Rationality Quotes November 2012
Here's the new thread for posting quotes, with the usual rules:
- Please post all quotes separately, so that they can be voted up/down separately. (If they are strongly related, reply to your own comments. If strongly ordered, then go ahead and post them together.)
- Do not quote yourself
- Do not quote comments/posts on LW/OB
- No more than 5 quotes per person per monthly thread, please.
Loading…
Subscribe to RSS Feed
= f037147d6e6c911a85753b9abdedda8d)
Comments (898)
"His mother had often said, When you choose an action, you choose the consequences of that action. She had emphasized the corollary of this axiom even more vehemently: when you desired a consequence you had damned well better take the action that would create it." - Lois McMaster Bujold, writer (b. 1949)
When I am speaking to people about rationality or AI, and they ask something incomprehensibly bizarre and incoherent, I am often tempted to give the reply that Charles Babbage gave to those who asked him whether a machine that was given bad data would produce the right answers anyway:
But instead I say, "Yes, that's an important question..." and then I steel-man their question, or I replace it with a question on an entirely different subject that happens to share some of the words from their original question, and I answer that question instead.
What does this mean?
Steel man
See also.
http://forums.catholic.com/showpost.php?s=911f001b47b040ac5997321714c0244b&p=7081969&postcount=8
“It was designed to look like one” does sound like a connection to me.
-Epicurus
I need help on this: I'm torn between finding this argument to be preposterous, and being unable to deny the premises or call the argument invalid.
At the very least, even assuming there's no reason to worry about your own death, you would probably still care about the deaths of others -- at least your friends and family. Given a group of people who mutually value having each other in their lives, death should still be a subject of enormous concern. I don't grant the premise that we shouldn't be concerned about death even for ourselves, but I don't think that premise is enough to justify Epicurus's attitude here.
Of course, for most of human history, there genuinely wasn't much of anything that could be done about death, and there's value in recognizing that death doesn't render life meaningless, even if it's a tragedy. But today, when there actually are solutions on the table, this quote sounds more in complacency than acceptance. Upvoted though, because it points to an important cluster of questions that's worth untangling.
You are allowed to have preferences about things that don't coexist with you.
Fair enough, but I think Epicurus' point might be rephrased thus:
-not really Epicurus
If that's right, it's not so much a question of being concerned about things you don't coexist with. He's saying that it's irrational to be concerned about things which are impossible and inconceivable.
That's stupid, of course. Of course, people die. But I have a hard time seeing where the argument actually goes wrong. I am regrettably susceptible to philosophical nonsense of every kind.
This argument implicitly assumes that we can't meaningfully talk about things not in the present.
It's linguistic trickery, like saying prisoners can't escape because if they escape they're not really prisoners now are they?
That's a good point, but it's not a solution (so much as a repitition) of the problem. How is it possible that prisoners can escape? Or that ships can sink?
I'm not saying I actually doubt that ships can sink, prisoners can escape, and people can die. That would be insane. My problem is that I have a hard time denying the force of the argument.
I don't think that's the kind of linguistic trickery it is. It's more like:
The dead person's body exists, but the dead person's mind/consciousness no longer does. If you equivocate by calling both of those things "the person", then they seem to simultaneously be dead and not dead. If you stop equivocating, the problem goes away.
Try this one:
EDIT: Changed some details because they were distracting.
Yes, I think I also just deny premise 2. Some words work like that: former presidents, for example, are not presidents.
The problem is in #2. Imaginary cheese is not a kind of cheese.
Edit: I'm not entirely sure this is where I saw it first, but this forum post (ironically, on a Catholic forum of some sort, apparently discussing whether certain games such as Magic are evil...) makes the argument excellently.
Edit2: In fact, I daresay an excerpt from said post is good enough to post as a rationality quote on its own, which I will now do.
Wonder what the author of that post was banned for.
I'm not sure I like this phrasing although the essential point is correct. I'd say rather that generally when one uses a word one implicitly has "actual" or "real" in front of it. Adding the word "actual" at the relevant points in the argument makes the problem more clear.
What is the position of imaginary cheese in thingspace, relative to the position of the cheese similarity cluster?
Along most dimensions (those relating to physical properties, most causal properties, etc.), imaginary cheese is quite far removed from actual cheeses. Along a couple of dimensions (verbal description, perhaps something like "what sorts of neutral firings are involved in perceiving it"), imaginary cheese is closer to actual cheeses.
