The overall message of the post sounds reasonable to me, but doesn't it apply to Pearl's causality as well? If the world is built from computation rather than causal arrows, how do you get to causal arrows?
If the world is built from computation rather than causal arrows, how do you get to causal arrows?
I had to do a bit of searching, but it seems that Eliezer (or at least Eliezer_2008) considers causal arrows to be more fundamental than computations:
...And, if we have "therefore" back, if we have "cause" and "effect" back—and science would be somewhat forlorn without them—then we can hope to retrieve the concept of "computation". We are not forced to grind up reality into disconnected configurations; there can be gl
Today's post, Against Modal Logics was originally published on 27 August 2008. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):
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