Rationality Quotes November 2012
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On the error of failing to appreciate your opponents' three-dimensionality:
Source: Milton Friedman, "Schools at Chicago," from The Indispensable Milton Friedman
H/T David Henderson at EconLog
Note: The final sentence of the passage, as presented by Henderson, is missing closing quotation marks. I have added them.
Robert Anton Wilson
Therefore, the first and most important duty of philosophy is to test impressions, choosing between them and only deploying those that have passed the test. You know how, with money--an area where we believe our interest to be at stake--we have developed the art of assaying, and considerable ingenuity has gone into developing a way to test if coins are counterfeit, involving our senses of sight, smell, hearing, and touch. The assayer will let the denarius drop and listen intently to its ring; and he is not satisfied to listen just once: after repeated listenings he practically acquires a musician's subtle ear. It is a measure of the effort we are prepared to expend to guard against deception when accuracy is at a premium.
When it comes to our poor mind, however, we can't be bothered; we are satisfied accepting any and all impressions, because here the loss we suffer is not obvious. If you want to know just how little concerned you are about things good and bad, and how serious about things indifferent, compare your attitude to going blind with your attitude about being mentally in the dark. You will realize, I think, how inappropriate your values really are.
Epictetus, Discourses I.20.7-12 (pages 51-52 of this edition) (original Greek, with alternate translations at the link)
Edited to correct a typo.
It is somewhat amazing to me that there are people who much less concerned about their ability to recognize false reasoning than their ability to recognize counterfeit currency. It seems pathetically obvious to me that sloppiness in the former, meta level would tend to be expensive at the latter, object level - for example, you end up with people placing their trust in tools like iodine pens to detect counterfeit notes when almost no evidence exists that such a measure is effective.
Currency is binary, either genuine or counterfeit. Ideas are on a continuum, some less wrong than others. Generally, bad ideas are dangerous because there's some truth or utility to them; few people are seduced by palpable nonsense. Parsing mixed ideas is a big part of rationality, and it's harder than spotting fake money.
A technicality: Officially, currency is binary, but in practice that's not the case. Fake currency that is convincing still has value. A fake dollar bill with a 50% probability of going un-noticed is in practice worth 50 cents (ignoring social consequences of passing off fake money). Fake currency with 100% convincingness is 100% as valuable as real currency (until you make enough to cause inflation).
Why?
Keith E. Stanovich, How to Think Straight About Psychology, 10th ed. (2013), 14.
ETA: Should have included the subsequent paragraph:
These aren't exactly opposed - 'out of sight, out of mind' is generally applied to things and problems, not, say, warm relationships.
Some of the others aren't exactly opposed either - I've generally heard not crossing a bridge before you get to it referring to trying to solve a problem you anticipate before it's possible to actually start solving the problem.
Really? I've seen it used twice for non-relationship contexts, but too many times to care to count (on the order of 50-80) in the context of long-distance relationships, usually as a warning that a couple should not hope to remain steady and trust eachother if they become far apart for a long period of time (months or more) for the first time since entering a relationship.
In fiction, this either turns into a self-fulfilling prophecy or becomes the whole reason the main character can complete the main quest.
In reality, the causal influence doesn't seem to be there, but anecdotally I observe that the drifting-apart usually happens regardless of whether any such prediction was made. Knowledge of this leads a significant fraction of couples to break-up preemptively when they're about to enter such a situation.
Alex Tabarrok
-Paul Graham in The Lies We Tell Kids
This sounds like a challenge. Would you prefer your children to not swear; and if yes, why?
My reasoning would be that I want my children to be successful (for both altruistic and selfish reasons), and I believe that a habit of swearing is on average harmful to social skills.
Disclaimer: There are situations where swearing is the right thing to do, so it would be optimal to swear exactly in these situations. But it would be difficult for a child to determine these situations precisely; and from the simple strategies, "never swear" (which often develops towards "don't swear in presence of adult people or someone who would inform them") seems very good.
I like to be around people who don't constantly emphasize their every word, making it hard to tell when something is actually important. Since swearing is a verbal marker of importance, its casual overuse is like shouting all the time; it's very wearying. And, lest I be accused of rationalising, I do not only apply this to children, but have also asked my wife to cut back on swearing.
As a side note, Americans are very loud, both in the literal sense of putting more decibels behind their voices, and in their over-reliance on swearing. I think you've fallen into the bad equilibrium that comes about when everyone has an incentive to be a little louder than the next guy, and there's no cost to being so.
