cousin_it comments on The noncentral fallacy - the worst argument in the world? - Less Wrong
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I dislike accusations of sexism as much as the next guy, but in the last year or two I have started to think that ev-psych is way overconfident. The coarse grained explanation is that ev-psych seems to be "softer" than regular psychology, which itself is "softer" than medicine, and we all know what percentage of medical findings are wrong. I'd be curious to learn what other LWers think about this, especially you, because your writings got me interested in ev-psych in the first place.
As in about the likelihood of certain kinds of explanations?
Can't think anything without a concrete example.
I am going to rehearse saying this in a robotic voice, while spinning round and round flailing my arms in a mechanical fashion.
Can you put it up on Youtube when you're done?
Off the top of my head:
http://www.cell.com/current-biology/retrieve/pii/S096098220701559X
So far as I know, the association of pink with girls and blue with boys is a western custom which only goes back a century or so.
Precisely.
This seems like a qualitative argument, when a quantitative argument would be more interesting. Who is the John Ioannidis of evolutionary psychology? Or, what research has been published that has later turned out to be false?
(Also, why do you dislike accusations of sexism? Shouldn't you only dislike false accusations of sexism?)
I dislike accusations of sexism for the same reason I dislike accusations of any other negative behavior. Those accusations signal either sexism or false accusations of sexism, both of which are net negatives to me.
See the OP.
Because you and I no doubt hang out in completely different circles, my view of the prototypical case of sexism is probably different from yours. Also, I consider most non-prototypical cases of sexism to be wrong, so there aren't really any connotations being smuggled in.
I may or may not agree depending on which definition of "sexism" you are using.
Well, in any debate you'd still have to explain why that particular example of sexism is wrong.
Not if (a) you're in a situation where everyone already agrees on that or (b) you consider fairness to be an important value.
And assuming you also don't want to even consider the possibility that you might be wrong. In any case, as you may have noticed, that's not true here.
More like you consider a particular interpretation of fairness to be such an important value that it trumps all others.
Having common language and beliefs does not preclude questioning those beliefs.
Can you unpack that?
Ok, I suppose I should ask you what your definition of sexism is.
Also, is e.g., affirmative action sexist, how about not using affirmative action? Same question about desperate impact?
Sexism can mean a whole bunch of different things. It's not a simple binary predicate: this is sexist, that isn't. In general, I mean a cluster of attitudes and actions that harm people based on their sex. Usually, its women being harmed, but definitely not always.
Affirmative action is, of course, an interesting case. On its face, it involves advantaging one group, which naturally comes at the expense of all other groups. So, of course it's sexism in one sense of the word. So why does anyone think it's fair? Because there are believed to be cognitive biases in play that prevent people from (for instance) selecting an equally qualified woman for a job (one day, I would like to write up a post on the evidence for this). The theory is that an explicit adjustment for these biases will result in treatment more like what there would have been if employers were unbiased. If this theory is correct, then in cases where we believe that there is such discrimination, maintaining the status quo would be sexism. Naturally, not all cases of affirmative action qualify for this.
As the discussion on The Bedrock Of Fairness shows, fairness can have many meanings. They frequently correspond almost exactly to meta-ethical stances (consequentialist, deontological, virtue ethics). I'm a consequentialist with regards to fairness (since I view it as merely a part of the whole system of ethics). And affirmative action is only justifiable under a consequentialist (or perhaps virtue ethics) framework of fairness -- and then only sometimes. I guess that is, as you say, one particular interpretation of fairness, but it's one that I would imagine is relatively common here, since consequentialist ethics are relatively popular on Less Wrong.