To take a two-dimensional example, perhaps gouda is at (4,6), cheddar is (5,3), mozarella is (3,7), provolone is (3,5)... and imaginary cheese is, say, (100,4). Within the cluster if you look only at the y dimension, quite distant from it if you look at all dimensions. And if we actually plotted cheese and imaginary cheese in some suitably higher-dimensional space, there'd be a lot of dimensions like x in my toy example (along which imaginary cheese is far from actual cheeses), and few like y (along which imaginary cheese is close to actual cheeses). Out of those dimensions in which cheeses form a cluster, most would be like x, few like y.
Edit: the basic issue is that things cluster in thingspace; categories into which we place things are reflections of that clustering. What things do not, in fact, do is fall neatly into classes and subclasses that might seem natural to us, like objects in Java, where if you have e.g. ImaginaryCheese extends Cheese (i.e. the ImaginaryCheese class is a subclass of the Cheese class), then ImaginaryCheese is guaranteed to inherit any and all properties of its superclass Cheese. All we really have is approximations of this behavior, to a lesser or greater extent, e.g.:
GoudaCheese behaves more or less like a subclass of Cheese; most relevant properties of Cheese (that is, properties shared by all things within the main body of the Cheese similarity cluster) are in fact inherited by GoudaCheese... because, of course, GoudaCheese is within the main body of the Cheese similarity cluster.
Conversely, ImaginaryCheese is not within the main body of the Cheese similarity cluster, so we shouldn't expect it to behave like a subclass of Cheese... and it doesn't.
So an alternate response to the logic in the great-grandparent (Nisan's comment) might be:
Yes, some cheese is imaginary. You can't get it anywhere because, unlike most cheeses, imaginary cheese isn't "a thing you can get". This is not a problem because reality doesn't (apparently!) feature strict class hierarchies.
In fact, the problem with the reasoning is that while you could construct a strict class hierarchy, the properties you could assign to the Cheese superclass would be only those shared by all cheeses... and if you're drawing the boundary around the similarity cluster such that ImaginaryCheese is within the boundary, then "existence outside of minds, and therefore ability to be 'gotten'" would not be one of those shared properties.
In your imagination.
Look! I made a pretty picture to help!
I can think of two possible things Epicurus could have meant, one correct and the other incorrect. We don't need to fear the experience of being dead, because there's no experience of being dead. But if we care about saving wild geese, then we should avoid dying, because our dying leads to fewer saved geese.
It's pretty much correct, as far as I can see. One should avoid death because s/he values life, rather than cling to life because s/he fears death.
Doing the latter helps sustain ability to do the former.
Doctor Who
Anonymous
-- John Allen Paulos(from Beyond Numeracy)
--David Eagleman
Cliff Pervocracy
While I think there's some truth to this, it's easy for me to come up with examples of things I've done that never made sense to myself.
CrimethInc (Not exactly a bastion of rationality, but they do have some good stuff now and again.)
-- George Weinberg commenting on Mencius Moldbug, “The magic of symmetric sovereignty”
(Not that I think that's a valid general principle, but I do feel that way about many of the thought experiments I see proposed on LW.)
-- Yvain, “Why I Hate Your Freedom”
--Carl Sagan
The Last Psychiatrist bats another one out of the park:
the meaning or source of the $ amounts if very unclear to me. Is there more on it somewhere?
John Maynard Keynes
Previously quoted on LW, but not in a quotes thread. I was reminded of it by this exchange.
Hasok Chang, Inventing Temperature: Measurement and Scientific Progress
Jason Brennan, Libertarianism: What Everyone Needs to Know
--Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn
Rationality challenge: Understand why I posted it here.
Bonsu Rationality Challenge: Reinvent the meaning of "God" I used to ironman the position. Start by ironmaning it yourself.
For decision-theoric reasons, the dark lords of the matrix give superhumanly good advice about social organization to religious people in ways that look from inside the simulation like supernatural revelations; non-religious people don't have access to these revelations so when they try to do social organization it ends in disaster.
Obviously.
Seems legit.
In abandoning one's religion, one also abandons an ethical system. If this lacuna is not filled in by another ethical system that works at least passably well, the consequences for personal and political behaviour can be dire.
Bonus challenge accepted, blind mode - no peeking at comments, take my word.
