Hmm the pre-commitment to ignore would depend on other agents and their pre-pre-commitment to ignore pre-commitments. It just goes recursive like Sherlock Holmes vs Moriarty, and when you go meta and try to look for 'limit' of recursion, it goes recursive again... i have a feeling that it is inherently a rock-paper-skissors situation where you can't cheat like this robot. (I.e. I would suggest, at that point, to try to make a bunch of proofs of impossibility to narrow expectations down somewhat).
It's not possible to coordinate in general against arbitrary opponents, like it's impossible to predict what an arbitrary program does, but it's advantageous for players to eventually coordinate their decisions (on some meta-level of precommitment). On one hand, players want to set prices their way, but on the other they want to close the trade eventually, and this tradeoff keeps the outcome from both extremes ("unfair" prices and impossibility of trade). Players have an incentive to setup some kind of Loebian cooperation (as in these posts), whi...
From the last thread:
Meta: