shminux comments on The Useful Idea of Truth - Less Wrong

77 Post author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 02 October 2012 06:16PM

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Comment author: shminux 02 October 2012 06:31:53AM 1 point [-]

Since my expectations sometimes conflict with my subsequent experiences, I need different names for the thingies that determine my experimental predictions and the thingy that determines my experimental results. I call the former thingies 'beliefs', and the latter thingy 'reality'.

You ought to admit that the statement 'there is "the thingy that determines my experimental results"' is a belief. A useful belief, but still a belief. And forgetting that sometimes leads to meaningless questions like "Which interpretation of QM is true?" or "Is wave function a real thing?"

Comment author: Peterdjones 02 October 2012 08:31:55PM * 1 point [-]

You ought to admit that the statement 'there is "the thingy that determines my experimental results"' is a belief.

Why? Didn;t anyone ever see results that conflict with their beliefs?

Comment author: shminux 02 October 2012 09:15:56PM 0 points [-]

Yes... and...? Feel free to explicate the missing steps between what I wrote and what you did.

Comment author: Peterdjones 03 October 2012 09:03:26AM 1 point [-]

So what was it that conflicted with their beliefs, when they saw a result that conflicte with their beliefs?

Comment author: Decius 03 October 2012 02:04:28AM 0 points [-]

The actual belief is "This thingy which determines my experimental results is internally consistent and the rules governing it are time-invariant."

Where are your experimental results? Where are your beliefs? If they aren't the same thing, how can you compare them?

And finally: What would you expect to see if the thingy which determined the results of your experiments didn't have the qualities you ascribe to it? Try to avoid putting the question a meta-level up; my conclusion is that there is no evidence which doesn't support the premise that what I call reality is capricious and transient- but that if it is, there is no change in expected outcome from any decision I can make.

Comment author: shminux comment score below threshold [+] (21 children)

Comment author: shminux 03 October 2012 04:52:20AM -4 points [-]

Sorry, I had trouble following your chain of logic. Maybe it would help if I express mine, it probably matches some standard philosophical model to some degree. The basic point is that people have some sensory experiences which we can model and predict reasonably accurately (like seeing rocks fall to the ground). We can also affect these experiences (for example, by throwing said rocks before seeing them fall). Next, we can certainly anticipate to some how our actions affect our future experiences (throwing rocks in order to see them fall). So the first trivial model is that there is an input stream (sensory experiences) and an output stream (actions), and some processing in between. This processing is what I mean by "models". Some of these are innate, others learned. Some models are useful (they predict future experiences well), some not so useful (like "black cats are bad luck"). One of those models is "there is this thingy from which experiences come from, let's call it reality". This happens to be an excellent model, very useful in many cases, because it predicts our future sensory experiences so well. So much so, it is easy to forget that this is but a model. If you forget it, then you start asking questions like "are all possible worlds real?" and other modal realism silliness. Indeed, to me "real" means only one thing: it's a part of that shiny model that states that our experiences come from "reality". Do modal realists seriously suggest that our experiences come from "all possible worlds"? Not as far as I know, given that one world seems to be plenty. This dissolves (for me) the modal realism questions, the QM interpretational questions and other dangling notions like "objective truth".

This approach may some day prove too cautious if, say, we find evidence that we are a simulation and the way the simulation is constructed includes that immutable reality from which our experiences come from. On that day I might be persuaded to become a realist. Until then, I am happy to agree that reality is a good model, it explains repeatable experiences and alleviates the worries about the sun not rising tomorrow for no good reason.

Comment author: pragmatist 03 October 2012 06:15:19AM * 4 points [-]

How are you conceiving of this output stream of actions? If you think of it as just a set of experiences (e.g. the experience of throwing a rock), then I don't see how it's distinct from the input stream. If you think of it as actual actions, like actually throwing a rock, then it seems to me you've already committed yourself at this stage to an external reality -- how can you a throw a rock if there are no rocks or, for that matter, if you have no limbs? -- and "reality" isn't just an explanatory model linking your input and output streams.

Comment author: shminux 03 October 2012 06:40:15AM 1 point [-]

You have a point, the only feedback of an action being taken is from the subsequent inputs, so I suppose I should think of simple actions as micro-models. Thanks. The meta-model of external reality comes in handy when you don't want to over-think it. What else did I miss?

Comment author: nshepperd 03 October 2012 03:34:07PM 2 points [-]

You're using an AIXI-like notion of senses and actions related by a turing machine or other computation? Isn't such a model annoyingly incomplete in that it can by design provide no explanation for how the input and output streams themselves came about?

Comment author: shminux 03 October 2012 04:32:25PM * 0 points [-]

provide no explanation for how the input and output streams themselves came about?

Right, you postulate input streams and use the feedback from our intentions to act back to the input streams to define outputs. Whether this is more complicated than postulating external reality is a separate discussion.

Comment author: nshepperd 03 October 2012 05:50:43PM 2 points [-]

Um, I don't think I'm concerned with "complexity" as such. It's more like...

Consider the Newtonian universe. "This place" is a euclidean space full of little billiard balls bouncing back and forth. You can point at some subset of the universe and say "that's me". If I ask "why am I seeing [something]?" you can answer that with "because that thing there is a brain, the one computing your experience of consciousness, and it is attached to eyes which happen to be looking at [something]". I guess, it's reductionist.

In the AIXI/instrumentalist model, "sensory input" doesn't seem to reduce to anything else, and the self is "taken for granted". Doesn't that bother you?

