Ghatanathoah comments on The Mere Cable Channel Addition Paradox - Less Wrong
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Comments (145)
1) I don't think anyone in the entire population ethics literature reads Parfit as you do: the moral problem is not one of feasibility via resource constraint, but rather just that Z is a morally preferable state of affairs to A, even if it is not feasible. Again, the paradoxical nature of the MAP is not harmed even if it demands utterly infeasible or even nomologically impossible, but that were we able to actualize Z we should do it.
Regardless, I don't see how the 'resource constraint complaint' you make would trouble the reading of Parfit you make. Parfit could just stipulate that the 'gain' in resources required from A to A+ is just an efficiency gain, and so A -> Z (or A->B, A->Z) does not involve any increase in consumption. Or we could stipulate the original population in A, although giving up some resources are made happier by knowing there is this second group of people, etc. etc. So it hardly seems necessarily the case that A to A+ demands increased consumption. Denying these alternatives looks like hypothetical fighting.
2) I think the pluralist point stands independently of the resource constraint complaint. But you seem imply a fact you value efficient resource consumption independently: you prefer A because it is a more efficient use of resources, you note there might be diminishing returns to the value of 'added lives' so adding lives becomes a merely inefficient way of adding value, etc. Yet I don't think we should care about efficiency save as an instrument of getting value. All things equal a world with 50 Utils burning 2 million utils is better than one with 10 utils burning 10. So (again) objections to feasibility or efficiency shouldn't harm the MAP route to the repugnant conclusion.
3) I take your hope for escaping the MAP is getting some sort of weighted sum or combination of total utility, the utility of those who already exist, and possibly average utility of lives will get us our 'total value'. However, unless you hold that the 'average term' or the 'person affecting' term are lexically prior to utility (so no amount of utility can compensate for a drop in either), you are still susceptible to a variant of the MAP I gave above:
So the A to A+ move has a small drop in average but a massive gain in utility, and persons already existing gain a boost in their wellbeing (and I can twist the dials even more astronomically). So if we can add these people, redistributing between them such that total value and equality increases seems plausible. And so we're off to the races. It might be the case that each move demands arbitrarily massive (and inefficient) use resources to actualize - but, again, this is irrelevant to a moral paradox. The only way the diminishing marginal returns point would help avoid MAP if they were asymptotic to some upper bound. However, cashing things out that way looks implausible, and also is vulnerable to intransitivity.
I don't see the similarity to Zeno's paradoxes of motion - or, at least, I don't see how this variant is more similar to Zeno than the original MAP is. Each step from A to A+ to B .... to Z, either originally or in my variant to make life difficult for your view is a step that increases total value. Given transitivity, Z will be better than A. If you think this is unacceptably Zeno like, then you could just make that complaint to the MAP simpliciter (although, FWIW, I think there are sufficient disanalogies as Zeno only works by taking each 'case' asymptotically closer to the singularity when tortoise and achilles meet, by contrast MAP is expanding across relevant metrics, so it seems more analogous to a Zeno case where Achilles is ahead of the Tortoise).