Eugine_Nier comments on What is moral foundation theory good for? - Less Wrong
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No way, I'm not! I mean, yes, I'm certainly mind-killed (and flattered when my mind-killedness is described in dramatic language like above, thanks!) - but at least... how to put it.. I'm mind-killed about the mind!
That is, I fret and read and (sometimes) post about social psychology and cultural processes and human ethics and stuff like that - which is, in the end, self-referential and self-fulfilling/negating to a degree.
If e.g. everyone in known history thought that economic equality was massively evil and alien and harmful and undesirable - why, societies would simply increase wealth divergence without ever worrying whether it's practical or moral to - like, in real life, we feel and act the same about starvation, even when we let its victims die in other ways.
If in 1936 or so 90% of Europeans got the idea that Hitler had unspeakably evil plans, he'd never be able to carry out those plans. {1}
Therefore, if someone, like me, fervently believes that [religion name]/[ideology name] is (in its worldview and revealed preferences, not its description of reality) an enormous priority to pursue OR avoid, more important than even lives or happiness - and that humanity is blind to that urgent matter, then they're slightly better off than someone who fervently believes that e.g. Mars has a breathable atmosphere.
The more people share the first "delusion", the less of a "delusion" it is internally and the more implementable it is in practice. Yes, of course some ev-psych facts - like selfishness, love of authority or envy - limit the phase space of working societies, but those realities can be stretched or hacked around, given how plastic our minds potentially are.
The second one remains a delusion no matter how large and committed a group tries to live up to it; a lone atheist and a million good Catholics following a papal edict would choke with equal speed on Mars. "Reality is that which, when you stop believing in it, does not go away."
Barron might hate the universe and feel that it hates him in return; I only hate some particular, and passing, arrangements in the universe, and resent the fact that most people insist on propping up those arrangements (by e.g. thinking that material welfare is the only real measure of political systems).
{1} Yes, yes, I'm aware of the Functionalist argument and find it rather credible; that bit was just rhetorical.
So how did the Soviet Union's attempt to create the "New Soviet Man" turn out?
There was some serious work in that direction in the 1920s, but with Stalin's ascent to power, left-wing education and indoctrination were in fact stamped out, to be replaced with Russian crypto-nationalism, imperial and militarist sentiment, and most notably an Asian-style cult of the god-king.
In fact, by the end of his life Stalin had uprooted or completely subverted virtually every institution that the 1920s' Old Bolshevik leaders introduced (with the sole exception of the repression apparatus, which he expanded while purging most personnel) - from the "New Economic Policy" and legal free abortion (!) to the avant-garde artists' organizations and the Comintern.
I'm not necessarily saying that those institutions were good (although the NEP objectively worked well enough); I'm saying that, since around 1930 and until the end, Soviet leadership only paid lip service to genuine radical indoctrination/reeducation, preferring the old staples of nationalism, feudal loyalty and leader-worship.
Later, in the Brezhnev era, an official cargo cult of sorts was formed around Marxist phraseology and such, but no-one gave a shit whether, say, the "Marxism-Leninism" classes at universities were even functioning as propaganda.
In fact, it was rather counter-productive as propaganda, as people began to mock even the several objective, verified achievements that it trumpeted - like the space program or the considerable infrastructure investment. The system became too stagnant even to attempt self-replication through indoctrination.
So there. The USSR was mostly an ineffective (if somewhat orderly) conservative regime that would have shat its collective pants if a New Soviet Man suddenly appeared in flesh.
And hey, a handful did appear, more or less by accident; e.g. Andrei Sinyavsky, Yuli Daniel, Vasily Grossman (Socialist Realist writers!), Sakharov, the Strugatsky brothers, numerous other good people who advocated left-wing ideas and got suppressed by an ostensibly socialist system. Oh, well, for the wider Warsaw Pact, I guess Zizek also counts as a New Soviet Man :)
P.S.: lengthy quote incoming! Orwell's praise of left-wing indoctrination in Homage to Catalonia.
Hadn't NEP originally been conceived as a temporary policy for the interim when the society was going to be slowly transformed into communism, after radical immediate implementation of communist economics attempted in the first years after the revolution visibly failed?
Well, the many far left movements had a militarist element (directed against the bourgeois) to them from the very beginning. Also the nationalism didn't start going until WWII, and only after it became clear that appealing to people to fight for communist ideals wasn't working.
They sure had a culture of violence, as in street fighting and insurgency etc, but under Stalin it turned into proper militarism, as in: approval of army hierarchy and officer-caste ethics as not merely necessary but laudable; formal expressions of loyalty turning organization-based rather than class-based; displaying the expected World Revolution (in films, lectures, etc) as being in essense a conventional war, with near-identical armies facing off and some aid from working-class sympathizers - rather then the preceding image of a massive popular rebellion... A somewhat-revisionist Russian historian, Mark Solonin, describes how the massive military build-up was accompanied by this gradual shift in propaganda from "revolutionary violence" to "Red militarism".
Believe me, it did! It was crypto-nationalism in the 30s, but back then Stalinist propaganda already began to lionize the historical achievements and the "properly" anti-feudal, anti-bourgeois sentiment of the Russian Volk. It appropriated 19th century authors like Pushkin who were previously fashionable to reject as retrograde.
There's a sharp contrast between the 1920s' propaganda line on Imperial Russia (backward, miserable, completely lost but for the Communist guidance), the lambasting of "Russian chauvinism" as a right-wing deviation and the insistence that all Soviet nationalities should harmoniously melt into a purely political whole - and the 1930s' quiet suppression of all that, with Old Russia called less a benighted rural wilderness and more a supremely talented nation, naturally predisposed towards communism, that only needed to overthrow Tsarism to assume its rightful place of world leadership.
I've read a few Russian studies about the relationship between Stalinism, Soviet culture and propaganda; they offer a far more nuanced view than the one you cite.
The lesson is probably that when you create a culture of violence, it tends to get out of the hand and go towards its own attractors.
Sounds reasonable.