Matt_Simpson comments on Causal Reference - Less Wrong

30 Post author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 20 October 2012 10:12PM

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Comment author: Matt_Simpson 28 October 2012 09:48:43PM 0 points [-]

one would also need additional code to "read off" the part of the simulated universe that corresponded to the camera inputs. That additional code looks like epiphenomenal mind-stuff.

I don't understand why the additional code looks like epiphenomenal mind-stuff. Care to explain?

Comment author: gwern 28 October 2012 11:12:00PM 2 points [-]

I take Carl to meaning that: the program corresponding to 'universe A simulating universe B and I am in universe B' is strictly more complex than 'I am in universe B' while also predicting all the same observations, and so the 'universe A simulating universe B' part of the program makes no difference in the same way that mental epiphenomena make no difference - they predict you will make the same observations, while being strictly more complex.

Comment author: CarlShulman 29 October 2012 09:18:44PM 0 points [-]

This seems to be talking about something entirely different.

Comment author: SilasBarta 28 October 2012 11:59:15PM 0 points [-]

the program corresponding to 'universe A simulating universe B and I am in universe B' is strictly more complex than 'I am in universe B' while also predicting all the same observations, and so the 'universe A simulating universe B' part of the program makes no difference in the same way that mental epiphenomena make no difference - they predict you will make the same observations, while being strictly more complex.

True, but, just as a reminder, that's not the position we're in. There are other (plausibly necessary) parts of our world model that could give us the implication "universe A simulates us" "for free", just as we get "the electron that goes beyond our cosmological horizon keeps existing" is an implication we get "for free" as a result of minimal models of physics.

In this case (per the standard Simulation Argument), the need to resolve the question of "what happens in civilizations that can construct virtual worlds indistinguishable from non-virtual worlds" can force us to posit parts of a (minimal) model that then imply the existence of universe A.

Comment author: Matt_Simpson 28 October 2012 11:32:38PM 0 points [-]

Ah, ok, that makes sense. Thanks!

Comment author: CarlShulman 29 October 2012 09:17:30PM 1 point [-]

The code simulating a physical universe doesn't need to make any reference to which brain or camera in the simulation is being "read off" to provide the sensory input stream. The additional code takes the simulation, which is a complete picture of the world according to the laws of physics as they are seen by the creatures in the simulation, and outputs a sensory stream. This function is directly analogous to what dualist/epiphenomenalist philosopher of mind David Chalmers calls "psychophysical laws."

Comment author: Gust 26 December 2012 04:15:24AM 0 points [-]

I don't know if this insight is originally yours or not, but thank you for it. It's like you just gave me a piece of the puzzle I was missing (even if I still don't know where it fits).