What I'm saying is that although I enjoy the fact that my daughter is alive, that's because my intuitions are broken.

I prefer the you that you consider broken to the ideal that you believe you advocate.

I notice I am very confused. Are you some form of solipsist? Do you endorse selfishness? Or believe that "altruism" just means "I care about my own mental state of believing my decisions make others happy"?

Does that apply only to people you can't interact with in principle, or to everyone you don't interact with? E.g., if I tell you "Someone on the other side of the planet is being tortured, if you press this button a rescue team will be sent", do you pay $1 to get access to the button, or do you stare at me blankly and say "I'll never meet this 'victim' or 'rescue team', they don't meaningfully exist." and go donate to a charity that sends donors pictures of the kids they've helped?

I am rather saying that your values may extend to things you do not (and will not, ever) know about, and therefore it may be necessary to make estimations about likelihoods of things that you do not (and will not, ever) know about.

It seems like a waste of time to think about things I can't ever know about. It seems like make-believe to place objective value on the existence of things that I'll never be able to experience or interact with. I don't understand why I should care about things that I will never ever know or experience. My values are broken insofar as they lead me to value abstract concepts in and of themselves, as opposed to physical things that I can interact with.

I'd like to point out that my interpretation means I'll fight like hell to keep my daughter inside my light-cone, because I don't want to lose her. Your interpretation means you'll be content with the idea of your daughters existence in the abstract, and to me that's no different than belief in an afterlife. I point this out because I think the initial example emphasizes the "downsides" to my position while ignoring any corresponding "upsides" that it might entail.

In this case, the epistemological work is being done by an assumption of regularity and a non-privileging of your particular position in the physical laws of the universe, which make it seem more likely that there is not anything special about crossing your light cone as opposed to just moving somewhere else where she will happen to have no communication with you in the future.

I thought about this. It turns out I've been using a modified version of Hume's problem of induction as the basis for my argument, in the back of my head. When it comes to real life and my future, I'm willing to temporarily discard the problem of induction because doing so brings me rewards. When it comes to things beyond my light cone and my experiences, I'm not, because there is no such reward and never could be.

In other words, I have a heuristic in my head that says paradoxes only go away when it is pragmatic to ignore them, because otherwise you sacrifice mental accuracy. This heuristic means that I'm not willing to discard the problem of induction when it comes to experiences and existences beyond my range of interaction.

Hopefully that makes my position clearer to you. It's not that I'm privileging my own position; it's that my position is the only one I have to work from and that I have no idea how things would work outside my light cone.