"God" = the objectively present, difficult-to-disentangle historical trends of the West, and the memetic strains that caused those trends, chiefly Universalism and its Christianity section. So here, a Universalist culture has violated Universalism's own naturally-evolved barriers and safety measures, and suffered for it by landing in a shallow circle of Hell. But Solzhenitsyn wasn't very Universalist, I'd say - not like Zizek and Moldbug and yours truly take it - so he couldn't see that Universalism can only stay alive while moving ever onwards and unfolding itself.
Also: this quote should be way way up there! And the Obamas of today shouldn't be quoted so much - all is dust, and all will be dust. But history will sort its Right and Left... in due course.
(help help will newsome is taking me over with his computational theology konkvistador you know you saw it help)
Meta-level point: It is possible to steel-man someone's position into an argument that they would not actually endorse. I think that might be what you are doing here.
I'm trying to be more whimsical in my posting on LW, but I'm not sure that "rationality," "optimization," or any other special virtue in this community is advanced by this provocative post or its religious-language framing.
"Men have forgotten God" -> "Men have lost certain beliefs and practices that strengthened social stability, and thus provided (despite their actual falsehood or even ridiculousness) a certain local optimum." ?
For a more detailed discussion go here.
It's an example of how even absurd amounts of research can fail to move a religious thought. I think too many people will fail to get the joke and the potential for abuse is too high.
--Mencius Moldbug on an experiment that has interesting results
DBZ Abridged on the lack of consequence concerning death in the series. Tien's supposed to be the only serious character in the series. That's the joke.
Edit: Perhaps I should explain this quote... I simply thought that Yamcha served as a good representation of most people's reactions... and Tien as a representation of "Um. It's no biggie." The rest of this series finale went off without a hitch as all characters realized "Wait. There are almost no consequences here. There may never be? What's the use in grieving!"
Henry David Thoreau
--Michael Gazzaniga
--Michael Gazzaniga
Regarding brain architecture.
-Paul Graham in The Lies We Tell Kids
This sounds like a challenge. Would you prefer your children to not swear; and if yes, why?
My reasoning would be that I want my children to be successful (for both altruistic and selfish reasons), and I believe that a habit of swearing is on average harmful to social skills.
Disclaimer: There are situations where swearing is the right thing to do, so it would be optimal to swear exactly in these situations. But it would be difficult for a child to determine these situations precisely; and from the simple strategies, "never swear" (which often develops towards "don't swear in presence of adult people or someone who would inform them") seems very good.
I like to be around people who don't constantly emphasize their every word, making it hard to tell when something is actually important. Since swearing is a verbal marker of importance, its casual overuse is like shouting all the time; it's very wearying. And, lest I be accused of rationalising, I do not only apply this to children, but have also asked my wife to cut back on swearing.
As a side note, Americans are very loud, both in the literal sense of putting more decibels behind their voices, and in their over-reliance on swearing. I think you've fallen into the bad equilibrium that comes about when everyone has an incentive to be a little louder than the next guy, and there's no cost to being so.
Thank you for this. I've been wondering reflectively why I've been swearing more frequently lately, and I just realized that it's to make sure my voice is heard. I'll try to attack the root of this and instead get my attention-validation from having good things to say rather than saying them most crassly.
I'm almost sure this is mainly a status thing. Frequent swearing is perceived as crass, a lower-class practice, and so aspirational parents encourage their children not to. This intent then proceeds to backfire when children develop their own social networks: status relations among children and young teenagers are quite different from adult ones, and swearing in this context is often a marker of independence and perceived maturity. This gradually unwinds during the teenage years as swearing in the presence of adults becomes more socially acceptable and adult-style status relations start to assert themselves.
The only thing that confuses me about this model is the lack of countersignaling, but perhaps children of that age can't reliably parse signaling at that level of indirection. Or maybe I just don't remember enough childhood social dynamics.
Or you could, y'know, try to think of a better way.
That you know what a policy of punishing swearing develops into ("don't swear in presence of adult people or someone who would inform them") shows that you have the ability to think forwards into the consequences, but also hints at some sort of stopping, perhaps motivated (because hey, finding better solutions is hard).
Clearly, you also have the ability to reason a bit further: What sort of microsociety does the above behavior encourage once they get into high school, where the majority of their perceivable world is a miniature scheduled wildland?
