JackV comments on [LINK] Using procedural memory to thwart "rubber-hose cryptanalysis" - Less Wrong
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I don't know if the idea works in general, but if it works as described I think it would still be useful even if it doesn't meet this objection. I don't forsee any authentication system which can distinguish between "user wants money" and "user has been blackmailed to say they want money as convincingly as possible and not to trigger any hidden panic buttons", but even if it doesn't, a password you can't tell someone would still be more secure because:
I think the "stress detector" idea is one that is unlikely to work unless someone works on it specifically to tell the difference between "hurried" and "coerced", but I don't think the system is useless because it doesn't solve every problem at once.
OTOH, there are downsides to being too secure: you're less likely to be kidnapped, but it's likely to be worse if you ARE.
Easier to avoid with basic instruction.
Enemy knows the system, they can copy the login system in your cell.
Indeed, for a recent, real world example, the improvement in systems to make cars harder to steal led directly to the rise of carjacking in the 1990s.