Thank you for this. I've been wondering reflectively why I've been swearing more frequently lately, and I just realized that it's to make sure my voice is heard. I'll try to attack the root of this and instead get my attention-validation from having good things to say rather than saying them most crassly.
I'm almost sure this is mainly a status thing. Frequent swearing is perceived as crass, a lower-class practice, and so aspirational parents encourage their children not to. This intent then proceeds to backfire when children develop their own social networks: status relations among children and young teenagers are quite different from adult ones, and swearing in this context is often a marker of independence and perceived maturity. This gradually unwinds during the teenage years as swearing in the presence of adults becomes more socially acceptable and adult-style status relations start to assert themselves.
The only thing that confuses me about this model is the lack of countersignaling, but perhaps children of that age can't reliably parse signaling at that level of indirection. Or maybe I just don't remember enough childhood social dynamics.
Or you could, y'know, try to think of a better way.
That you know what a policy of punishing swearing develops into ("don't swear in presence of adult people or someone who would inform them") shows that you have the ability to think forwards into the consequences, but also hints at some sort of stopping, perhaps motivated (because hey, finding better solutions is hard).
Clearly, you also have the ability to reason a bit further: What sort of microsociety does the above behavior encourage once they get into high school, where the majority of their perceivable world is a miniature scheduled wildland?
When I was six and used swear words in front of my school principal (hey, when you spend half the day in the principal's office for the 13th time, you kinda get used to someone), he later brought it up with my parents (though I vaguely recall it wasn't in any negative manner). My parents immediately started reprimanding me, naturally, but he stopped them, and afterwards they changed strategies based on his advice and some insight they gained from reading more research and books on related topics.
I'm certainly glad they did, in retrospect, because in the twisted social environment that high schools are, a good swearing strategy can be extremely effective. I don't know how widely this'd work, YMMV and all that, but a "leave me alone" usually didn't get prospective bullies off my back. If I then followed up with a steady gaze and a "leave me the fuck alone" (yes, I know, but that's how 14-year-olds talked when I was there), now suddenly they'd grow much more cautious and start re-evaluating whether they should still try to play their little status game and get their cheap fun, when someone who rarely ever swears had just signaled to them that shit got serious.
All in all, "never swear" seems to me like it never actually works, and takes much more effort to attempt (by punishing every single instance of swearing that you can find, even though you know you can only find a small fraction of them) than other strategies like teaching "swearing gets less useful and powerful each time you use it, so if you always keep it as a reserve it'll be that much more effective".
Oh, I was not specific enough. What I wanted to write is that a habit of swearing is harmful to your social skills after you leave the school. Imagine a person at a job interview saying: "Yeah, I know the fucking Java, but NetBeans is gay, and if you ain't doing unit tests like all the time, you are seriously retarded, man." ;-)
Probably no one would do this intentionally, but the problem is, if you get a habit of swearing, then sometimes a word or two slips through, often unnoticed (by you; but your audience is shocked). At some moment this happened to me (no, not at a job interview, at least I think so), and after getting a feedback I decided to be extra careful. Which I would want to teach my children. I was very lucky to get that feedback, because most people assume that others are well aware of all the words they use.
Nick Cooney, Change of Heart
In which Winnie-the-Pooh tests a hypothesis about the animal tracks that he is following through the woods:
Hasok Chang, Inventing Temperature: Measurement and Scientific Progress
-- Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History
Paul Valéry
Teachings of Diogenes
Another from the same site — on free will:
The real irony of the story is a historical context I think most readers these days miss: that when the real Plato paid court to a 'king' - Dionysius II, tyrant of Syracuse - it went very poorly. Plato was arrested, and barely managed to arrange his freedom & return to Athens.
Twice.
And supposedly Plato was sold into slavery by the previous tyrant.
This works until the king sends armed men to confiscate your vegetables.
"Once, Chuang Tzu was fishing the P’u River when the King of Ch’u sent two of his ministers to announce that he wished to entrust to Chuang Tzu the care of his entire domain.
Chuang Tzu held his fishing pole and, without turning his head, said: 'I have heard that Ch’u possesses a sacred tortoise which has been dead for three thousand years and which the king keeps wrapped up in a box and stored in his ancestral temple. Is this tortoise better off dead and with its bones venerated, or would it be better off alive with its tail dragging in the mud?'
'It would be better off alive and dragging its tail in the mud,' the two ministers replied.
'Then go away!' said Chuang Tzu, 'and I will drag my tail in the mud!'"
