Any strategy that takes being publicly announced (and precommitted to) into account and still allows the opponent to get away with defecting the first round ist a terribly horrible strategy.
Publicly announcing is not actually precommitting. If Clippy says it plays TFT-1D, for how long would you really cooperate?
It seems to me there is little benefit to playing the strategy you announced, or vice versa.
I mean, "terribly horrible" on what scale? If the criterion is "can it be strictly dominated by another strategy in terms of results if we ignore the cost of making the strategy more complicated," then, sure, a strategy that reliably allows opponents to costlessly defect on the first of 100 rounds fails that criterion. I'd argue that a more interesting set of criteria are "is the expected utility close to the maximum expected utility generated by any strategy," "is the standard deviation in expected utility acceptably low," and "is the strategy simple enough that it can be taught, shared, and implemented with little or no error?" Don't let the perfect become the enemy of the good.
Today's post, The Truly Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma was originally published on 04 September 2008. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):
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This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was The True Prisoner's Dilemma, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
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