Simple version: if your model includes phenomena X in its timeline, yet does not make any claims about X having causal influence, then I can play with X to attempt to break your model.

Hence I used the weapons that were implicit in the model. For Kurzweil's model, it includes the history of evolution on earth, a history littered with disasters, meteor impacts and the like. Since the model is claimed to be correct despite these disasters, I decided that adding a few more shouldn't break the model if the model actually worked.

I was gentler on Robin's model, because it focused more on narrowly on human evolution. Still, it covers a period in history where there were pandemic, genetic bottlenecks, dramatic expansions of new technology, and so on. If the model was correct across these phenomena, then I could play with them without blowing up the model.

What would be equivalent for Moore's much narrower law? Well, there are no "unless economic growth splutters" caveats. So the most credible way to break Moore's law is to add a few economic disasters and imagine their consequences. But actual real economic disasters seem to have not affected Moore's law at all. What else? Political change? This might work - there's some evidence that communist states didn't have a Moore's law for their own computer industry. So a global communist takeover could break Moore's law - or at least caveat it to "in a market economy, computer speeds will..."