Sean Thomason
Everything is always better with fucking.
I think people tell you that when you aren't as good at the inside the box things as your competitors and need to take a risk to set yourself apart. Thinking outside the box is a gamble, which may be the only shot for someone in a losing position. Of course, that's from a business perspective, where I've tended to hear it more. For a science/truth seeking perspective I'd say "Don't forget to look at the box from outside from time to time."
--Michael Gazzaniga
Source: The Economist's "Babbage" blog, in a post on exoplanets
(Of course, science advances when reality agrees with models too.)
Edited to remove "emphasis added" from the quotation, which I had added originally but have since decided against.
-- The Science of Discworld, Terry Pratchett, Ian Stewart and Jack Cohen
Yes, yes it does. Otherwise, what would be the point? There's an infinity of ways to get things wrong; you don't want to spend your life catalouging them.
The word "right" (without the use of modifiers such as “exactly”) might sound too weak and easily satisfiable, but I think the idea is the following: Theories that may seem complete and robust today might be found to be incomplete or wrong in the future. You cannot claim certainty in them, although you can probably claim high confidence under certain conditions.
You can't ever claim absolute certainty in anything. There's no 1.0 probability in predictions about the universe. But science can create claims of being "right" as strong and justified as any other known process. Saying "science doesn't claim to get things right" is false, unless you go on to say "nothing can (correctly) claim to get things right, it's epistemologically impossible".
--Bertrand Russell, "Philosophy's Ulterior Motives". (The context is Descartes' philosophy and the obviously fallacious proofs he offers of the existence of God and the external world.)
Or laziness, or lack of time, or honest error. Multiple causes can have the same effect, and hanlons razor comes into play/
I think men whose reasoning powers are that good are few and far between. (Women too, I'm not trying to be some sort of sexist here.)
I've encountered the phenomena described in this quote and used it as a signal in the game of Mafia. It's quite effective but I think has limited general application.
--Borderlands 2
(House, MD deals with moral grandstanding)
Is the expected number of people you'd save by doing that actually greater than 1?
I checked the numbers on this recently. An average heart transplant costs about 1.1 million dollars, and has a mean survival time of about five years (at a very poor QoL). I think there's a pretty strong case that they shouldn't be done at all.
Kidney transplants have a much better RoI, but they don't require the death of the donor.
Does that include the cost of finding a donor?
There are other estimates available on the web, but I worked off this one:
http://www.transplantliving.org/before-the-transplant/financing-a-transplant/the-costs/
Cost of finding a donor is under 'procurement'. As far as I can tell, the immunosuppressant entry only covers the first year of post-transplant care, so factoring in a five-year mean survival time gives the $1.1 million figure I mentioned.
$1.1M was at least an order of magnitude larger than my guesstimate for the price of the transplant itself, so I wondered if that figure included something else. [follows link] OK, the figure for "physician during transplant" was indeed within an order of magnitude of what I expected, but hardly any of the other expenses had even occurred to me.
Jason Brennan, Libertarianism: What Everyone Needs to Know
http://forums.catholic.com/showpost.php?s=911f001b47b040ac5997321714c0244b&p=7081969&postcount=8
“It was designed to look like one” does sound like a connection to me.
--Carl Sagan
New Yorker article on David Deutsch
(I saw this on Scott Aaronson's blog)
"His mother had often said, When you choose an action, you choose the consequences of that action. She had emphasized the corollary of this axiom even more vehemently: when you desired a consequence you had damned well better take the action that would create it." - Lois McMaster Bujold, writer (b. 1949)
-Epicurus
I need help on this: I'm torn between finding this argument to be preposterous, and being unable to deny the premises or call the argument invalid.
You are allowed to have preferences about things that don't coexist with you.
I can think of two possible things Epicurus could have meant, one correct and the other incorrect. We don't need to fear the experience of being dead, because there's no experience of being dead. But if we care about saving wild geese, then we should avoid dying, because our dying leads to fewer saved geese.
It's pretty much correct, as far as I can see. One should avoid death because s/he values life, rather than cling to life because s/he fears death.
At the very least, even assuming there's no reason to worry about your own death, you would probably still care about the deaths of others -- at least your friends and family. Given a group of people who mutually value having each other in their lives, death should still be a subject of enormous concern. I don't grant the premise that we shouldn't be concerned about death even for ourselves, but I don't think that premise is enough to justify Epicurus's attitude here.
