A mind-independent reality exists, but we lack epistemic access to it.

Three problems:

1. This seems to entail the absurd proposition "p, but we have no way of knowing that p". I.e., it's not clear how to cash out 'epistemic access' in a way that allows us to know that there is a mind-independent world, without knowing anything further about that world. This uncharitably commits skepticism to an internal tension, if not an outright contradiction.

2. "We only have access to how things appear to us", inasmuch as it implies "We have access to how things appear to us", is itself a substantive doctrine about how reality breaks down, and one skepticism need not endorse. So this uncharitably assigns certain doctrinal commitments to skeptics as a group.

3. This reading assumes that skeptics are realists of some sort, or that they privilege realism as a hypothesis over idealism. The original question does not state this, so idealistic or neutral skeptics may be unfairly biased by this interpretation.

Reality is not mind-independent. It is either wholly or partly mentally constituted.

'Mentally constituted' is vague. If this just means that part of reality is mental (or irreducibly mental), then it seems to treat dualism as a form of idealism, which is very nonstandard.