Assuming the copy had biochemistry, or some other way of experiencing emotions, the cop(ies) of me would definitely object to what had happened. Alternately, if a virtual copy of me was created and was capable of experiencing, I would feel that it was important for the copy to have the opportunity to make a difference in the world - that's why I live - so, yes, I would feel upset about my copy being destroyed.

You know, I think this problem has things in common with the individualism vs. communism debate. Do we view the copies as parts of a whole, unimportant in and of themselves, or do we view them all as individuals?

If we were to view them as parts of a whole, then what is valued? We don't feel pain or pleasure as a larger entity made up of smaller entities. We feel it individually. If happiness for as many life forms as possible is our goal, both the originals and the copies should have rights. If they copies are capable of experiencing pain and pleasure, they need to have human rights the same as ours. I would not see it as ethical to let myself be copied if my copies would not have rights.