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lukeprog comments on [Poll] Less Wrong and Mainstream Philosophy: How Different are We? - Less Wrong
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Note: I don't think most theistic philosophers would consider the simulation hypothesis to be a variant of theism.
That's because they say "theism" but they mean "traditional religion". They probably wouldn't accept a reification of Azathoth either, or the Flying Spaghetti Monster.
This is because the folks who take the simulation hypothesis as a serious possibility (like Bostrom) also believe we are in a non-interventionist simulation (one without a creator/controller who regularly intervenes to answer prayers, reward worship and so on). They don't seem to care too much about whether there are other simulations somewhere whose creators do intervene. Generally they'd concede the point if pressed (OK, somewhere in the universe of simulations and simulators there are gods, but not around here. Happy?) and then move on.
The main point about "theism" (as opposed to "deism" say) is that God or the gods really affect us. They don't just exist as an abstract debating point: it actually matters to us that they exist.
If the being(s) running the simulation are all-knowing and all-powerful with respect to the simulation, I think most philosophers would go there, even theistic ones.
Hell, if Spinoza's God counts as a theistic position, then the simulation hypothesis is practically golden.
"Gods are ontologically distinct from creatures, or they're not worth the paper they're written on." -- Damien Broderick.
Can anyone exhibit an actual theist who says that a Matrix Lord composed of non-mental, non-mysterious parts counts as a God? So far as I know this position is held solely by people who want to mock the Simulation Hypothesis.
Hi, I'm a simulation-theist. Nice to meet you.
If someone asks you whether you believe in a god, how likely are you to say "yes" versus "it's complicated"? (Or versus "no"?)
I'm quite likely to answer in the affirmative in most contexts. On the other hand, "are you religious?" would tend to get some version of the "it's complicated" answer.
Pretty sure the Mormons qualify. I'm not one myself, but I used to live next door to a few, and this looks like a fair representation of their beliefs. The money quote:
... which explains why there is actually a Mormon Transhumanist group, and why there was even a conference on the subject in April where I live (Salt Lake City; unfortunately couldn't attend)
I hold it in order to mock theism.
Physicalist reductionism is such a fundamental part of my belief system that I think charity requires that theism be interpreted as the SH. I appeal to the popular perception of the absurdity of the SH in order to undermine professions of belief in theism.
How (do you use it to mock/undermine theism)?
Cool. I should have specified 'I'm intrigued; can you move down a level of specificity (as to how)?'
Most people seem to believe that it's absurd to suppose we're living in the Matrix; I point out that theism is not significantly different from this.
According to my informal experiments with presenting the SA to friends, the absurdity reaction is highly sensitive to framing-effects and especially the particular sequence in which I present the premises.
If the non-mental parts they are composed of are unlike the non-mental parts we are composed of, I would. I am made of quarks and leptons and things in Life are made of dead cells and live cells, and IMO that's more than enough for us to be ontologically distinct from us. The same would apply to the next level up (if there's one).
Well, hence the confusion about Spinoza's God. It's not really ontologically distinct for him, since his God 'is' the universe. (His God is also just mental-stuff, but Spinoza was an idealist, so to him all stuff was mental-stuff.)
Now, Spinoza's might not count as a 'Matrix Lord' since he denies that God 'chooses' anything in our sense (he holds to a very strong version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason) so it's not like God is 'running' the simulation, as it were: God just is the simulation according to Spinoza.
Likewise, most theistic philosophers are comitted to God being omniscient, omnipotent, and (usually) omnibenevolent. But some put that in 'absolute' terms while some put it in terms of this world: omnipotent regarding this world, etc. For the latter group, there is no clear philosophical dilemma in saying that a Matrix Lord counts as God, especially if that Matrix Lord is also the "First Cause."
In fact, assuming that such a Matrix Lord exists, most theistic philosophers would be required to say it counts as God.