Of course, for most of human history, there genuinely wasn't much of anything that could be done about death, and there's value in recognizing that death doesn't render life meaningless, even if it's a tragedy. But today, when there actually are solutions on the table, this quote sounds more in complacency than acceptance. Upvoted though, because it points to an important cluster of questions that's worth untangling.
-Sennett Forell, Foundation and Empire
-- A dialogue by Philip Gasper
Hilarious. It reminded me of Dennett's "Superficiality vs. Hysterical Realism" (which is much more serious and academic, though).
--xkcd.
Doctor Who
-- John Allen Paulos(from Beyond Numeracy)
Source: Andrew Sullivan in an otherwise fairly bland political post
More often than not it hits you first.
Paul Graham
False.
I mean, grain of truth, yes, literally true, no. You can shock the hell out of people and distinguish yourselves quite well by doing rational things.
You can shock many people by doing some rational things - those preselected for not being done by most people already, and also those that are explicitly counter to important irrational things that many people do. And these specific rational actions have an availability bias. Conversely, once something is "normal", it's not a highly available mental example of "especially rational".
But can you really shock many people by doing a randomly selected rational thing? By giving the right answer on a test? By choosing the deal that gains you the most money? By choosing a profession, a friend, a place to live, based on expectations of happiness? By choosing medical treatment based on scientific evidence? By doing something because it's fun?
It might shock people that the choice is in fact rational; they may disagree that the deal you chose will earn you the most money. But when people agree about predictions, why would they be shocked by most rational choices? I think a random (but doable) irrational act is much more shocking than a random rational one.
Paul Krugman says something similar
(Very close to the end of Ricardo's Difficult Idea] )
Well, it is similar insofar as "reciting the contents of a standard textbook" and "doing rational things" are similar.
Mileage varies.
Krugman's talking about Ricardo's Law in particular, very basic, very old, not disputed so far as I know, and not known to the general populace.
Sometimes, yes, but only along certain dimensions. If your group performs rituals, they can't be rational because then they will be the same as other groups'. For example, the Jewish practice of eating flat bread on Passover is arbitrary [1], but it only works because it is arbitrary.
[1] It's not entirely arbitrary if you believe the story of Passover, but that's a somewhat different point. Actually, it may be interesting to examine whether it's rational in that case—I can see arguments for both sides.
Sure, but that's a lot more difficult. There are so many arbitrary things to do, and wrong things to believe, that they're going to be the default because they're easy.
Thomas Sowell
Partial duplicate
I think it's still worth leaving up, because the previous post left off the second half of the quote. The quote I posted is more comprehensive.
Cliff Pervocracy
While I think there's some truth to this, it's easy for me to come up with examples of things I've done that never made sense to myself.
http://www.theonion.com/articles/loved-ones-recall-local-mans-cowardly-battle-with,772/
I find both the ironic and straightforward meaning of this quote to be meaningful.
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter 13
But if my (not a mathematician) friend says that god spoke to him in a dream, and gave him a proof of the Goldbach conjecture, and he has the proof and it's valid, then I would think something more interesting than a typical dream was going on.
But then the dream is doing zero work: your friend could simply say God told him the proof of the conjecture, and your situation is the same - if the proof checks out then you need to compare base rate for gods delivering math proofs and your friend secretly having a hobby of being a mathematician and succeeding etc to see whether it changes your beliefs.
And delivering a mathematical proof is surely not what >99% of God's previous statements were doing.
How do you know? People mention "divine inspiration" quite frequently. The point is that the statement is untestable and thus irrelevant, not that it is most likely false.
Why is that relevant? To see the flaw in your reasoning replace "God" with "mathematician X" and notice that >99% of mathematician X's previous statements aren't delivering mathematics proofs either.
Anzai & Simon
(This version is from Wikipedia.)
Previously approximated here.
I still habitually complete this joke with:
Though I'm now tempted to add:
"Hmph," snorts the cognitive psychologist. "Such presumption. An event occurred that we experienced as the perception of a black sheep, only one side of which was visible, standing on what we believed to be a field in Scotland."
I've heard a version in which after the mathematician speaks, the shepherd yells “Snowy White [the name of the sheep]! Stop rolling in the mud!”
Best version, in my snap judgment. The story, told this way, is about the different modes of thinking of astronomers, physicists, mathematicians, and shepherds. (and there are other variations about the approaches of stage magicians and cognitive psychologists, each of which has a characteristic interest. As a pure and careful thinker, the mathematician comes up with something similar to the practical approach of the stage magician, or the more-carefully-specified approach of the cognitive psychologist.)