When I was six and used swear words in front of my school principal (hey, when you spend half the day in the principal's office for the 13th time, you kinda get used to someone), he later brought it up with my parents (though I vaguely recall it wasn't in any negative manner). My parents immediately started reprimanding me, naturally, but he stopped them, and afterwards they changed strategies based on his advice and some insight they gained from reading more research and books on related topics.
I'm certainly glad they did, in retrospect, because in the twisted social environment that high schools are, a good swearing strategy can be extremely effective. I don't know how widely this'd work, YMMV and all that, but a "leave me alone" usually didn't get prospective bullies off my back. If I then followed up with a steady gaze and a "leave me the fuck alone" (yes, I know, but that's how 14-year-olds talked when I was there), now suddenly they'd grow much more cautious and start re-evaluating whether they should still try to play their little status game and get their cheap fun, when someone who rarely ever swears had just signaled to them that shit got serious.
All in all, "never swear" seems to me like it never actually works, and takes much more effort to attempt (by punishing every single instance of swearing that you can find, even though you know you can only find a small fraction of them) than other strategies like teaching "swearing gets less useful and powerful each time you use it, so if you always keep it as a reserve it'll be that much more effective".
Oh, I was not specific enough. What I wanted to write is that a habit of swearing is harmful to your social skills after you leave the school. Imagine a person at a job interview saying: "Yeah, I know the fucking Java, but NetBeans is gay, and if you ain't doing unit tests like all the time, you are seriously retarded, man." ;-)
Probably no one would do this intentionally, but the problem is, if you get a habit of swearing, then sometimes a word or two slips through, often unnoticed (by you; but your audience is shocked). At some moment this happened to me (no, not at a job interview, at least I think so), and after getting a feedback I decided to be extra careful. Which I would want to teach my children. I was very lucky to get that feedback, because most people assume that others are well aware of all the words they use.
Nick Cooney, Change of Heart
http://www.theonion.com/articles/loved-ones-recall-local-mans-cowardly-battle-with,772/
I find both the ironic and straightforward meaning of this quote to be meaningful.
Keith E. Stanovich, How to Think Straight About Psychology, 10th ed. (2013), 14.
ETA: Should have included the subsequent paragraph:
Lazarsfeld is also discussed here under http://lesswrong.com/lw/im/hindsight_devalues_science/
These aren't exactly opposed - 'out of sight, out of mind' is generally applied to things and problems, not, say, warm relationships.
Some of the others aren't exactly opposed either - I've generally heard not crossing a bridge before you get to it referring to trying to solve a problem you anticipate before it's possible to actually start solving the problem.
Really? I've seen it used twice for non-relationship contexts, but too many times to care to count (on the order of 50-80) in the context of long-distance relationships, usually as a warning that a couple should not hope to remain steady and trust eachother if they become far apart for a long period of time (months or more) for the first time since entering a relationship.
In fiction, this either turns into a self-fulfilling prophecy or becomes the whole reason the main character can complete the main quest.
In reality, the causal influence doesn't seem to be there, but anecdotally I observe that the drifting-apart usually happens regardless of whether any such prediction was made. Knowledge of this leads a significant fraction of couples to break-up preemptively when they're about to enter such a situation.
That's interesting. I'd more seen it used with annoyances. Maybe because I haven't seen much of LD relationships, and those that I did see, worked. And it was clear they were going to work from the outset because they were really serious about each other.
Yeah. The advice applies mostly to "Let's get married when you return!"-style relationships, where the couple met in meatspace, dated in meatspace, became a "couple" in meatspace, and then have to separate for a long period of time and things will all be better once they get back together... all of which often fails horribly.
From three data points, it seems like those that survive the first separation might have no trouble with subsequent ones, or at least that the risk of repeat separations is greatly diminished (though if one cheated the first time, they'll likely be cheating the other times too, AFAIK, but that's 1 more datapoint + folk wisdom).
7/7 relationships I've seen that were started in cyberspace, stayed long distance for a while, then met in meatspace, then had to have a long-distance period, all survived (and are still healthy couples to this day as far as I'm aware). Seems like the filtering effect applies long before anyone ever meets eachother for cyberspace-started relationships, especially for long-distance ones.
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter 13
But if my (not a mathematician) friend says that god spoke to him in a dream, and gave him a proof of the Goldbach conjecture, and he has the proof and it's valid, then I would think something more interesting than a typical dream was going on.
