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thomblake comments on The Useful Idea of Truth - Less Wrong
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"Possible" is an important qualifier there. Since 0 and 1 are not probabilities, you are not describing a possible world.
The comment doesn't lose too much if we take 'definite' to mean 0.99999 instead of 1. (I would tend to write 'almost certainly' in such contexts to avoid this kind of problem.)
Yvain's objection fails if "definitely" means "with probability 0.99999". In that case the conditional probability P( encounter civilization | universe contracts) is well-defined.
Oh, I thought I retracted the grandparent. Nevermind---it does need more caveats in the expression for it to return to being meaningful.
I think it loses its force entirely in that case. Nisan's proposal was a counterfactual, and Yvain's counter was a possible world where that counterfactual cannot obtain. Since there is no such possible world, the objection falls flat.
If this claim is meaningful, isn't Nisan's proposal false?
No. Why would that be?