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Trevor_Caverly comments on The raw-experience dogma: Dissolving the “qualia” problem - Less Wrong
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Is your position the same as Dennett's position (summarized in the second paragraph of synopsis here) ?
I agree with Dennett that qualia don't exist. I disagree that the concept of qualia is basically a remnant of an outmoded psychological doctrine; I think it's an innate idea.
Dennett can be criticized for ignoring the subjective nature of qualia. He shows, for example, that reported phenomenal awareness is empirically bogus in that it doesn't correspond to the contents of working memory. I'm concerned with accounting for the subjective nature of the qualia concept.
Dennett basically thinks qualia are empirically falsifiable; I think the concept is incoherent.
Let me try to answer more succinctly. Dennett and I are concerned with different problems; Dennett's is a problem within science proper, while mine is traditionally philosophical. Dennett's conclusion is that "qualia" don't provide introspective access to the functioning of the brain; my conclusion is that our common intuition concerning the existence of qualia is incoherent.