But then the dream is doing zero work: your friend could simply say God told him the proof of the conjecture, and your situation is the same - if the proof checks out then you need to compare base rate for gods delivering math proofs and your friend secretly having a hobby of being a mathematician and succeeding etc to see whether it changes your beliefs.
And delivering a mathematical proof is surely not what >99% of God's previous statements were doing.
Why is that relevant? To see the flaw in your reasoning replace "God" with "mathematician X" and notice that >99% of mathematician X's previous statements aren't delivering mathematics proofs either.
How do you know? People mention "divine inspiration" quite frequently. The point is that the statement is untestable and thus irrelevant, not that it is most likely false.
I don't think the version with the math proof is meaningless in a probabilistic sense; my point is that the meaning comes from an additional factor unrelated to the dream, and I think Hobbes would agree that in the absence of any additional aspect of God speaking to the dreamer such as prophecies (objectively verifiable, like the proof!) there's no reason to believe him. But these additional aspects are the strange and unusual things which might oblige Hobbes to believe him, not the speech in a dream.
--Saturday Morning Breakfast Cereal
--xkcd.
What is he alluding to? (I don't watch lots of mass media these day, let alone American mass media.)
Many Republican pundits had elaborate theories about how polls were understating Romney's chances in the recent US presidential election, but the results turned out to match polls quite well.
Republicans talking about skewed polls were the most egregious example, but nonpartisan media was generally calling the election "razor tight", "a tossup" and similar things, too. In their case, the reason seems to be an ignorance of how statistics works. E.g. seeing polls with Obama up by 2% and a margin of error of 3, they would label it "a statistical tie", even though a) even with a single such poll, it implies a much higher chance of Obama winning, and b) with many polls giving numbers in that range, the chances of Romney being actually ahead drop to near-zero, barring systematic error.
Assuming the “margin of error” is one sigma, that's a 75% probability of Obama winning, which hardly qualifies as “much higher” IMO.
EDIT: Retracted. If, as James_K says, the margin of error is 1.96 sigma, that's a 90% probability for Obama.
The normal margin of error on a political opinion poll would be 1.96 sigma - a 95% confidence interval (that's how you'd get a margin of error of just over 3 percentage points on a poll of 1000 people.
True, also the media will tend to exaggerate the tightness of any race to make their news more exciting. Who will say up until the wee hours of the morning watching commercials and news, if the outcome is certain?
Traditional pundits are intimidated and frightened by Nate Silver's quantitative analysis. They see their comfy job pandering to the beliefs-as-attire market, with no expectation of accuracy, disappearing if pundits who can actually predict things take over.
edit: This comment, further down the page, explains well.
Exactly. Here is an excellent article elaborating further. (Only quibble is that is was not just Silver; other data-based analysts like Sam Wang and Josh Putnam made essentially the same predictions):
A dataset including Wang & Putnam, with scoring of accuracy:
I assume he is referring to the tendency of the media to call a persistent but small lead "too close to call." It's confusing the margin of lead with the likelihood of winning.
Either that, or the tendency of partisan commentators to make predictions for their side that were totally unconnected to state-by-state polling results.
— Neal Stephenson, The Diamond Age
I'm uncomfortable with Stephenson's take here* on hypocrisy because I think it neglects context. His implied analysis holds in the context of a homogeneous culture, but fails badly in a relatively heterogeneous one, and here's why:
In a heterogeneous/multicultural society, the moral stances you publically advocate signal a frame for others, who hold different values, to engage with you. They tell others about what topics to avoid in discussion, how to predict your behavior, and so on--generally, how to behave politely and get along with you.
In the heterogeneous society, the hypocrite is wasting other people's time, in forcing unnecessary behavioral accomodations on them.
*: It's possible that Stephenson was entirely aware of what I'm saying here, since he's describing only the semi-closed neo-Victorians, but those who quote him take the description at face value.
I read that as a point against multicultural society.
The word "multicultural" deserves a better analysis. What exactly is a "culture" (besides that for many people it is an applause light), which parts of culture should we preserve and which are free for optimization, whether we can measure a utility function of a culture and whether that function itself is culture-specific, whether cultures can be extrapolated, how much can human cultures be different, et cetera.
The important part is that we are speaking about human cultures, which puts some limit on how different they can be. We should not discuss them as if there is no such limit, as if an arbitrary set of values can be a culture, and each such set is automatically an applause light.
