= 27d567bc2d48d9f40e9ccc20ea370b15)
ArisKatsaris comments on Interlude for Behavioral Economics - Less Wrong
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
= 783df68a0f980790206b9ea87794c5b6)
Loading…= b715d02e85f7b3b4ae65ca3d3e450868)
Subscribe to RSS Feed
Powered by Reddit
= f037147d6e6c911a85753b9abdedda8d)
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
Comments (49)
I'd be thinking that I'd like to do the honorable/right thing. There exist non-monetary costs in defecting; those include a sense of guilt. That's the difference to a True Prisoner's Dilemma, where you actually prefer defecting if you know the other person cooperated.
That last "if you know the other person cooperated" is unnecessary, in a True Prisoner's Dilemma each player prefers defecting in any circumstance.
Not quite: e.g. If you're playing True Prisoner's Dilemma against a copy of yourself, you prefer cooperating, because you know your choice and your copy's choice will be identical, but you don't know what the choice will be before you actually make it.
If you don't know for sure that they'll be identical, but there's some other logical connection that will e.g. make it 99% certain they'll be identical. (e.g. your copies were not created at that particular moment, but a month ago, and were allowed to read different random books in the meantime), then one would argue you're still better off preferring cooperation.
Given the context, I was assuming the scenario being discussed was one where the two players' decisions are independent, and where no one expects they may be playing against themselves.
You're right that the game changes if a player thinks that their choice influences (or, arguably, predicts) their opponent's choice.