I agree. In terms of my statement regarding those who hold that:

CDT loses in NP and then proponents of CDT just whine about NP by complaining about predictors that punish rational people.

My claim wasn't that this wasn't a suitable conclusion but rather that it wasn't a suitable starting point. As you note, it's good to construct a steel man of an opponent's argument before attacking it but even more crucially, it's important that we don't attack straw men. The view of CDT in the FAQ isn't even a steel man, it's just the position advocated by many proponents of CDT. Attacking anything weaker than this is attacking a straw man. So proponents of CDT may whine that NP punishes irrational agents but they at least have an argument as to why NP punishes irrational agents as well. Ignoring this argument while attacking its conclusion is undesirable.

(That's all just a statement of what we seem to be agreeing about).

I just brought this up because I wasn't sure whether the original sentence I quoted was painted with "this sentence has lukeprog/crazy88's unconditional support" or "this sentence belongs as part of the CDT philosophy".

Definitely not - this section of the FAQ is summarising a popular view, not endorsing it. I took the words "on this account" to mean that the statement wasn't being endorsed but rather a particular account being summarised. However, perhaps this could be made more clear (as follows?)

Consequently, the proponent of CDT will argue that, insofar as decision theory is about determining which decision is rational, CDT reasons correctly in Newcomb’s problem.

In terms of this:

Is it worth mentioning (in a different section) the problems of reconciling the CDT model of a "decision" with reductionism?

The FAQ is meant to be more of a basic level introduction to decision theory so I'm not sure if this is the place for it. But Luke's the one who knows the master plan.