I don't know how to have a discussion where the answer to the question "show me how it might be" is "First of all I said [it] might be."

You didn't say "show me how [it might be]", you said "show me how [it is]"

So you already know that there are no such statements that "everybody" agrees to.

Most people that aren't moral realists still have moral intuitions, you're confusing the categorization of beliefs about the nature of morality vs the actual moral instinct in people's brains. The moral instinct doesn't concern itself with whether morality is real; eyes don't concern themselves with viewing themselves; few algorithms altogether are are designed to analyze themselves.

As for moral nihilists, assuming they exist, an empty moral set can indeed never be transformed into anything else via is statements, which is why I specified from the very beginning "every person equipped with moral instinct".

If you are able to state that you are talking about something which has no connection to the real world,

The "connection to the real world" is that the vast majority of seeming differences in human moralities seem to derive from different understandings of the worlds, and different expectations about the consequences. When people share agreement about the "is", they also tend to converge on the "ought", and they most definitely converge on lots of things that "oughtn't". Seemingly different morality sets gets transformed to look like each other.

That's sort of like the CEV of humanity that Eliezer talks about, except that I talk about a much more limited set -- not the complete volition (which includes things like "I want to have fun"), but just the moral intuition system.

That's a "connection to the real world" that relates to the whole history of mankind, and to how beliefs and moral injuctions connect to one another; how beliefs are manipulated to produce injuctions, how injuctions lose their power when beliefs fall away.

Now with a proper debater that didn't just seek to heap insults on people I might discuss further on nuances and details-- whether it's only consequentialists that would get attractive moral sets, whether different species would get mostly different attractive moral sets, whether such attractive moral sets may be said to exist because anything too alien would probably not even be recognizable as morality by us; possible exceptions for deliberately-designed malicious minds, etc...

But you've just been a bloody jerk throughout this thread, a horrible horrible person who insults and insults and insults some more. So I'm done with you: feel free to have the last word.