So, can someone summarize why EY thinks that p-morality is inferior (not just h-inferior) to h-morality, which he seems to call a one-place function "morality"? The OP and the following discussion did not make it clear for me.
He doesn't. He only thinks that p-morality is h-inferior. He doesn't believe that there's such a thing as "inferior".
EDIT: Hmmm... I don't really mean that EY doesn't believe that there's such a thing as "inferior". I just mean that when he uses the word "inferior" he means "h-inferior". He doesn't think that there's some universal "inferior" by which we can judge p-morality against h-morality, but of course p-morality is h-inferior to h-morality.
Today's post, The Bedrock of Morality: Arbitrary? was originally published on 14 August 2008. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):
Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments to the original post).
This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was Is Fairness Arbitrary?, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
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