I think IAWYC, but I'd steel-man Decius and assume that young children unconscious people, etc. wouldn't count as “actors” and thus such actions wouldn't be more immoral than, say, replace a broken string in a guitar without its consensus.

It's not the totality thereof- contract theory is also included with the concept "It is possible to consent to actions in the future in a manner which may not be unilaterally revoked."

I can't explain why the social contract or geographical government has jurisdiction over a new actor who does not choose to accept it.

If my premise that people are metaphysically equal is wrong, then something which is not part of this universe has privileged access over something else which is not part of this universe.

I would, for example, expect the same entity to make decisions for two physical bodies, or for psychic phenomena to exist and not have a physical basis, or for consciousness to persist after death differentially depending on the conscious entity; in general, things would have to be able happen without a physical basis and differentially based on the metaphysical person.

Since I posit that the metaphysical person exists only as a moral abstraction (and can thus be defined to be equal), such evidence that 'personhood' is an actual concrete thing, and that some 'personhoods' were inherently superior in an objectively measurable way would falsify my moral beliefs. I also suspect that it would be problematic for all moral systems.

It can also treat people as the ends, instead of the means, of desirable world states.

I intuit that there is also something along the lines of 'equal objectification'; if everyone, including oneself, is objectified equally, is that really objectification? I don't know and must consider that.

If things are different in a significant way, it is appropriate that they are treated as different.

It is a premise of mine that people are metaphysically equal; to delve further into that we need to discuss what 'people' means. I doubt that you will find such a discussion rewarding.

I'm not at all sure what it means for an act to be immoral, under a consequentialist moral frame, if not that it leads to the loss of value. Can you expand on this?