Thanks for this whole comment. In particular,

There are, incidentally, a group of philosophers who do take the T-sentences to be a full definition of truth, or at least to be all that we can say about truth. But these are not correspondence theorists. They are deflationists.

My gut instinct is deflationist, but I don't see this view as being opposed to "correspondence". The alleged conflict is dubious at best. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy writes:

the correspondence intuition so understood would endorse:

(8) The proposition that snow is white is true because snow is white

Now, the problem with (8) is that, when we combine it with the deflationary theory-or at least with a necessary version of that theory-we can derive something that is plainly false. Someone who holds a necessary version of deflationism would clearly be committed to the necessary truth of:

(9) The proposition that snow is white is true iff snow is white.

And, since (9) is a necessary truth, it is very plausible to suppose that (8) and (9) together entail:

(10) Snow is white because snow is white.

Unfortunately, however, (10) is false. The reason is that the relation reported by ‘because’ in (8) and (10) is a causal or explanatory relation, and such relations must obtain between distinct relata.

Emphasis added: the italicized premise is false. Explanation is a cognitive feat, and the same fact (even if the identity is a necessary one) can be cognized in different ways. (Such explanations occur frequently enough in mathematics, I think.) The SEP author anticipates my objection and writes:

If ‘because’ creates an opaque context, then it would be illegitimate to suppose that (8) and (9) entail (10). This too is a possibility; however, it is not clear that ‘because’ creates opaque context of the right kind. In general we can distinguish two kinds of opaque context: intensional contexts, which allow the substitution of necessarily co-referring expressions but not contingently co-referring expressions; and hyper-intensional contexts, which do not even allow the substitution of necessarily co-referring expressions. If the inference from (8) and (9) to (10) is to be successfully blocked, it is necessary that ‘because’ creates a hyper-intensional context. However, it is open to a friend of the correspondence objection to argue that, while ‘because’ creates an intensional context, it does not create a hyper-intensional context.

It is open to them to argue that "because" does not create a hyper-intensional context, but it is much more plausible that it does. So until a good argument comes along, mark me down as a correspondence deflationist.