with "the same"?
How much of this difference can actually be attributed to the followers attempting to obey religious precepts, and how much is simply floating in the sea of cultural memes in the parts of the world where Buddhism and Christianity respectively happen to be common? Would you expect practicing Christians in Japan, Korea, China, or India (and who are ethnically Japanese, Korean, etc.) behave more like your model of "Buddhists" or "Christians"?
Religion is more than obeying general precepts. During the time my Catholic grandmother was in school she wanted to read some book. Before reading it she asked her priest to allow her to read it because it was on the Catholic census. Following the religion seriously and not reading anything that's on the census has an effect that goes beyond the general precepts.
A lot of Buddhists are vegetarians. A lot of Buddhists mediate. Those practices have effects.
Your question assumes that people in Japan can be either "Christians" or "Buddhists" but can't be both. Even when the Chrisitans in Malta pray to Allah you can't be Muslim and a Christian at the same time. There no similar problem with being a Zen Buddhist and being Christian at the same time.
I think that there a correlation but I'm not sure about the extend to which Far East Christians resemble Western Christians. Making a decision to convert to Christianity when you live in China has a lot of apsects that don't exist when someone who lives in a Christian town simply decides to stay Christian.
I'm not sure I understand your response. Let me restate what I was getting at above, in responding to this assertion:
This claim makes a prediction regarding the rates of lying and violence among "followers" of Buddhism and Christianity. But what counts as a data point for or against this claim depends on what could be meant by "the followers" of these religions. Two possible interpretations:
For instance, I consider myself an atheist, but I was raised in a Christian family and live in a society where Christianity is the predominant religious influence. I have read the Gospels (and most of the rest of the Bible); by contrast I have not read the Qur'an, the Tripitaka, the Vedas, or the Talmud. I don't pray, attend church, or listen to the teachings of priests or pastors.
By interpretation 1, I am not a Christian; and whether I happen to lie or do violence would not count for or against the claim above. (It would also not count regarding Buddhism; although I've done Zen meditation more recently than I've done Christian worship ...) By interpretation 2, my cultural background counts me as a Christian; and my tendencies to lie or do violence would count for or against the claim above.
So, I'm asking: What would count as evidence for or against the claim regarding the rate of lying and violence among Christians and Buddhists?
I don't think you understand what Buddhism happen to be. If I go into something rumored to be a Buddhist monastry and ask the inhibatans whether they attempt to live according to the precepts of Buddhism there a fairly good chance that the answer is no.
Attempting stuff means having attachment to it. Buddhism is about moving beyond such attachments.
What's my empiric claim?
log(Time spent in Buddhist rituals + X /Time spent in Christian rituals +X) correlates with log(Rate of lying Y / Rate of being violent + Y)
The formula is only supposed to give a general idea. There probably a better way to express the idea.
That's evidence that the religion does not change people too much.
Which might be a good thing. Religious cults do change people. An average Scientologist does not behave the same way as an average Christian. You could measure the influence of the religion by measuring how the distribution of personalities changes.
On the other hand, let's not reverse stupidity here. Changing personality is generally a bad thing, but that is not necessary, just very probable.
It's also evidence that religion may change people in the same way regardless of details.
If LW-rationality goes mainstream, it's followers will then be drawn from the same distribution.
I find it unlikely that we'll have to opportunity to observe this.
I think it's plausible that LW-rationality, or rather a third hand version of it, will go mainstream.
<pseudo-math> You could define equivalence relations on the set of religious people (RP) and the set of atheistic humanists (AH). In most cases, the people in the sets only interact with (or at least influenced by) other members of the same or similar sets. Turn these interactions into operations on members of the set (a,b in RP, a*b = "a makes b feel awkward/scared/unhappy around a" or maybe something based on social relationships between members). These operations would create new "people" whose characteristics are similar to that of the person who has been molded by the defined social interaction(s).
