MarkusRamikin comments on Game Theory As A Dark Art - Less Wrong

50 Post author: Yvain 24 July 2012 03:27AM

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Comment author: MarkusRamikin 24 July 2012 08:18:28AM 3 points [-]

the auction gains even more money from people who have seen it before than it does from naive bidders

How on Earth?

Comment author: Ezekiel 24 July 2012 03:31:32PM 19 points [-]

Read as:

the auction gains even more money from people who have seen it before [and are nevertheless willing to play again] than it does from naive bidders

Comment author: MarkusRamikin 24 July 2012 04:18:19PM *  2 points [-]

Right, of course. Selection effect.

I think what confused me was that I took that to mean the total amount of money earned, not per-person.

Comment author: nshepperd 25 July 2012 03:22:51PM *  2 points [-]

If I'm reading the link (thanks VincentYu!) correctly, your first impression was right. In the graduate class, total amounts earned were [1.95, 1.90, 2.15, 2.50] in that order for consecutive auctions. In the undergraduate class, [2.30, 2.05, 4.25, 3.50].

The number of people playing (bidding) did decrease (graduate: [5, 3, 4, 2], undergraduate: [6, 4, 3, 2]) in each round, but a selection effect is insufficient to explain the increase in total earnings, since there's no reason these "selected" people could not have bid equally as much in the first round.

ETA: Note that this is a two-highest-bidders-pay auction, not all-pay, so the increase in total earnings does reflect an average increase in individual bids as well.

Comment author: mfb 24 July 2012 12:55:05PM *  1 point [-]

Unfortunately, the link seems broken. I would really like to see this study.

Great examples of game theory.

Considerung the evil plutocrat:

  • What happens if both parties vote "nearly" 50% yes? The bill would fail, and the money depends on rounding issues. In addition, the best solution for both would be a cooperation here. Reject the bill, share the money in some way.

  • If a party reasons that the other party votes 100% yes, the best option would be just some "yes", and several "no" votes. The bill passes, but the party gets a better reputation. Therefore, we have no stable equilibrium.

Edit: Why does the site steal single line breaks?

Comment author: thomblake 24 July 2012 06:35:09PM 1 point [-]

Edit: Why does the site steal single line breaks?

The site uses Markdown for formatting - to add a line break to the end of a line, add two spaces at the end. Note the "Show help" button for more info.

Comment author: VincentYu 24 July 2012 05:10:42PM 1 point [-]

Unfortunately, the link seems broken. I would really like to see this study.

Google HTML version.

Edit: Why does the site steal single line breaks?

I can't answer why, but you can prevent that by putting two extra spaces at the end of the line before a single line break (more details).

Comment author: fubarobfusco 24 July 2012 05:35:39PM 0 points [-]

What happens if both parties vote "nearly" 50% yes? The bill would fail, and the money depends on rounding issues. In addition, the best solution for both would be a cooperation here. Reject the bill, share the money in some way.

Indeed, the problem seems to assume that political parties are not the sorts of things that can learn to cooperate with each other against a common foe.