paper-machine comments on Work on Security Instead of Friendliness? - Less Wrong
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Comments (103)
What salary level is good enough evidence for you to consider someone clever?
Notice that your criteria for impressive cleverness excludes practically every graduate student -- the vast majority make next to nothing, have few "concrete" things to show off, etc.
Except the interview you quoted says none of that.
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This is substantially different from EY currently being a math prodigy.
In other words, he's no better than random chance, which is vastly different from "[thinking] he can do advanced math with little effort using some intuition." By the same logic, you'd accept P=NP trivially.
I don't understand. The base rate for Marcello being right is greater than 0.5.
Maybe EY meant that, on the occasions that Eliezer objected to the final result, he was correct to object half the time. So if Eliezer objected to just 1% of the derivations, on that 1% our confidence in the result of the black box would suddenly drop down to 50% from 99.5% or whatever.
Yes, but that's not "no better than random chance."
Sure. I was suggesting a way in which an objection which is itself only 50% correct could be useful, contra Dmytry.
Oh, right. The point remains that even a perfect Oracle isn't an efficient source of math proofs.
It's not criteria for cleverness, it is criteria for evidence when the prior is 0.0001 (for 1 in 10 000) . One can be clever at one in 7 billions level, and never having done anything of interest, but I can't detect such person as clever at one in 10 000 level with any confidence without seriously strong evidence.
I meant, a childhood math prodigy.
If Marcello failed one time out of ten and Eliezer detected it half of the time, that would be better than chance. Without knowing failure rate of Marcello (or without knowing how the failures are detected besides being pointed out by EY), one can't say whenever it is better than chance or not.