Jayson_Virissimo comments on Morality open thread - Less Wrong

6 Post author: Will_Newsome 08 July 2012 02:30PM

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Comment author: Jayson_Virissimo 09 July 2012 03:53:13AM *  3 points [-]

A common response (although, one I cannot find an example of via the search feature, blah) I have observed from Less Wrongers to the challenge of interpersonal utility comparison is the claim that "we do it all the time". I take this to mean that when we make decisions we often consider the preferences of our friends and family (and sometimes strangers or enemies) and that whatever is going on in our minds when we do this approximates interpersonal utility calculations (in some objective sense). This, to me, seems like legerdemain for basically this reason:

One stand restoring to utilitarianism its role of judging policy, is that interpersonal comparisons are obviously possible since we are making them all the time. Only if we denied "other minds" could we rule out comparisons between them. Everyday linguistic usage proves the logical legitimacy of such statements as "A is happier than B" (level-comparison) and, at a pinch, presumably also "A is happier than B but by less than B is happier than C" (difference-comparison). A degree of freedom is, however, left to interpretation, which vitiates this approach. For these everyday statements can, for all their form tells us, just as well be about facts (A is taller than B) as about opinions, tastes or both (A is more handsome than B). If the latter, it is no use linguistic usage telling us that interpersonal comparisons are "possible" (they do not grate on the ear), because they are not the comparisons utilitarianism needs to provide "scientific" support for policies. An equally crucial ambiguity surrounds the piece of linguistic testimony that tends to be invoked in direct support of redistributive policies: "a dollar makes more difference to B than to A." If the statement means that the incremental utility of a dollar to B is greater than it is to A, well and good. We have successfully compared amounts of utilities of two persons. If it means that a dollar affects B's utility more than A's, we have merely compared the relative change in B's utility ("it has been vastly augmented") and in A's ("it has not changed all that much"), without having said anything about B's utility-change being absolutely greater or smaller than A's (i.e. without demonstrating that the utilities of two persons are commensurate, capable of being expressed in terms of some common homogeneous "social" utility).

-Anthony de Jasay, The State

Comment author: bryjnar 09 July 2012 12:01:38PM *  1 point [-]

I think the point is to suggest that there may be a precise concept hiding in there somewhere.

Compare with "niceness". We say "Jim is nicer than Joe, but not as nice as James", and yet there's currently no prospect of a canonical unit of niceness. There are then two things we can say:

  • maybe if we really focus in on what people mean by "nice", and do lots of studies into what makes them think that people are nice, and think really hard, then we can come up with a precise concept of niceness that we can stick a unit on.
  • even if we can't do that, even if "niceness" is just irredeemably fuzzy, then perhaps it's still appropriate to treat our judgements of niceness as though they approximated some precise concept.

So we can either say: the science of niceness is coming; or the science of niceness is impossible, but we can pretend we're approximating to it for all intents and purposes.

I think something along these lines might be able to help out utilitarianism.

Comment author: Jayson_Virissimo 09 July 2012 12:36:38PM *  5 points [-]
  • maybe if we really focus in on what people mean by "nice", and do lots of studies into what makes them think that people are nice, and think really hard, then we can come up with a precise concept of niceness that we can stick a unit on.

Jasay addresses this very counterargument a few paragraphs later:

On the other hand, if they are to be understood as verifiable, refutable matters of fact, interpersonal comparability must mean that any difficulties we may have with adding up are technical and not conceptual; they are due to the inaccessibility, paucity or vagueness of the required information. The problem is how to get at and measure what goes on inside people's heads and not that the heads belong to different persons. Minimal, widely accessible information about Nero, Rome and fiddling, for example, is sufficient for concluding that, for a fact, there was no net gain of utility from the burning of Rome while Nero played the fiddle. Progressively richer, more precise information allows progressively more refined interpersonal findings. Thus we move forward from the non-addibility resulting from sheer lack of specific data to an at least quasi-cardinal utility and its at least partial interpersonal comparison. At least ostensibly, the contrast with proposals to ignore specificity and strip individuals of their differences, could not be more complete. The proposal here seems to be to start from admitted heterogeneity and approach homogeneity of individuals by capturing as many of their differences as possible in pairwise comparisons, as if we were comparing an apple and a pear first in terms of size, sugar content, acidity, colour, specific weight and so on through n separate comparisons of homogeneous attributes, leaving uncompared only residual ones which defy all common measure. Once we have found the n common attributes and performed the comparisons, we have n separate results. These must then be consolidated into a single result, the Comparison, by deciding their relative weights.

Would, however, the admission that this procedure for adding up utilities is intellectually coherent, suffice to make it acceptable for choosing policies? If the procedure were to be operated, a host of debatable issues would first have to be somehow (unanimously?) agreed by everybody whose utility gain or loss was liable to be compared in the operation. What distinguishing traits of each individual (income, education, health, job satisfaction, character, spouse's good or bad disposition, etc.) shall be pairwise compared to infer utility levels or utility differences? If some traits can only be subjectively assessed, rather than read off from Census Bureau statistics, who shall assess them? What weight shall be given to each characteristic in inferring utility, and will the same weight do for people of possibly quite different sensibilities? Whose values shall condition these judgements? If some "equitable" way were unanimously agreed for delegating powers for taking comparative readings and setting the weights, the delegate would either go insane, or would just produce whatever result looked right to his intuition.

The long and short of it is that objective and procedurally defined interpersonal comparisons of utility, even if they are modestly partial, are merely a roundabout route all the way back to irreducible arbitrariness, to be exercised by authority. At the end of the day, it is the intuition of the person making the comparison which decides, or there is no comparison.

I apologize for the excessive quotation length, but I couldn't think of a good chunk to cut.

Comment author: torekp 13 July 2012 01:17:10AM 2 points [-]

The exact same arguments could be leveled against intrapersonal utility comparisons. After all, a person's desires and tastes change over time, or even oscillate.

The answer to both "dilemmas" is the same: one can only get there from here. That is, each must use one's present weightings of the various dimensions of utility. In a democracy or an anarchy, these can then be discussed and bargained over to reach some reasonable trade-off between (e.g.) those who especially want to see their fellow citizens experience more pleasure and those who especially wish to see them exercise more autonomy.

Of course, this makes utilitarian arguments secondary to (e.g.) democratic process. But that's the way I like it.

Comment author: Jayson_Virissimo 13 July 2012 09:52:09AM *  2 points [-]

The exact same arguments could be leveled against intrapersonal utility comparisons. After all, a person's desires and tastes change over time, or even oscillate.

Not exactly, but I see what you mean. I agree that (at least seemingly) analogous arguments can be leveled against intrapersonal utility comparisons (with a similar level of inductive strength).

Of course, this makes utilitarian arguments secondary to (e.g.) democratic process. But that's the way I like it.

I would wager that you wouldn't be so pleased if your preferences differed significantly from the median voter's.

Comment author: bryjnar 09 July 2012 01:12:37PM 1 point [-]

That all sounds pretty fair! I don't think I made it clear but I'm fairly sceptical of that particular route myself: I just don't think our conception of "utility" is that coherent. Or to put it in Jasay's terms: I'm not sure we have coherent answers (as a species) to the question of how to weight stuff etc.

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