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Comment author: Peterdjones 03 October 2012 12:06:05PM * 3 points [-]

One of those models is "there is this thingy from which experiences come from, let's call it reality"

Or, to give it is full title, "there is this thingy from which experiences come from, let's call it reality, and it is in the territory and not part of the map"

it predicts our future sensory experiences so well. So much so, it is easy to forget that this is but a model.

Who's forgetting what? Our meta-model of model-making is that you can make as many models as you like of something, and the original doens't vanish. Making a model of the territory doens't turn it into a map.

If you forget it, then you start asking questions like "are all possible worlds real?" and other modal realism silliness. I

Well, you've thrown out the single world as well. All the babies went out with the bathwater.

This dissolves (for me)[..]other dangling notions like "objective truth".

I'll say. Once you have asumed that the territory is just another map, it becomes impossible to explain why anyone would care about getting into alignment with it.

t reality is a good model, it explains repeatable experiences

"I have a model which says my exeriences will repeat, therefore they will repeat". Hmmmm.

Comment author: DaFranker 03 October 2012 04:43:02PM * 2 points [-]

You're making some good points. Unfortunately, shminux is often just that easy to pattern-match with "naive postmodernist" stereotypes, which doesn't help for charitable interpretation.

In my experience, his points are usually more coherent than this (or, in most cases, more coherent than an average interpretation of his posts' contents would suggest).

The charitable interpretation is that shminux always implies in his points something similar to Eliezer's notions that you can't just step outside of your own perceptions to see the territory directly, but do have some mechanisms already in place that receive "new" information from somewhere which you have no control over, which is what (AFAICT) shminux calls "reality".

Basically, AFAICT, shminux draws the boundaries for the term/concept "reality" in a slightly different area/manner, one that allows him to remove the node "external territory" entirely without sacrificing practical points like "believing I can fly doesn't prevent me from going splat if I jump off a building". The utility of this difference is apparently obvious to him, and debated by others.

Comment author: thomblake 03 October 2012 05:27:22PM 2 points [-]

The charitable interpretation is that shminux always implies in his points something similar to Eliezer's notions that you can't just step outside of your own perceptions to see the territory directly, but do have some mechanisms already in place that receive "new" information from somewhere which you have no control over, which is what (AFAICT) shminux calls "reality".

That's a little too charitable though, since that's effectively the view shminux is arguing against.

Comment author: DaFranker 03 October 2012 05:37:45PM 0 points [-]

That's a good point, if your assessment of what shminux argues against is better than mine. It probably is, since I can't yet make useful predictions on this.

Comment author: [deleted] 03 October 2012 03:50:12PM 1 point [-]

I'm having some trouble understanding you, because I'm not sure what you mean when you use the word 'model'. Could you explain that more directly? Assume my only grasp on the word has to do with small plastic airplanes.

Comment author: shminux 03 October 2012 04:40:01PM 0 points [-]

:) I wish I could start with small plastic airplanes... By a model I mean an algorithm taking existing inputs and predicting future ones. I'm sure there are more formal definitions around.

Comment author: Decius 03 October 2012 10:08:31AM -2 points [-]

Throwing the rock doesn't prove that the rock exists. By the time that you concretize to the point that you can talk about interacting with the world, you have already made some completely unjustifiable assumptions about how the world works. What premise allows you to make the jump from "I perceive that there is a rock there" to "There is a rock there"?

The hypothesis that reality is impermanent is nonfalsifiable; there is no way to show evidence for or against the theory that the universe came into existence already a consistent whole, including my memories of beginning to type this post. There is also no way to differentiate a universe which came into existence a moment ago and will pass out of existence in a moment from the persistent model that you use.

Comment author: shminux 03 October 2012 02:59:25PM * 0 points [-]

Throwing the rock doesn't prove that the rock exists.

I never used the word "exist" in relation to physical objects once. Clearly you have sensory inputs which are best explained by the rock in question existing, though. As I said, reality is a useful model. The rest of your logic is pure strawman.

Comment author: thomblake 03 October 2012 03:07:59PM 1 point [-]

The rest of your logic is pure strawman.

You seem to be getting this sort of response a lot. You should probably increase your credence in the hypothesis that you're being unclear, rather than that everyone is deliberately misrepresenting you.

Comment author: DaFranker 03 October 2012 04:48:04PM * 0 points [-]

Could you give me some feedback on whether this response contains a more appropriate description of your point? I've skipped over some important stuff at the end as for what exactly your model entails, but I believe with some more explanation you'd obviously describe things better than I currently could.

Comment author: shminux 03 October 2012 05:00:10PM 0 points [-]

I certainly agree with your last paragraph.

Comment author: Decius 04 October 2012 08:13:54AM -1 points [-]

Reality is only a useful model within the model of reality; outside of the model of reality, having models is in general not useful.

What makes the model of reality 'useful', as opposed to any of the models which are mutually exclusive with reality?

Comment author: Peterdjones 04 October 2012 09:29:07AM 1 point [-]

Huh?

Comment author: Decius 04 October 2012 01:08:00PM 1 point [-]

If the world existed only as a suitably advanced hallucination, would your experiences would not be different. A hallucination which at this moment is remembered to have had followed certain rules is under no obligation to continue to follow those rules.

Comment author: Peterdjones 03 October 2012 10:27:43AM -1 points [-]

So much for pure empiricism, then. However, Best Explanation deals with that just fine.

shminux comments on The Useful Idea of Truth - Less Wrong

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