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Emile comments on The Fabric of Real Things - Less Wrong
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Koan 2:
"Does your rule there forbid epiphenomenalist theories of consciousness - that consciousness is caused by neurons, but doesn't affect those neurons in turn? The classic argument for epiphenomenal consciousness has always been that we can imagine a universe in which all the atoms are in the same place and people behave exactly the same way, but there's nobody home - no awareness, no consciousness, inside the brain. The usual effect of the brain generating consciousness is missing, but consciousness doesn't cause anything else in turn - it's just a passive awareness - and so from the outside the universe looks the same. Now, I'm not so much interested in whether you think epiphenomenal theories of consciousness are true or false - rather, I want to know if you think they're impossible or meaningless a priori based on your rules."
How would you reply?
So if Universe A features epiphenomenal consciousness, and Universe B doesn't, and that we consider the statement that we are in universe A and not universe B, then looking back at the rule:
These "causal links" you trace out are part of the map, not part of the territory - you have to be able to deduce their existence. And in this case (unlike the spaceship scenario), there is no way anybody can deduce the existence of the neuron -> consciousness link, since by definition nothing can be observed about the consciousness.
=> so, firmly in the "meaningless" camp.