Starting from a certain subset of RP, these operations could possibly generate the entire set of members (i.e a*b = c in RP, where c has the equivalent disposition as someone who has interacted with b under some applicable equivalence relation). Do the same for AH (using the same equivalence relation), and compare the structures. Under different types of interactions between members, this could reveal some interesting group-theoretical properties. Maybe there is a generating set for RP and not for AH if we keep the equivalence relations from getting too specific. </pseudo-math>
I guess what I'm getting at is that the structural elements of a certain set of people could tell us something about the distribution that the set was pulled from, or even invalidate the need to look at the distribution at all. Maybe the structure is even more important; these sets could pull from the same distribution, but the ideologies that formed these sets could result in drastically different results from operations (social interactions or relationships) between members of the set. Or we could see if only the generating members of the set were pulled from the same distribution, but the social interactions between them created a set member not from the original distribution, resulting in the set having to pull from that distribution also.
Anyway, this is probably not coherent or useful at all, but if nothing else it did lead me to the work of Harrison White on mathematical sociology:
This was particularly interesting:
-Daniel Kahneman, winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics
-Chinese proverb
Minor spoiler alert. (I think you know the drill.)
Game of Thrones (TV series), episode S01E06
(Rational agents should WIN.)
I like the quote, though really there's no particular reason to put it in rot13.
Minor point: The character's name is spelled Oebaa
...huh. Well wow. I'm going to remember that trick, that's clever. I had no idea you could do that here.
Also, noted, and fixed.
Upvoted. It's maybe not obvious from the quote alone, but in context, "honor" doesn't mean abstaining from deceit or manipulation -- it means following the largely impractical "rules" of dueling, when the bottom line is just who kills the other man.
If those four people who downvoted this would enlighten me as to why this is a bad quote, that would be much appreciated.
Would your opinion of the quote change if "fighting dishonorably" were replaced by "violating the Geneva convention"?
Perhaps. I'd say that should depend on the price for failure and how that compares to the violation. But point taken.
I have a general policy of downvoting anything in rot13. No, I'm not going to work to read your comment!
Instead, put your spoiler text in the hover text of a fake url, like this
Syntax:
Ah. I just picked up that technique from MinibearRex up there. I see you said it first, so kudos to you, then. It's a useful trick. I'll remember it.
...incidentally, if it's too much work to click the link, copy-paste the text and click the button, then you might save yourself even more time and effort by just scrolling on without bothering to click the thumbs-down button either. There are friendlier ways to express disapproval, too. But thanks for the advice, I'll try to be less of a bother next time.
This is kind of funny. I learned this trick from Grognor's comment when I saw it in the recent comments section. And then I decided to try it out when I noticed the misspelling, not realizing it was on the same post.
To the extent honor encodes valid ethical injunctions, ignoring it will cause you to loose in the long run.
Exactly-- compare Protected from Myself to "rationalists should win!".
First, it is an appeal to consequences against honor. Worse, it is an appeal to fictional consequences.
Second, honor is not the opposite of rationality. Just making an argument against honor would not automatically be a rationality quote even if it was a good argument.
Third it was encrypted which made me waste more than three times the amount of time reading it that I would have if it was in plain text. When it turned out to be bad this made the disappointment much worse.
P.S.: Regarding your third point, is there a less bothersome way to handle spoilers? I've only seen rot13 being used for that purpose here. I'd gladly make it less cumbersome to read if I could do so without risking diminishing the fun of other people who watch or intend to watch this series.
(Or maybe the annoyance caused by the encryption is worse than the risk of spoiling just one scene in case there's anyone reading this who watches the series and is a season and a half behind... I dunno. Neither course of action should be a big deal.)
Jeez, you guys. You miss the point.
-
-
-- Eliezer Yudkowsky
The point isn't that honour is bad, the point is (much more generally) that rational agents shouldn't follow the Rules and lose anyway, they should WIN. Whether the Rules are the rules of honour, of mainstream science or of traditional rationalism, or whatever, if they don't get you to win, find a way that does. And it's futile to complain about unfairness after you lost, or the guy you were rooting for did.
The only part that appeals to fictional consequences is the additional implication that oftentimes, an ounce of down-to-earth pragmatism beats any amount of lofty ideals if you need to actually achieve concrete goals.
