Yes: safe harbor laws that grant protection if best practices are followed. You might explain the laws as resulting from signaling concerns, but the benefits of the safe harbor protection are codified, and not based on people judging signaling. In particular, it's worth noting that the benefits accrue even when other behaviors signal the opposite intention.
Consider OSHA rules as an example. Follow the rules, and you're protected. You don't get hit with OSHA compliance fines, and your insurance pays out in the event of an accident. If the latest safety research shows that the OSHA rules are insufficient, you can safely ignore the research while complaining about the costs of OSHA compliance, and nothing changes. If the latest research shows the OSHA rules demand behavior that harms worker safety, and you follow the research, you're in violation and in trouble. This is true even if the research is public and well accepted.
Normally, a signaling model would be interpreted as having a person interpreting the signals and acting on them. That person might ignore private knowledge, but should offer some accommodation for a company following published, reviewed research. You could use a signaling model that includes lots of detail about how the signals are interpreted according to fixed rules without regard for other contexts, however I think that misses what makes signaling models strong: they adapt well to context. A signaling model that requires you to ignore context seems stretched a bit thin to me. I'd say that the model that says you just follow the rational astrology to get the benefits, without worrying about signaling, has fewer moving parts in this context.
(I would agree that for most rational astrologies, most of the benefits to be accrued are signaling benefits.)
your insurance pays out in the event of an accident.
In the United States, worker's compensation insurance is no fault - the worker gets something whether or not the employer did anything wrong/was negligent. Damages are from a table ($X for Y injury, no punitive damages). The employer's compliance with OSHA is mostly irrelevant in terms of payments to the worker.
The article can be found here. While it is not, for many of us, new ground, it is an excellent treatment, and it requires no rationalist background in order to be understood. The subject is the pernicious pull of doing the standard thing, regardless of whether or not the standard thing makes any sense, and it does us the service of giving that phenomenon a descriptive link we can share as well as an excellent name.
I hope to, after more discussion and thought, write a main post on the subject.