To the extent that humans from different cultures can share values, there can be common values even in the multicultural society. And there can be cross-cultural hypocrisy with regards to these common values.
In other words, we should not model humans from different cultures as incomprehensible aliens. Funny thing is that there two opposite political reasons to do so. The obvious one: racists/nationalists/etc. try to describe the other people as completely alien, to make it easier to explain why we should avoid them. The more subtle one: politically correct people sometimes also describe humans from other culture as aliens, just to signal how tolerant they are; because tolerance to an alien is more difficult, and therefore more noble, than tolerance to a mere human.
In yet other words, the "multicultural" society -- as its greatest proponents and opponents imagine it -- does not really exist. There is just an interaction between different human cultures, which includes a lot of differences, but also a lot of shared values.
As far as I can see, "multiculturalism" is the belief that we should celebrate and encourage diversity because we are all really the same.
If one looks at the competing Christological doctrines of early Christianity -- Arianism, monophysitism, monothelitism, Marcionism, Patripassianism, Nestorianism, Chalcedonianism, and so on, from a modern atheistic perspective it all looks insane. Even leaving aside one's presumption of the non-existence of the relevant supernatural entities, it still looks like a mass of confabulation accreted like a pearl in an oyster, around a seed of irritation resulting from thinking about how Jesus could have been both a man and God.
So, after perusing that section of the Wikipedia page I just linked, look at the first paragraph of Wikipedia on multiculturalism.
Doesn't it look just as insane? Is "a society at ease with the rich tapestry of human life and the desire amongst people to express their own identity in the manner they see fit" any more meaningful a string of words than "the human nature and pre-incarnate divine nature of Christ were united as one divine human nature from the point of the Incarnation onwards"? What would the bishops who argued about the latter at Chalcedon have made of the former? Never mind agreeing or disagreeing with it, what would it even mean?
What exactly is "a society at ease with the rich tapestry of human life"?
Am I "at ease" with cultures that have a hobby of cutting small girls' genitalia? Hell no! Does that make me an intolerant racist, or whatever is the most appropriate boo light today? So sue me, or at least make sure I will never get a job at academia!
Multiculturalism is an applause light, until you look at specific details. Then it sometimes gets ugly. Of course, to remain "politically correct" you have to stay in the far mode, and ignore all the details. It's easier that way.
Just like "desire amongst people to express their own identity in the manner they see fit". Again, if your desire includes a desire to cut small girls' genitalia, then I think those girls deserve to have their opinion heard too. If that is against your sick religion, again, you have the choice to sue me, criticize me in media, assassinate me, or all three things combined. (In a sufficiently "politically correct" society you literally could do all three suggested things, and then have some educated people excuse your actions.)
This all is a completely different thing from when people from village X decide to wear robes with red flowers, and people from village Y decide to wear robes with blue flowers. Or if Americans pour ketchup over all their foods, while Asians use the soy sauce. With that kind of culture I have no problems. I also have no problems with folk songs, operas, paintings, or books (assuming those books don't preach something I find repulsive).
It is bad that these two things are often mixed together under a wide umbrella of "culture". Then it makes people objecting to genital mutilation seem like brain-damaged bigots obsessing about the right color of flowers on everyone's robes. And that is pretty dishonest. And evil.
Would you mind describing the Schelling fence between those two things.
Policy debates should not appear one-sided. There are pluses and minuses to multiculturalism. Other cultures have good and bad aspects, and the default for humans is to reject anything out-group, good or bad. So a shove in the direction of the ridiculous caricature of multiculturalism above would generally be a good thing, on the whole.
To all those claiming that multiculturalism has no downsides, I would like to point out that "equal time for creationism" sprung from and used multiculturalism; the notion that you can justify anything using religious freedom can and does lead to Bad Things being justified thus. AFAIK no real society is perfectly multicultural, but that's poor implementation; a bug, not a feature.
EDIT: I am in favour of all the Good Things that spring to mind when we hear "multiculturalism", and do not advocate the Bad Things associated with opposing it (ie a single monolithic and enforced culture.)
Exactly which multiculturalist do you think are "at ease" with that behavior?
Assassination is not really an accepted political move in Western Europe or the US, which are the domains of political correctness. I challenge you to find a recent murder in either region that was not prosecuted by the government authorities for "political correctness" (as opposed to established legal doctrines like insanity).
