Peterdjones comments on Proofs, Implications, and Models - Less Wrong

58 Post author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 30 October 2012 01:02PM

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Comment author: Peterdjones 04 November 2012 12:46:04PM 1 point [-]

If you are a simulation, then the kind of consciousness you think you have is by definition simulable. Right down to your simulated scepticism that it is possible.

But one can't assume that is the case in order to prove the premise.

Comment author: scav 05 November 2012 07:08:19PM 1 point [-]

Nor can you assume that is not the case to argue against being inside a simulation. Speculations about whether consciousness can be simulated are no help either way. If you're being simulated you don't have any base reality to perform experiments on to decide what things are true. You don't even have a testable model of what you might be being simulated on.

So, deciding between two logically consistent but incompatible hypotheses that you can't directly test, you're down to Occam's Razor, which I think favours base reality rather than a simulated universe.

Comment author: Peterdjones 06 November 2012 10:28:32AM 1 point [-]

I agree with all of that. But Bostrom's argument is a bad choice for EY's purposes, because the flaws in it are subtle and not really a case of any one premise being plumb wrong.