Speculation of sufficiently advanced future technologies is indistinguishable from magical thinking.
Unless there is scientific method in what you're doing, and unless you're producing something testable and testing it, you are certainly not in the reference class of scientists. Unless there is plenty of rigour, you are not in reference class of people using mathematical methods (even if you have formulas in your papers). Not up to grabs here either. Maybe the reference class is philosophers. If you wish, philosophers with PhD.
As they do tend to honestly make actual arguments rather than just try to manipulate for profit the people who already agree with core ideas, one can examine actual argumentation. Which is not very good. E.g. simulation argument of his looks watertight at first glance but is really reliant on assumption about physics (suppose MWI is correct, now the counting patently doesn't work for probabilities), and does not account for potentially enormous number of simulated beings that can easily tell their reality is simulated as the simulator cuts some corners. Typical example of philosophy, making arguments that seem true for mere lack of alternative propositions to made up assertions. You only spend time formalizing such stuff if you can't see that you are building false precision, making up far too many assumptions for the results to be meaningful in any way (in the field where intuition is unlikely to work, too). If you don't see that you are making a lot of extremely shaky assumptions when you are making a lot of extremely shaky assumptions, you'll be susceptible to generating false precision precisely as per Nick Szabo's article.
Their musings about singularity are in precise agreement with the hypothesis that at the current point in time it is early enough that the only people 'working' on this are those who for some reason fail to see when they aren't making progress. I'm pretty sure all this movement will look very silly in 100 years - there will be dangers they did not see and there won't be dangers they focused on.
suppose MWI is correct, now the counting patently doesn't work for probabilities
What is the correct counting for MWI, exactly?
does not account for potentially enormous number of simulated beings that can easily tell their reality is simulated as the simulator cuts some corners.
I think you are misunderstanding the SA, which is surprising since it's formally pretty simple.
The SA is a trilemma; finding evidence that strongly supports one leg of the trilemma is not a problem with the trilemma itself. It's just reasons for you to bite a particular bullet...
Nick Szabo on acting on extremely long odds with claimed high payoffs:
Beware of what I call Pascal's scams: movements or belief systems that ask you to hope for or worry about very improbable outcomes that could have very large positive or negative consequences. (The name comes of course from the infinite-reward Wager proposed by Pascal: these days the large-but-finite versions are far more pernicious). Naive expected value reasoning implies that they are worth the effort: if the odds are 1 in 1,000 that I could win $1 billion, and I am risk and time neutral, then I should expend up to nearly $1 million dollars worth of effort to gain this boon. The problems with these beliefs tend to be at least threefold, all stemming from the general uncertainty, i.e. the poor information or lack of information, from which we abstracted the low probability estimate in the first place: because in the messy real world the low probability estimate is almost always due to low or poor evidence rather than being a lottery with well-defined odds.
Nick clarifies in the comments that he is indeed talking about singularitarians, including his GMU colleague Robin Hanson. This post appears to revisit a comment on an earlier post:
In other words, just because one comes up with quasi-plausible catastrophic scenarios does not put the burden of proof on the skeptics to debunk them or else cough up substantial funds to supposedly combat these alleged threats.