Less Wrong views on morality?

hankx7787

Do you believe in an objective morality capable of being scientifically investigated (a la Sam Harris *or others*), or are you a moral nihilist/relativist? There seems to be some division on this point. I would have thought Less Wrong to be well in the former camp.

Edit: There seems to be some confusion - when I say "an objective morality capable of being scientifically investigated (a la Sam Harris *or others*)" - I do NOT mean something like a "one true, universal, metaphysical morality for all mind-designs" like the Socratic/Platonic Form of Good or any such nonsense. I just mean something in reality that's mind-independent - in the sense that it is hard-wired, e.g. by evolution, and thus independent/prior to any later knowledge or cognitive content - and thus can be investigated scientifically. It is a definite "is" from which we can make true "ought" statements relative to that "is". See drethelin's comment and my analysis of Clippy.

That's a nice and unexpected answer, so I'll continue asking questions I have no clue about :-)

If metaethics doesn't influence paperclip maximization, then why do I need metaethics? Can we point out the precise difference between humans and paperclippers that gives humans the need for metaethics? Is it the fact that we're not logically omniscient about our own minds, or is it something deeper?

Is it the fact that we're not logically omniscient about our own minds, or is it something deeper?

Well, there's certainly that. Also, human algorithms for decision-making can feel different from simply looking up a utility - the algorithm can be something more like a "treasure map" for locating morality, looking out at the world in a way that can feel as if morality was a light shining from outside.

0TimS14y

Consider dealings with agents that have morals that conflict with your own. Obviously, major value conflicts preclude co-existence. Let's assume it is a minor conflict - Bob believes eating cow milk and beef at the same meal is immoral. It is possible to develop instrumental or terminal values to resolve how much you tolerate Bob's different value - without reference to any meta-ethical theory. But I think that meta-ethical considerations play a large role in how tolerance of value conflict is resolved - for some people, at least.

3Jack14y

Perhaps I misunderstood. There are definitely possible scenarios in which metaethics could matter to a paperclip maximizer. It's just that answering "what meta-ethics would the best paperclip maximizer have?" isn't any easier than answering "what is the ideal metaethics?". Varying an agent's goal structure doesn't change the question. That said, if you think humans are just like paperclip maximizers except they're trying to maximize something else than you're already 8/10ths of the way to moral anti-realism (Come! Take those last two steps the water is fine!). Of course it's also the case that meta-ethics probably matters more to humans than paperclip maximizers: In particular metaethics matters for humans because of individual moral uncertainty, group and individual moral change, differences in between individual moralities, and the overall complexity of our values. There are probably similar possible issues for paperclip maximizers-- like how should they resolve uncertainty over what counts as a paperclip or deal with agents that are ignorant of the ultimate value of paperclips-- and thinking about them pumps my anti-realist intuitions.

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Less Wrong views on morality?

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Less Wrong views on morality?

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