About as many as there are environmentalists who are "at ease" with the mercury content of compact fluorescent bulbs, while campaigning to abolish incandescents. Female genital mutilation is a cultural practice, but instead of saying that this cultural practice is wrong and should be stopped, which a multiculturalist cannot do, some of them say that "there are cultural and political aspects to the practice's continuation that make opposition to it a complex issue", or that "the ritual of FGM has been the primary context in some communities in which the women come together", or that colonial attempts at eradication constitute "interference with women's decisions about their own rituals", or that "its apparent victims were in fact its central actors". Quotes from Wikipedia.
A multiculturalist could take a different tack and argue that FGM is not a cultural practice, making it permissible to oppose. However, since it is a cultural practice, and is clearly understood and explicitly stated by those who practice it to be a cultural practice, that isn't so easy to maintain. But I doubt impossible; the insanity is not peculiar to philosophers and theologians, but is bred whenever one is obliged to cling to both sides of a contradiction.
On both points: what the flaming Hell are you talking about? Snopes says,
(Wiki-link added.) See also the information - in particular, the graph of lifetime mercury emissions for incandescent vs flourescent - at Energystar.gov.
So the comparison with FGM seems truly bizarre. I also don't think you have the slightest clue what you're talking about when it comes to FGM and multiculturalism -- in particular, I doubt you bothered to follow the link to the Lynn Thomas source. It seems straightforwardly descriptive. Feminists sometimes criticize attempts to impose a ban in African nations because bans tend not to work and may turn this horrific practice into a symbol of resistance to imperialism. I gather people have had more success by talking to mothers about the health risks. So this seems like a fine example of how:
*understanding other cultures can help you talk to people and find common values
*conservatives talking about feminism or "multiculturalism" often look really stupid.
And yet they have a problem with adding the trace lead amounts of lead to electronics necessary to prevent tin whiskers.
It's also worth noting that human "cultures" behave remarkably like empirical clusters of loosely-correlated social norms, behaviors, signals, status rules, hierarchical systems, beliefs, and moral systems. This seems to strongly support most of what you've said here, and obviously there is some drift and some shared space between "cultures" depending on how you carve them.
What you're describing is the definition of "culture" (more precisely, a definition of "culture", and a good one). I'm not sure why you're giving the weaker qualification of "behave remarkably like" rather than "are".
This particular wording was meant to convey the sense that "Whatever people generally define as 'culture' or as separate 'cultures', even if they use rigid aristotelian categories, it still behaves pretty much like this."
The red car effect/availability heuristic at work - I instantly thought of a Zizek quote. Or were you quoting this bit too?
I'm more on the "good fences make good neighbors" side, which I guess is the opposite from Zizek (judging by this quote; I don't know more about his opinions). He criticizes the fear of harassment (and labels it "obsessive", just to remind the reader that it is a boo light); I would like to talk also about those specific situations where the threat is real.
To me it seems that the "politically correct" description of people from other cultures is that they are a) completely different, but also b) completely harmless.
On the other hand, my opinion is that people from other cultures are often very similar, but even the small differences can be dangerous.
A "political correct" picture of a different people is something like this: They have green skin and worship ants... but if we will tolerate their green skins and ant worship, they will certainly be pleasant neighbors and our lives will be made more rich by their presence.
My picture of a different people is something like this: They are mostly like me: they value truth, and they want to punish people who harm others. Unfortunately, their idea of truth is whatever their holy prophet said; their idea of harm is opposing the prophet's words; and their idea of proper punishment is to murder everyone who disagrees with their prophet. This is why they wouldn't make pleasant neighbors.
see also
--Borderlands 2
Excellent game BTW. It's better than Diablo 3 at what Diablo 3 is supposed to be (kill-loot-repeat), and it has good and actually funny writing, and passable shooter mechanics.
(House, MD deals with moral grandstanding)
Is the expected number of people you'd save by doing that actually greater than 1?
I checked the numbers on this recently. An average heart transplant costs about 1.1 million dollars, and has a mean survival time of about five years (at a very poor QoL). I think there's a pretty strong case that they shouldn't be done at all.
Kidney transplants have a much better RoI, but they don't require the death of the donor.
Correction: the median post-heart-transplant survival time seems to be a little over 10 years now, so the mean is probably close to that.. However, it's important to note that organ transplants aren't performed just before the patient dies of natural causes, so there's overlap between post-transplant survival and the lifespan the patient would have had without a transplant.
