ArisKatsaris comments on The raw-experience dogma: Dissolving the “qualia” problem - Less Wrong

2 Post author: metaphysicist 16 September 2012 07:15PM

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Comment author: [deleted] 14 September 2012 05:28:31PM *  6 points [-]

One would not predict the existence of intrinisically subjective qualities in an entirely physcial, and therefor entirely objective, universe.

Disagree.

Let's look at the actual observations. I see red, It has some atomic "redness" that is different from the atomic "blueness" of blue and the atomic pleasure of orgasm and the atomic feeling of cold. Each of these atomic "qualia" are subjectively irreducible. There are not smaller parts that my subjective experience of "red" is made up of.

Is this roughly the qualia problem? That's my understanding of it.

Here's a simple computer program that reports on whether or not it has atomic subjective experience:

qualia = {"red", "blue", "cold", "pleasure"}
memory_associations = {red = {"anger", "hot"}, blue = {"cold", "calm"},
pleasure = {"hot", "good"}}
function experience_qualia(input)
for _, q in ipairs(qualia) do
if input == q then
print("my experience of", input, "is the same as", q)
else
print(q, "and", input, "feel different")
end
end
print("furthermore, the feeling of", input, "seems connected to")
print(table.concat(memory_associations[input], " and "))
print("I have no way of reducing these experiences, therefore I exist outside physics")
end
experience_qualia"red"
experience_qualia"blue"

From the inside, the program experiences no mechanisms of reduction of these atomic qualia, but from the outside, we can see that they are strings, made up of bytes, and compared by hash value. While I don't know the details of the neurosceince of qualia, I expect the findings to be roughly similar. Something will be an irreducible symbol with various associations and uniqueness from within the system, but outside, we will be able to see "oh look, redness is this particular pattern of neurons firing".

EDIT: LW killed my program formatting. It should still run (lua, by the way)

Comment author: ArisKatsaris 14 September 2012 05:37:29PM *  3 points [-]

"From the inside, the program experiences no mechanisms of reduction of these atomic qualia"

Materialism predicts that algorithms have an "inside"?

As a further note, I'll have to say that if all the blue and if the red in my visual experience were switched around, my hunch tells me that I'd be experiencing something different; not just in the sense of different memory associations but that the visual experience itself would be different. It would not just be that "red" is associated with hot, and that "blue" is associated with cold... The qualia of the visual experience itself would be different.

Comment author: [deleted] 14 September 2012 05:49:34PM 3 points [-]

Materialism predicts that algorithms have an "inside"?

Yes. The scene from within a formal system (like algebra) has certain qualities (equations, variables, functions, etc) that are different from the scene outside (markings on paper, equals sign, BEDMAS, variable names, brackets for function application).

That's not really a materialism thing, it's a math thing.

As a further note, I'll have to say that if all the blue and if the red in my visual experience were squitched around, my hunch tells me that I'd be experiencing something different; not just in the sense of different memory associations but that the visual experience itself would be different. It would not just be that "red" is associated with hot, and that "blue" is associated with cold... The qualia of the visual experience itself would be different.

Hence the part where they are compared to other qualia. Maybe that's not enough, but imagining getting "blue" or "sdfg66df" instead of "red" (which is the evidence you are using) is of course going to return "they are different" because they don't compare equal. Even if the output of the computation ends up being the same.

Comment author: ArisKatsaris 14 September 2012 05:59:46PM 1 point [-]

That's not really a materialism thing, it's a math thing.

I'm under the impression that what you describe falls under computationalism, not materialism, but my reading on these ideas is shallow and I may be confusing some of these terms...

Comment author: [deleted] 14 September 2012 06:03:19PM *  2 points [-]

I must say I can't tell the difference between materialism "the mind is built of stuff" and computationalism "the mind is built of algorithms (running on stuff)".

If I get them confused in some way, sorry.

Comment author: FAWS 17 September 2012 04:21:40PM 1 point [-]

That thought experiment doesn't make much sense. If the experiences were somehow switched, but everything else kept the same (i .e all your memories and associations of red are still connected to each other and everything else in the same way) you wouldn't notice the difference; everything would still match your memories exactly. If there even is such a thing as raw qualia there is no reason to suppose they are stable from one moment to the other; as long as the correct network of associations is triggered there is no evolutionary advantage either way.