RobinZ comments on The Useful Idea of Truth - Less Wrong
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Looking at Furslid's answer, I discovered that my definition is somewhat ambiguous - a statement may be implied or refuted by quite a lot of different kinds of models, some of which are nearly useless and some of which are anything but, and my definition offers no guidance on the question of which model's usefulness reflects the statement's meaningfulness.
Plus, I'm not entirely sure how it works with regards to logical contradictions.
Where Recursive Justification Hits Bottom and its comment thread should be interesting to you.
In the end, we have to rely on the logical theory of probability (as well as standard logical laws, such as the law of noncontradiction). There is no better choice.
Using Bayes' theorem (beginning with priors set by Occam's Razor) tells you how useful your model is.
I think I was unclear. What I was considering was along the following lines:
What occurred to me just now, as I wrote out the example, is the idea of simplicity. If you penalize models that add complexity without addition of practical value, the professor's list will be rapidly cut from almost any model more general than "what answer will receive a good grade on this professor's tests?"