I notice that I am meta-confused...
Supposing that all possible universes 'exist' with some weighting by simplicity or requirement of uniformity, does not make me feel less fundamentally confused about all this;
Shouldn't we strongly expect this weighting, by Solomonoff induction?
Allow me to paraphrase him with some of my own thoughts.
Dang, existence, what is that? Can things exist more than other things? In Solomonoff induction we have something that kind of looks like "all possible worlds", or computable worlds anyway, and they're each equipped with a little number that discounts them by their complexity. So maybe that's like existing partially? Tiny worlds exist really strongly, and complex worlds are faint? That...that's a really weird mental image, and I don't want to stake very much on its accuracy. I mean, really,...
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