Eliezer_Yudkowsky comments on [Poll] Less Wrong and Mainstream Philosophy: How Different are We? - Less Wrong

38 Post author: Jayson_Virissimo 26 September 2012 12:25PM

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Comment author: Jayson_Virissimo 26 September 2012 02:05:16PM 1 point [-]

Personal identity: physical view or psychological view?

Submitting...

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 26 September 2012 11:59:54PM 7 points [-]

Other: Leaning toward a causal view. In other words, your past self has to be the cause of your future self, but the specific atoms are irrelevant.

Comment author: [deleted] 27 September 2012 02:51:23AM 3 points [-]

Holy crap! I'm identical with my kid!

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 27 September 2012 03:29:45PM 2 points [-]

Causal descent is a necessary but not sufficient condition, just like a QM-ignorant "physicalist" doesn't necessarily believe that if I grind you up and make a new person out of those "particular particles", it is the same person just in virtue of being made out the "same particles". Not that there's any such thing as the "same particles" in modern physics, just waves in a particle field, etc.

Comment author: [deleted] 27 September 2012 04:17:28PM 2 points [-]

Right, but causal descent is common to the physical and psychological views. 'Physicalism' among philosophers generally doesn't refer to some kind of 'same atoms' view. That's an incoherent view long before we bring in considerations of quantum physics, and the 'same particles' issue. Mostly that kind of physicalism is restricted to people who are wrong on the internet.

Physicalism among (most) philosophers who hold that view is the claim that your identity is tied to a particular animal (or whatever hardware) that has physical persistance conditions (like the processes which keep it alive, etc.). If you create an atom-for-atom duplicate of that animal, and then kill one of the two of them, you haven't therefore killed both of them. They're not identical in that sense, and that's the sense of 'identity' that physicalists are calling personal identity.

So nothing about quantum physics, so far as I can see, makes a difference to this question.

Comment author: Thomas 27 September 2012 06:41:56AM 0 points [-]

Holly crap, identical withe everybody ever lived. Except those of course, who were not self aware. If such exist.

Comment author: [deleted] 27 September 2012 12:13:13AM 1 point [-]

Based on pragmatist's interpretation, this sounds like the physical view.

Comment author: pragmatist 27 September 2012 07:12:48AM 2 points [-]

It sounds like the psychological view to me, although I guess that depends on what Eliezer means by "self".

Comment author: MugaSofer 27 September 2012 11:46:23AM 1 point [-]

This confuses me. I'm a bunch of LessWrong posts?

I voted Accept: psychological view.

Comment author: [deleted] 27 September 2012 02:34:09AM 1 point [-]

Voted other for essentially this reason. Still very confused about this question.