Where do you see variances in the basic conception of property rights vary as though genetic and not cultural? Do children born of people who have a different set of property values than those with whom they are raised have the concept of their genes or of the people who raised them?
Based on the developmental cognitive science literature, I'd say that a sense of property rights can't develop until after the sense of other is developed. That means that most adopted children should develop the same concept of property rights as their family, if property rights are cultural.
What does the evidence say?
Where do you see variances in the basic conception of property rights vary as though genetic and not cultural?
I never said anything about variance. Due to the physiological unity of humankind there may not be very much variance in the genetic component.
Look at my analogy with language: people learn the language of their parents, but that doesn't mean language ability has no genetic basis.
Today's post, Ethical Inhibitions was originally published on 19 October 2008. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):
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