MileyCyrus comments on Imperfect Voting Systems - Less Wrong

34 Post author: Yvain 20 July 2012 12:07AM

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Comment author: MileyCyrus 20 July 2012 03:37:38AM 1 point [-]

You can solve the domination problem by just picking a vote at random, and having that vote be the deciding vote. So if 49% of people vote for Bush, and 49% vote for Gore, and 2% vote for Nader, then Bush, Gore and Nader have a 49, 49 and 2% chance of winning respectively. In this system, you can always vote for your favorite candidate without worrying about how electable they are.

Comment author: Alicorn 20 July 2012 03:50:12AM 10 points [-]

(one example of an unreasonable system that eliminates tactical voting is picking one ballot at random and determining the results based solely on its preferences; the precise text of the theorem rules out “nondeterministic or dictatorial” methods).

Comment author: MileyCyrus 20 July 2012 08:08:19AM 3 points [-]

That's what happens when you skim articles before work :P

Comment author: [deleted] 24 July 2012 05:14:26PM 2 points [-]

This. I used to be a prolific lesswrong contributor on another account until I realized that everything I wrote felt insufficiently edited and researched and I devolved into lurkerhood. It would be much easier posting here if I had not someone recieved the impression this was actually a high status site.