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MugaSofer comments on [Poll] Less Wrong and Mainstream Philosophy: How Different are We? - Less Wrong
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I can observe myself in a way I that can't others.
From my vantage point, a copy or upload of someone else behaves the same as the 'original'. From that same vantage point, a newly created copy of myself is clearly 'outside' my mind and therefore observationally different.
But surely the copy is as much the same person as the "you" of five minutes ago as the original?
To you and everyone else, but not to me.
They may not be you(now), but if you count yourself as the same person as you(earlier), then they have to be the same person as you(earlier) as well. I think.
A newly created copy or electronic upload of me (call him 'Copy B') would have all my behavioral attributes and memories. He could be called $myName by anyone else observing either of us (we could be indistinguishable to a third observer).
However, to me (the guy writing this response, call me 'Copy A'), there would be an obvious observable difference between Copy A and Copy B. I see the world from Copy A's point of view, with his eyes and ears and I would observe Copy B from the outside as I would any other person, without knowing what is going on in his mind or experiencing the world from his point of view. Yes, Copy B might say the same about Copy A, but it's my fear that Copy A would never find himself genuinely waking up inside a copying chamber or as an upload. If that's true, uploading myself would be the death of my subjective point of view.
I get where you're coming from. I don't necessarily have an epiphenomenal view of the mind, but I also believe that the concept of qualia is not well understood by anyone. I do not understand why I'm me and not someone else, and neither does our current knowledge on the subject.
Based on this I'm agnostic on whether mind uploading in the style we're discussing would really preserve me and my stream of qualia, or kill me and create another person with a new stream of qualia. Without any evidence that it would preserve me, I would not accept going through such a process.
There are possible scenarios in which the copying process could preserve what I consider to be me: For example, if there is only one observer at all, who experiences all qualia streams throughout the world (that possibility scares me, honestly). Another possibility might be that copying me would simply double my measure in the world, and what I consider my qualia stream would have twice as many experiences after the copying process. These are just speculation, though.
This has definitely been an interesting discussion for me. Examining my thoughts on this subject has raised more possible interpretations than settled anything, though!
I had the same reaction, but the majority of others I've talked to disagree with me, so it's nice to see someone who thinks the same way. Here are my arguments with TheOtherDave (Ironic, I know!):
Teleporter Malfunction Scenario
No, I understand that, I'm saying that, while Copy B is not the same person as Copy A, he IS the same person as Copy A was before being copied, at least as much as Copy A is.
What would you do if you discovered you were Copy B in such an experiment? Because presumably he would do the same thing.
I don't contest your first paragraph.
Regarding your question: I don't know. Probably update my understanding of this subject.