Peterdjones comments on The raw-experience dogma: Dissolving the “qualia” problem - Less Wrong
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But it doesn't. It just establishes that if they, they covary with physical states in the way that would be expected from identity theory. Admitedly it seems redundant to have a non physical extra ingredient that nonetheless just shadows what brains are doing physicallly. I think that's a flaw in Chalmers' theory. But its conceptual, not empirical.
I... err... what? My mastery of the English language is insufficient to compute the meaning of the I-assume-is-a sentence above.
I meant
"It just establishes that if they exist, they covary with physical states in the way that would be expected from identity theory."
But thats not the whole problem. It establishes they covary with physical states in the way that would be expected from identity theory, and Chalmerserian dualism, and a bunch of other theories (but maybe not Cartesian dualism).
Tests need to distinguish between theories, and yours doesn't.
Hmm. I thought it did. I guess I need to review a few things.