But the shepherd is living in a different realm, very connected to reality, and comes up with something, from knowledge, not from thinking and careful analysis, that the sheep isn't black at all. The cognitive psychologist allowed for this, distinguishing the possibility of perceptual error, but still could not speak with authority about the sheep itself.
But this version doesn't mention the cognitive psychologist. The shepherd essentially confirms the conceptual space of the cognitive psychologist.
"Bah", says the thermodynamicist. "All I know is that your brain is in a configuration that makes you say you saw a black sheep a minute ago."
"Meh", says the trivialist. "Scottish sheep are black. Scottish sheep are white. Scottish sheep are black and white. Scottish sheep are purple octopuses. And I don't even need to look out the window."
While everyone else is arguing the pragmatist has googled "Scottish Sheep varieties"
And Robin Hanson sets up a prediction market in Scottish sheep colors.
And Paul Graham is making money off of startups that try to profit from the recent boom in Scottish sheep color economies. Oh wait...
Cloned white and black True ScotsSheep with lifetime color warranties are marketed, free shipping worldwide.
Add in another scoffing thermodynamicist, and we can round out the joke with an infinite regress.
And the biologist says, "guys, that's a dog"
When I am speaking to people about rationality or AI, and they ask something incomprehensibly bizarre and incoherent, I am often tempted to give the reply that Charles Babbage gave to those who asked him whether a machine that was given bad data would produce the right answers anyway:
But instead I say, "Yes, that's an important question..." and then I steel-man their question, or I replace it with a question on an entirely different subject that happens to share some of the words from their original question, and I answer that question instead.
Thomas Huxley
-- Adam Savage
If this were true, the ancient Greeks would've had science.
My impression was that it was the screwing around that was lacking.
-Galen, a Roman doctor/philosopher, on Asclepiades's unwillingness to admit that the kidneys processed urine - despite Galen demonstrating the function of the kidneys to Asclepiades by, well, cutting open a live animal and pointing to the urine flowing from its kidneys to its bladder (search the page for "ligatures" to find Galen's experiment described), among other things.
And in case it's not obvious to readers, the Greeks were huge fans of irony - the above quote should be read sarcastically.
Yes, in MythBusters context, sitting around talking about stuff doesn't qualify as screwing around. It is, at best, the thing you do to prepare for screwing around.
They came impressively close considering they didn't have any giant shoulders to stand on.
Yep. If nothing of what Archimedes did counts as ‘science’, you're using an overly narrow definition IMO.
They... did? If you want to make a distinction between Greek natural philosophy and modern science, which understands more about theories, hypotheses, and causality, and is rich enough to support an entire class of professional investigators into the natural world, then sure, the Greeks only had natural philosophy, and Savage is being too broad with his definition of 'science.' I think I side with Savage's approach of normalizing science- I would rather describe science as "deliberate curiosity" than something more rigorous and restrictive.
Quote from Peter Watts' Blindsight.
About the prospects of a fight against a superintelligence:
Great book, it's freely available here, in plain html.
Can you recommend similar novels?
Unfortunately, I can’t: this kind of (strangely refreshing) cynicism is, in my limited experience, unique to Peter Watts, and the use of interesting “starfish aliens” seems to be quite rare.
There are, however, other short stories (not novels) of Peter Watts that have a somewhat similar mood , such as Ambassador, but you probably are already aware of them.
-Aristosophy. I like to think this is about the Robot's Rebellion.
"Reality Injection Attack" would make a great name for a mathcore band.
"
well shit that didn't work."
On confirmation bias
If a man objects to truths that are all too evident, it is no easy task finding arguments that will change his mind. This is proof neither of his own strength nor of his teacher's weakness. When someone caught in an argument hardens to stone, there is just no more reasoning with them.
Epictetus, Discourses I.5.1-2 (page 15 of this edition) (original Greek, with alternate translations at the link)
-John Maynard Keynes
— Neal Stephenson, The Diamond Age
I'm uncomfortable with Stephenson's take here* on hypocrisy because I think it neglects context. His implied analysis holds in the context of a homogeneous culture, but fails badly in a relatively heterogeneous one, and here's why:
In a heterogeneous/multicultural society, the moral stances you publically advocate signal a frame for others, who hold different values, to engage with you. They tell others about what topics to avoid in discussion, how to predict your behavior, and so on--generally, how to behave politely and get along with you.