I thought adding that "rational agents should win" reference would make the intended idea clear enough. But I'll take my own advice and just make a mental note to be clearer next time.
I dunno, I think all of that is overstated. I mean, sure, perfectly rational agents will always win, where "win" is defined as "achieving the best possible outcome under the circumstances."
But aspiring rationalists will sometimes lose, and therefore be forced to choose the lesser of two evils, and, in making that choice, may very rationally decide that the pain of not achieving your (stated, proactive) goal is easier to bear than the pain of transgressing your (implicit, background) code of morality.
And if by "win" you mean not "achieve the best possible outcome under the circumstances," but "achieve your stated, proactive goal," then no, rationalists won't and shouldn't always win. Sometimes rationalists will correctly note that the best possible outcome under the circumstances is to suffer a negative consequence in order to uphold an ideal. Sometimes your competitors are significantly more talented and better-equipped than you, and only a little less rational than you, such that you can't outwit your way to an honorable upset victory. If you value winning more than honor, fine, and if you value honor more than winning, fine, but don't prod yourself to cheat simply because you have some misguided sense that rationalists never lose.
EDIT: Anyone care to comment on the downvotes?
It could be more than four. Someone might have upvoted you.
Kij Johnson, "The Man Who Bridged the Mist"
nominated for this year's Hugo
-Rob DenBleyker
Ha! I was in a checkout at the mall and pulled up a science blog to see the developments on the Higgs-Boson. When I heard the 99.9999% proof I literally could not hold in my verbal amazement. Well no one around me (mother, sister, scared check-out girl) had the slightest clue what it was about and explaining only led to resentment and confusion (despite using an apologetic light tone i.e. leaving out the "God Particle" association.)
I'm betting on psychotic episodes. Any way to settle it?
Induce psychotic episodes in some people, explain Higgs boson to others, compare outcome religiosity.
Now I'm reminded of when my mother phoned me asking me “what's about this God particle they've found and everyone's talking about? does it prove that God exist, or that God doesn't exist?” and I told her not to mind journalists as they don't understand a thing and they're just trying to sell newspapers, and to look at the cover picture on my Facebook profile instead. (It shows the Lagrangian of the Standard Model before symmetry breaking.) She was a bit disappointed by that. ;-)
John Ioannidis Why Most Published Research Findings Are False
Combining the two statements, many research findings are inaccurate measures of the prevailing bias.
-- Clay Shirky
From the same page:
This gives me a new perspective on human insanity, or more positively, on how much relatively low-hanging fruit is out there.
This seems ridiculously low. That's an average of less than one minute per person worldwide.
I think I've spent about a minute contributing to Wikipedia - and I'm one of those rare humans with access to a computer and clean water.
EDIT: Wait, including talk pages... probably several minutes.
Most people don't contribute to Wikipedia.
-- Louis C.K.
-Marvin Minsky
Thinking of your brain (and yourself) like an instrument to played might be useful for instrumental rationality.
I'd like to propose a new guideline for rationality quotes:
I enjoy the Alpha Centauri quotes, but I think posting 5 of them at once is going a bit overboard. It dominates the conversation. I'm fine with them all getting posted eventually. If they're good quotes, they can wait a couple months.
-- Bill Bryson
I think this is a bad principle to try to uphold. It means you have to understand the motivations behind all your principles, rather than just knowing that they are good principles. Which may be valuable for a small class of philosophers, but it's wasted effort for the general population.
I doubt this is being put forward as a "principle to uphold" since that would be self-contradictory. It is probably aimed at the sorts of cases where someone might say "well I wouldn't have bothered but it was the principle of the thing".
And in most of those cases "the principle of the thing" refers to what we would call TDT/UDT-type considerations.
-- Thomas Sowell
Without having a date on the quote, it's hard to know exactly which three decades he's referring to, but we certainly seem to be in a better position regarding crime, housing and race relations than three decades ago. Education, probably not so much. This sounds to me like just a meta-contrarian longing for a return to the imagined "good old days".
He published that in 1993, which was about at the historic peak of violent crime in the US since 1960. The situation has improved a lot since then, but through the decades of 1960-1990, things looked pretty grim.
