OK, thanks for clarifying.

the idea that our preferences can be reduced down to the desire to have experiences, irrespective of personal identity [..] morally wrongheaded thinking...
a good steel man of the concept of "personal identity" is "the part of your utility function that contains preferences for how your mind, personality, values, etc, will change in the future."

For my own part, I agree that our preferences can't be reduced to the desire to have experiences, but I wouldn't say that they can be reduced to (the desire to have experiences + the desire to be a certain way in the future) either. Mostly my desire-to-be-a-certain-way is instrumental.

Since I consider that sense of connectedness to be a manifestation of my personal-identity-preferences, I consider it very morally significant, because really, it seems like the satisfaction of other people's preferences is one of the most important parts of morality.

Sure, if your preferences are bound up with that sense of connectedness in a way that importantly defines your notion of morality, then that sense of connectedness will be morally significant to you. Agreed.