In the heterogeneous society, the hypocrite is wasting other people's time, in forcing unnecessary behavioral accomodations on them.
*: It's possible that Stephenson was entirely aware of what I'm saying here, since he's describing only the semi-closed neo-Victorians, but those who quote him take the description at face value.
I read that as a point against multicultural society.
The word "multicultural" deserves a better analysis. What exactly is a "culture" (besides that for many people it is an applause light), which parts of culture should we preserve and which are free for optimization, whether we can measure a utility function of a culture and whether that function itself is culture-specific, whether cultures can be extrapolated, how much can human cultures be different, et cetera.
The important part is that we are speaking about human cultures, which puts some limit on how different they can be. We should not discuss them as if there is no such limit, as if an arbitrary set of values can be a culture, and each such set is automatically an applause light.
To the extent that humans from different cultures can share values, there can be common values even in the multicultural society. And there can be cross-cultural hypocrisy with regards to these common values.
In other words, we should not model humans from different cultures as incomprehensible aliens. Funny thing is that there two opposite political reasons to do so. The obvious one: racists/nationalists/etc. try to describe the other people as completely alien, to make it easier to explain why we should avoid them. The more subtle one: politically correct people sometimes also describe humans from other culture as aliens, just to signal how tolerant they are; because tolerance to an alien is more difficult, and therefore more noble, than tolerance to a mere human.
In yet other words, the "multicultural" society -- as its greatest proponents and opponents imagine it -- does not really exist. There is just an interaction between different human cultures, which includes a lot of differences, but also a lot of shared values.
It's also worth noting that human "cultures" behave remarkably like empirical clusters of loosely-correlated social norms, behaviors, signals, status rules, hierarchical systems, beliefs, and moral systems. This seems to strongly support most of what you've said here, and obviously there is some drift and some shared space between "cultures" depending on how you carve them.
What you're describing is the definition of "culture" (more precisely, a definition of "culture", and a good one). I'm not sure why you're giving the weaker qualification of "behave remarkably like" rather than "are".
This particular wording was meant to convey the sense that "Whatever people generally define as 'culture' or as separate 'cultures', even if they use rigid aristotelian categories, it still behaves pretty much like this."
The red car effect/availability heuristic at work - I instantly thought of a Zizek quote. Or were you quoting this bit too?
I'm more on the "good fences make good neighbors" side, which I guess is the opposite from Zizek (judging by this quote; I don't know more about his opinions). He criticizes the fear of harassment (and labels it "obsessive", just to remind the reader that it is a boo light); I would like to talk also about those specific situations where the threat is real.
To me it seems that the "politically correct" description of people from other cultures is that they are a) completely different, but also b) completely harmless.
On the other hand, my opinion is that people from other cultures are often very similar, but even the small differences can be dangerous.
A "political correct" picture of a different people is something like this: They have green skin and worship ants... but if we will tolerate their green skins and ant worship, they will certainly be pleasant neighbors and our lives will be made more rich by their presence.
My picture of a different people is something like this: They are mostly like me: they value truth, and they want to punish people who harm others. Unfortunately, their idea of truth is whatever their holy prophet said; their idea of harm is opposing the prophet's words; and their idea of proper punishment is to murder everyone who disagrees with their prophet. This is why they wouldn't make pleasant neighbors.
As far as I can see, "multiculturalism" is the belief that we should celebrate and encourage diversity because we are all really the same.
If one looks at the competing Christological doctrines of early Christianity -- Arianism, monophysitism, monothelitism, Marcionism, Patripassianism, Nestorianism, Chalcedonianism, and so on, from a modern atheistic perspective it all looks insane. Even leaving aside one's presumption of the non-existence of the relevant supernatural entities, it still looks like a mass of confabulation accreted like a pearl in an oyster, around a seed of irritation resulting from thinking about how Jesus could have been both a man and God.
So, after perusing that section of the Wikipedia page I just linked, look at the first paragraph of Wikipedia on multiculturalism.
Doesn't it look just as insane? Is "a society at ease with the rich tapestry of human life and the desire amongst people to express their own identity in the manner they see fit" any more meaningful a string of words than "the human nature and pre-incarnate divine nature of Christ were united as one divine human nature from the point of the Incarnation onwards"? What would the bishops who argued about the latter at Chalcedon have made of the former? Never mind agreeing or disagreeing with it, what would it even mean?
What exactly is "a society at ease with the rich tapestry of human life"?
