benelliott comments on [Poll] Less Wrong and Mainstream Philosophy: How Different are We? - Less Wrong
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Yes: There are certain sentences which are true solely by virtue of the meanings of the words involved, so these sentences are not subject to empirical falsification. Example: "All bachelors are unmarried." It is impossible for this sentence to be false, provided the words retain their ordinary meaning.
No: Every sentence is potentially open to empirical falsification. [EDIT: I guess the "No" answer would also be appropriate for those who believe that no sentence is open to empirical falsification, although I would be very surprised if anyone on this site fits that description.]
The Yes answer seems obvious, is there some sort of gotcha?
[VOTE BEFORE READING THIS COMMENT TO AVOID PRIMING.]
The most prominent critic of the distinction is Quine. You can read about the reasons for his opposition here. A quote:
There is also Chalmers 2009 I guess paper about this, which breifly reviews the history of what happened after Quine polarized the topic. Revisability and Conceptual Change.
Chalmers attemps (in my view succesfully) to rescue 80% of what matters in the distinction, avoiding Quinean and post Quinean traps.