Good to know. Updated.
In the US at least the murder rates today are comparable to those of the 1960s only because of advances in trauma medicine.
I've no idea of the data's provenance, but this table claims aggravated assault rates of 86/100,000 in 1960, 440/100,000 in 1993, and 252/100,000 in 2010 if I've got my math right. Murder rates are 5.08/100,000, 9.51/100,000, and 4.77/100,000 respectively. So the decline in murder since 1993 has outpaced the decline in assault (it also rose less steeply between '60 and '93), and trauma medicine's a plausible cause, but both declines are quite real: I wouldn't say the comparison to the 1960s is valid only because of medical improvements.
In any case, 1960 was more like fifty years ago. The per-100,000 aggravated assault rate in 1980 was just under 300 -- substantially over the 2010 numbers.
Another important reason is that Americans have in the meantime embraced a lifestyle that would have struck earlier generations as incredibly paranoid siege mentality. (But which is completely understandable given the realities of the crime wave in the second half of the 20th century.)
Yet another reason is, of course, the draconian toughening of law enforcement and criminal penalties.
Which would, nevertheless, be considered absurdly lenient by the standards of any pre-20th century society.
I wouldn't call the present U.S. system "absurdly lenient." The system is bungling, inefficient, and operating under numerous absurd rules and perverse incentives imposed by ideology and politics. At the same time, it tries to compensate for this, wherever possible, by ever harsher and more pitiless severity. It also increasingly operates with the mentality and tactics of an armed force subduing a hostile population, severed from all normal human social relations.
The end result is a dysfunctional system, unable to reduce crime to a reasonable level and unable to ensure a tolerable level of public safety -- but if you're unlucky enough to attract its attention, guilty or innocent, "absurd leniency" is most definitely not what awaits you.
To clarify I was commenting on murder rates specifically in light of how trauma medicine has reduced the fraction of violent assaults that cause death. The factors you describe seem more along the lines of avoiding violent assault in the first place.
Controlling for improvements in trauma medicine, today's murder rate would be three times that of the 1960s, but the numbers would be better than the controlled for medicine 1990s numbers, which where five times 1960s levels.
In other words yes in the past 20 years Americans seem to be getting assaulted less and I think all of what you describe played a role. There is also the unfortunate problem of police sometimes having nasty incentives to misclassify crimes so some of the drop might be fictional.
Interesting. Where did you find this fact? Are there others like it there?
Murder and Medicine: The Lethality of Criminal Assault 1960-1999
To be clear there are other possible explanations for why violent assault as recorded has become less lethal, I just think this one is by far the most plausible.
I always think it's weird on cop shows and the like where an assaulter is in custody, the victim is in the hospital, and someone says "If he dies, you're in big trouble!". The criminal has already done whatever he did, and now somehow the severity of that doing rests with the competence of doctors.
It makes sense as an interrogation tactic, at any rate. If you're going for a confession and the person is distraught (either by what they did or by getting caught doing what they did) then it's a variation on "confess now or you'll get a worse sentence" with the added bonus that the timeline on the "confess" is both out of the interrogator's hands and it doesn't seem artifiical to the suspect.
Indeed, this seems to be an area where the legal system opts for a consequentialist approach; no surprise, then, that you would find it weird.
Um, I thought consequentialism was about evaluating the goodness of a course of action based on its probable consequences. If all it amounts to is hindsight then it's not much use for making ethical decisions about future actions. But I think that would be a straw man.
If you apply that crazy approach to consequentialism then I should be allowed to stand on a roof heaving bricks out into the street, and I'm not doing anything wrong unless and until one of them actually hits somebody.
Consequentialism is about deriving the ethical value of actions from their consequences. If someone thinks that the badness of an action is not determined until the consequences are known (like the police in Alicorn's example, or more to the pont the legal system they represent), then, necessarily, they are applying consequentialist moral intuitions, and not deontological moral intuitions.
No one said anything about "all it amounts to" being "hindsight". Your second paragraph is a straw man. While it is true that if someone believes that, they must be a consequentialist, it does not follow that a consequentialist must necessarily believe that.
