But why should what Eliezer says is e-right converge to what I think is m-right? (given that both e-right and m-right are permitted to change over time, and that both of us prefer a universe in which the other is right)
A key feature of 'rightness' in societies is that societies which follow a concept of 'rightness' that results in their continued existence and increased influence have continued existence and increased influence. Therefore the existing and influential societies likely have moral values which encourage their existence and influence. That seems circular, but it is also the explanation for why p-morality is not exemplified; p-morality does not make a society more influential or more likely to continue to exist. Similarly, values which promote the survival and proliferation of those who hold them become more popular over time.
Should continued existence and increased influence be the (?)-right measure of the (?)-quality of x-morality?
Today's post, The Bedrock of Morality: Arbitrary? was originally published on 14 August 2008. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):
Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments to the original post).
This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was Is Fairness Arbitrary?, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
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