The Litany of Tarski has connections to certain versions of the direction-of-fit model of beliefs and desires. The model is usually considered a descriptive attempt at cashing out the difference between the functional role played by beliefs and desires. Both beliefs and desires are intentional states, they have propositional content (we believe that p, we desire that p). According to the direction-of-fit model, the crucial difference between beliefs and desires is the relation between the content of these states and the world -- specifically, the direction of fit between the content and the world differs. In the case of beliefs, subjects try to fit the content to the world, whereas in the case of desires, subjects try to fit the world to the content.

However, some philosophers treat the direction-of-fit model not as descriptive but as normative. The model tells us that the representational contents of our beliefs and desires should be kept rigorously separate (don't let your conception of how the world is be contaminated by your conception of how you would like it to be) and that we should have different attitudes to the contents of these mental states. Here's Mark Platts, from his book Ways of Meaning:

Beliefs aim at being true, and their being true is their fitting the world; falsity is a decisive failing in a belief, and false beliefs should be discarded; beliefs should be changed to fit with the world, not vice versa. Desires aim at realization, and their realization is the world fitting with them; the fact that the indicative content of a desire is not realized is not yet a failing in the desire, and not yet any reason to discard the desire; the world, crudely, should be changed to fit with our desires, and not vice versa.

Also related (but not referring to the map/territory distinction as explicitly) is what Ken Binmore calls "Aesop's principle" (in reference to the fable in which a fox who cannot reach some grapes decides that the grapes must be sour). From his book Rational Decisions:

[An agent's] preferences, her beliefs, and her assessments of what is feasible should all be independent of each other.

For example, the kind of pessimism that might make [the agent] predict that it is bound to rain now that she has lost her umbrella is irrational. Equally irrational is the kind of optimism that Voltaire was mocking when he said that if God didn't exit, it would be necessary to invent Him.

I should note that Binmore is talking about terminal preferences here. Of course, instrumental preferences need not (indeed, should not) be independent of our beliefs about the world and our assessments of what is feasible.