I did say that it would be a straw man version of consequentialism. But I think I misunderstood what you were saying, or at least where your emphasis was, so I was kind of talking past you there :(
Thankfully in other areas the law is not concerned only with the contingent consequences of actions in general. Conspiracy to commit a crime is a crime. Attempted murder is a crime. Blackmail is a crime even if the victim refuses to be bullied and the blackmailer doesn't follow through on their threat. Kidnapping isn't considered to be babysitting if the victim is released unharmed.
So yeah. I think anyone could find it a little weird with or without calling it consequentialist.
Well, I suppose it's easier to prove that the victim could have died from the violence inflicted, if they do actually die.... but yeah, on the whole I agree.
If we're relying on doctor competence anyway here, we could see about getting official professional opinions on to what extent the injuries could have been lethal. Like retroactive triage.
I can see the logic of treating the severity of the crime as contingent on the actions (and perhaps intentions) of the criminal rather than the actual results, such that the fact that someone dies as a consequence of my battering them doesn't make it an act of murder.
But that also applies to shorter-window consequences, like when I shoot someone and they dodge to the left and the bullet hits them in the shoulder vs. I shoot someone, they dodge to the right, and the bullet hits them in the throat.
Treating the severity of the crime as contingent on consequences in the firing-a-gun case and contingent on actions in the battering-someone case would seem equally weird to me.
Downvoted for several obvious reasons. Seriously, just fucking THINK of the quote in this context a little bit!
Are you assuming that Thomas Sowell is defending, say, racial discrimination? If so, then you'd be wrong. He's talking about things like affirmative action which are intended to help disadvantaged groups, but which he contends have had the exact opposite effect.
If you meant something else, then please say it instead of assuming that it's obvious.
Oh, sorry! I did indeed assume just that (and some things about the general racial supremacist attitude of Western societies before decolonization, etc), while totally overlooking that he's an American and that they indeed have that curious issue. In fact... yeah, not to defend my brashness or anything, but mentioning "race relations" in that context so off-handedly is indeed bound to make people think of one as a Segregationist or something!
He also happens to be black, if that's relevant.
Can you expand on what additional information you believe you're providing when you "explain" a downvote in this way, rather than just downvoting silently?
From where I sit the "explanation" seems purely an attempt to shame Viliam_Bur in public, and by extension to shame anyone who might agree with that quote or think it at all compelling. Is that what you have in mind?
-- Thomas Sowell
Depending on the speaker, this quote has the potential for reinforcing substantial status quo bias, since taking it serious would dramatically reduce the frequency of truly attempting to speak truth to power. In other words, the quote seems tailor-made for justifying a generalized counter-argument to all speak-truth-to-power actions.
— Epimenides the Cretan
-- Thomas Sowell
Retracted, because it's a duplicate.
--Dr. Samuel Johnson; "The Life of Cowley", Lives of the English Poets (1781)
duplicate
Link to the original.
Robert H. Frank, 2011 September 12, speaking on Russ Roberts' EconTalk podcast. The rest of the quote can be found near 14:11 in the transcript. Robert H Frank was talking a lot about his book The Darwin Economy: Liberty, Competition, and the Common Good.
Interesting, and I would happily bet against that prediction.
--John Stuart Mill (1854).
--A.L. Kitselman
See also Paul Graham's essay Keep Your Identity Small, on the same subject.
From Sid Meier's Alpha Centauri
--Prime Function Aki Zeta-5, Sid Meier's Alpha Centauri
@Konkvistador you will enjoy They're Made Out Of Meat
I prefer the original version.
Susan B. Anthony
That is not always true.
Mortification of the flesh is at least a mixed case. Delicious kinky endorphins.
–John Stuart Mill
"'Whereof one cannot speak thereof be silent,' the seventh and final proposition of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, is to me the most beautiful but also the most errant. 'Whereof one cannot speak thereof write books, and music, and invent new and better terminology through mathematics and science,' something like that, is how I would put it. Or, if one is not predisposed to some such productivity, '. . . thereof look steadfastly and directly into it forever.'"
