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Giles comments on Interlude for Behavioral Economics - Less Wrong
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Does this mean that a significant fraction players actually prefer the (C, C) outcome to the (D, C) outcome? What would happen if you pretended the game was PD but if there was a (D, C) result you offered the defector a (secret) chance to change their move to C? Would a lot of them accept that offer?
Actually, I'm not sure whether the extra move needs to be secret or whether it can be announced in the original rules.
I may have to test that variant. I occasionally work Prisoner's Dilemma style situations in to my games, as it's a very easy way to learn about the players :)