Am I "at ease" with cultures that have a hobby of cutting small girls' genitalia? Hell no! Does that make me an intolerant racist, or whatever is the most appropriate boo light today? So sue me, or at least make sure I will never get a job at academia!
Multiculturalism is an applause light, until you look at specific details. Then it sometimes gets ugly. Of course, to remain "politically correct" you have to stay in the far mode, and ignore all the details. It's easier that way.
Just like "desire amongst people to express their own identity in the manner they see fit". Again, if your desire includes a desire to cut small girls' genitalia, then I think those girls deserve to have their opinion heard too. If that is against your sick religion, again, you have the choice to sue me, criticize me in media, assassinate me, or all three things combined. (In a sufficiently "politically correct" society you literally could do all three suggested things, and then have some educated people excuse your actions.)
This all is a completely different thing from when people from village X decide to wear robes with red flowers, and people from village Y decide to wear robes with blue flowers. Or if Americans pour ketchup over all their foods, while Asians use the soy sauce. With that kind of culture I have no problems. I also have no problems with folk songs, operas, paintings, or books (assuming those books don't preach something I find repulsive).
It is bad that these two things are often mixed together under a wide umbrella of "culture". Then it makes people objecting to genital mutilation seem like brain-damaged bigots obsessing about the right color of flowers on everyone's robes. And that is pretty dishonest. And evil.
To all those claiming that multiculturalism has no downsides, I would like to point out that "equal time for creationism" sprung from and used multiculturalism; the notion that you can justify anything using religious freedom can and does lead to Bad Things being justified thus. AFAIK no real society is perfectly multicultural, but that's poor implementation; a bug, not a feature.
EDIT: I am in favour of all the Good Things that spring to mind when we hear "multiculturalism", and do not advocate the Bad Things associated with opposing it (ie a single monolithic and enforced culture.)
Would you mind describing the Schelling fence between those two things.
Policy debates should not appear one-sided. There are pluses and minuses to multiculturalism. Other cultures have good and bad aspects, and the default for humans is to reject anything out-group, good or bad. So a shove in the direction of the ridiculous caricature of multiculturalism above would generally be a good thing, on the whole.
Exactly which multiculturalist do you think are "at ease" with that behavior?
Assassination is not really an accepted political move in Western Europe or the US, which are the domains of political correctness. I challenge you to find a recent murder in either region that was not prosecuted by the government authorities for "political correctness" (as opposed to established legal doctrines like insanity).
see also
Something Positive
David Deutsch, The Beginning of Infinity
And yet they couldn't even defeat the Spartans or keep Savonarola from taking power.
To be fair, with a general like Napoleon, how could the Spartans lose?
John Maynard Keynes
Previously quoted on LW, but not in a quotes thread. I was reminded of it by this exchange.
Anonymous
--David Eagleman
--Neal Stephenson, In the Beginning Was... the Commandline
From "Richard Feynman and The Connection Machine"
I would like to upvote the Feynman quote. I am not interested in upvoting the Stephenson quote. I think it would be better if these quotes were in separate comments, as recommended in the post.
I would like to upvote the Stephenson quote, and not the Feynman quote.
You two talk between yourselves so that only one of you upvote the entire comment.
This reminds of how two high school classmates of mine eluded the prohibition from voting for themselves as class representatives by voting for each other.
Or, you both downvote the conglomerate and each write a comment expressing objection to the combination, approval of the desired quote and indifference to the other.
(I downvoted the conglomerate on the principle "I wish to see less quote-comments that people believe should be separate, especially when said quotes are verbose anyway". There is an implied "...and would upvote both comments if they were split to encourage trivial improvements in response to feedback".)
I would like to abstain from voting on them, but to do so in separate posts.
--Saturday Morning Breakfast Cereal
Henry David Thoreau
-Descartes, Discourse on method part 6.
Charles Mackay from "Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds"
Teachings of Diogenes
William Blake
That's Blake again. Tim Freeman is the author of the quote before the Blake quotes on this page.
--Prime Function Aki Zeta-Five, Sid Meier's Alpha Centauri
Removing all those glands and hormones (assuming they are pars pro toto for our evolved urges), what would be left? A frontal lobe staring at the wall?
William Blake
Freeman? That's one of my favorite lines from Blake's "Proverbs of Hell"...
--Michael Gazzaniga
Regarding brain architecture.
The Last Psychiatrist bats another one out of the park:
CrimethInc (Not exactly a bastion of rationality, but they do have some good stuff now and again.)