-- Daniel Kolak, comment on a post by Gordon Cornwall.
This misses the point that Wittgenstein made. Inventing better terminology doesn't help you if you don't have any information in the first place.
Something might have happened before the big bang. The big bang erased all information about what happened before the big bang. Therefore we shouldn't speak about what happened before the big bang.
Gods might exist or might not exist. We don't have any evidence to decide whether they exist. Therefore we should stop speaking about gods.
To come to a question that more central to this community: We have no way to decide through the scientific method whether the Many Worlds Hypothesis is true. According to Wittgenstein we should therefore be silent.
Inventing new terminology doesn't help with those issues.
I'm by no means an expert on this, but I was under the impression that Wittgenstein meant that language was an insufficient tool to express the "things we must pass over in silence", e.g. metaphysics, religion, ethics etc., but that he nevertheless believed that these were the only things worth talking about. My understanding was that he believed that language is only good for dealing with the world of hard facts and the natural sciences and, while we cannot use it to express certain things, some of these things might be "shown" by different means, in line with his comment that the unwritten part of the tractatus was the most important part.
This conclusion from one of hist lectures largely sums up how I would understand his view of many of the "things we must pass over in silence".
This is largely the way I have been led to interpret it through reading other people's interpretations and it is probably wrong, but I thought that I'd try and express it here, because I do have a strong desire to expand my knowledge of Wittgensteinian philosophy. One thing which I do think is quite likely though, is that Wittgenstein would consider any written "interpretation" of his work to ultimately be "nonsense" insofar as any written part of it is concerned.
I just noticed how poorly written part of my above comment was. I think I've fixed it now. I'm glad to see a positive response to it at least, since it shows that people care more about substance than the clarity of writing, which seems more than a little apt when talking about Wittgenstein. It also indicates that I haven't been entirely misled in my interpretation of a notoriously difficult philosopher.
As much as it might be fun to pretend that my strange writing style was intended as a way of reaching people with "similar thoughts" in a truly Wittgensteinian sense, it was not. It was a boring old mistype. I am nowhere near smart enough to pull that off.
IIRC, in "On Certainty" in particular, Wittgenstein had a lot to say about the role of language and how it is not primarily a mechanism for evaluating the truth-value of propositions but rather a mechanism for getting people to do things. In particular, I think he dismisses the entire enterprise of Cartesian doubt as just a game we play with language; arguing that statements like "There exists an external reality" and "There exists no external reality" simply don't mean anything.
So I'd be surprised if he were on board with language as a particularly useful tool for hard facts or natural sciences, either.
Admittedly, it's been like 20 years since I read it, and it's a decidedly gnomic book to begin with, and I'm no kind of expert on Wittgenstein. So take it with a pound of salt.
The Tractatus is a product of what is called the early or first Wittgenstein, while "On Certainty" belongs to his latter stage. By that time he had repudiated the emphasis of the Tractatus on logical correspondence with facts and switched to speaking of language games and practical uses. In both phases his position on "unspeakable" things like ethics and metaphysics was similar (roughly the one Danfly summarizes at the beginning of the parent quote).
-- Theodore Dalrymple, article in "Library of Law and Liberty".
It's strange that we have many phrases like "on the one/other hand", "pros and cons", and "both sides of the story", then.
No, those phrases exist to help patch the flaw in human reasoning the parent describes. In fact it would be strange that we had those phrases and the corresponding flaw didn't exist.
These phrases are mainly used in near mode, or when trying to induce near mode. The phenomenon described in the quote is a feature (or bug) of far mode.
Not wanting to take a principle to heart is not the same thing as denying that's the way things work, though. I think most people acknowledge (or at least give lip service) that being able to be objective is virtuous and often important. Even the ones who are rubbish at actually being so in real life.
And of course it's entirely possible to be blatantly one-sided about capital punishment, but still want to hear both sides of the story when your kids are having an argument.
And of course it's also entirely possible to realise you should be objective, even if that's more difficult and disturbing and less satisfying. You can just grit your teeth and tell your need for one-sidedness to shut up and let you think properly.