--Mencius Moldbug on an experiment that has interesting results
Charles Babbage
H.L. Mencken
"Some magic bullets from the past"
On the bottom line(http://lesswrong.com/lw/js/thebottomline/)/[politics as a mindkiller:
Source: Bill Clinton, in an appearance on The Daily Show with Jon Stewart (episode date: September 20, 2012). The quoted material appears at about the 6:50 mark.
Duplicate
So it is. I guess I didn't check thoroughly enough. Thanks.
--Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn
Rationality challenge: Understand why I posted it here.
Bonsu Rationality Challenge: Reinvent the meaning of "God" I used to ironman the position. Start by ironmaning it yourself.
"Men have forgotten God" -> "Men have lost certain beliefs and practices that strengthened social stability, and thus provided (despite their actual falsehood or even ridiculousness) a certain local optimum." ?
In abandoning one's religion, one also abandons an ethical system. If this lacuna is not filled in by another ethical system that works at least passably well, the consequences for personal and political behaviour can be dire.
Bonus challenge accepted, blind mode - no peeking at comments, take my word.
"God" = the objectively present, difficult-to-disentangle historical trends of the West, and the memetic strains that caused those trends, chiefly Universalism and its Christianity section. So here, a Universalist culture has violated Universalism's own naturally-evolved barriers and safety measures, and suffered for it by landing in a shallow circle of Hell. But Solzhenitsyn wasn't very Universalist, I'd say - not like Zizek and Moldbug and yours truly take it - so he couldn't see that Universalism can only stay alive while moving ever onwards and unfolding itself.
Also: this quote should be way way up there! And the Obamas of today shouldn't be quoted so much - all is dust, and all will be dust. But history will sort its Right and Left... in due course.
(help help will newsome is taking me over with his computational theology konkvistador you know you saw it help)
For a more detailed discussion go here.
For decision-theoric reasons, the dark lords of the matrix give superhumanly good advice about social organization to religious people in ways that look from inside the simulation like supernatural revelations; non-religious people don't have access to these revelations so when they try to do social organization it ends in disaster.
Obviously.
Seems legit.
Meta-level point: It is possible to steel-man someone's position into an argument that they would not actually endorse. I think that might be what you are doing here.
I'm trying to be more whimsical in my posting on LW, but I'm not sure that "rationality," "optimization," or any other special virtue in this community is advanced by this provocative post or its religious-language framing.
It's an example of how even absurd amounts of research can fail to move a religious thought. I think too many people will fail to get the joke and the potential for abuse is too high.
-- Yvain, “Why I Hate Your Freedom”
-- George Weinberg commenting on Mencius Moldbug, “The magic of symmetric sovereignty”
(Not that I think that's a valid general principle, but I do feel that way about many of the thought experiments I see proposed on LW.)
“Must a name mean something?" Alice asked doubtfully.
Of course it must," Humpty Dumpty said with a short laugh; "my name means the shape I am - and a good handsome shape it is, too. With a name like yours, you might be any shape, almost.”
Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass
Neil deGrasse Tyson
What percentage of your philosophy? If your philosophy is completely unsettled daily, you're probably insane.
Each morning I go through all my beliefs and randomly flip their truth values, guaranteeing maximal surprise
That's certainly true. I think the point isn't that you should be constantly changing everything you believe, but that you should actively seek out new knowledge—especially knowledge that has a high probability of shifting the way you think (in a positive direction, of course).
Sure. I'm saying I'd prefer a wording that points out the diminishing returns of philosophical unsettlement, and the unavoidability thereof.
I used to agree, but that part of my philosophy recently became unsettled.
Sting
I have as much authority as the Pope, I just don't have as many people who believe it. -George Carlin
"I have the same height as the Empire State Building, I just don't tower as many feet from the ground."
Interpreting Carlin charitably, he is talking about moral or rational authority, not about authority in the sense of power over others.
Sean Davis discussing political polling.
I'd like everyone to be far more skeptical of those who are instinctively skeptical of math.
Specifically, as part of the recent conservative criticism of Nate Silver.
-- Siderea
(Hat-tip to Nancy Lebovitz.)
Meh. 'But' is just 'and' with a case of incongruity. That's what it is, so I don't see a problem with using it for that... though of course dark arts applications would be problematic.
Train self to perceive the word "but" as an alarm bell. When tempted to use it in an argument, immediately abort sentence and reflect on whether to swap the clauses before and after it, or even save the latter for a more appropriate time. (I imagine a lot of people here already do that.)