Case in point: An acquaintance with COPD had a lung transplant, then died a year later of related causes. His condition at the time of the lung transplant wasn't good but wasn't that dire; it's quite possible he would have lived longer and had a better QoL without the transplant.
The national registry on solid organ transplants is at http://www.srtr.org/, if anyone wants to do some data mining.
Does that include the cost of finding a donor?
There are other estimates available on the web, but I worked off this one:
http://www.transplantliving.org/before-the-transplant/financing-a-transplant/the-costs/
Cost of finding a donor is under 'procurement'. As far as I can tell, the immunosuppressant entry only covers the first year of post-transplant care, so factoring in a five-year mean survival time gives the $1.1 million figure I mentioned.
$1.1M was at least an order of magnitude larger than my guesstimate for the price of the transplant itself, so I wondered if that figure included something else. [follows link] OK, the figure for "physician during transplant" was indeed within an order of magnitude of what I expected, but hardly any of the other expenses had even occurred to me.
What do you mean by 'shouldn't be done'? Do you mean it's imprudent for an individual to spend that much money on a heart transplant, even though she values her own life?
Or do you mean it's immoral for an individual to spend that much money on herself, rather than on greater utility for others?
Or do you mean it's imprudent or immoral for medical practitioners and researchers to invest so much time and effort into performing heart transplants and gradually improving the technology? Or do you mean it's imprudent or immoral for the state to fund such efforts?
Or do you mean it's imprudent or immoral for the state to permit individuals to purchase heart transplants?
If it's moral for someone to spend that much of their money on a house or a yacht, it's moral for them to spend it on a heart transplant, but it may be a net utility loss for the patient.
The first heart transplant was performed 45 years ago. Almost half a century of effort has yielded a state of affairs that could politely be described as 'dire'. Immoral, no, imprudent yes.
Yes and yes. The return on investment is appalling. A back of the envelope estimate I did a while ago, IIRC, showed that public health investment had a RoI 6 to 8 orders of magnitude better than organ transplants.
I also think it's immoral that the donor's estate is denied even a tiny share of the revenue.
See above, re: houses and yachts.
AFAIK yes. Up to 8 people.
Do you mean saving figuratively? (Also addressed at drethelin who used "save a life".)
Heart, lungs, liver, left kidney, right kidney = 5, and that's being generous.
Pancreas and corneas certainly improve quality of life, but aren't life savers. For skin grafts there's alternatives AFAIK.
Is there a stash of secret organs I'm missing?
You can give a small part of the liver, which grows to a functioning liver in the recipient. Presumably that means that you could get multiple liver transplants from one suicide by organ donations.
Yes, to my knowledge that was only done with living donors, but you are correct:
Interestingly, "living donor liver transplantation for pediatric recipients involves removal of approximately 20% of the liver", but you can't just take any 20% unfortunately.
If only there were more focused, high-scale, no-holds-barred research efforts on growing organs in the vat, xenotransplants from engineered e.g. pigs, for all of which proofs-of-concept and actual human trials by isolated low-funded groups exist (e.g. artificially grown trachea for a swedish girl if I recall correctly)! We have the technology, as they say, we're just too reluctant to use it.
I have no idea where to find quantified data on average lives saved. Most of the people involved have an incentive to exaggerate.
Up to?
Not all of your organs will be usable or near enough to save a life. A lot depends on the way you choose to kill yourself.
I'd realized as much, but that still left me wondering what actual average "Up to 8" signifies. After allowing for different suicide methods and such, that "Up to 8" might be 8, or it might be something like 1.1. The result of a utilitarian calculation would probably be sensitive to the real world average being ≈8 versus ≈1.
Does it means "8 people saved (for unspecified time)" or "the saved people gain 8 times as much QALYs as the donor lost"?
AFAIK, the there are some problems with transplanted organs which require repeated medical attention and sometimes a lot of painkillers, so we convert X years of a healthy person to Y years of people with bad health.
On the other hand, a person willing to follow this advice and kill themselves probably suffers from depression, so we should reduce their remaining years estimate by a probability of suicide (other than the specific one recommended in this thread).
When do we hit diminishing returns?
Let's find out.
You mean by calculation, right?
I mean, if every suicidal person saves the lives of up to eight people who want to live, it might be worth outright encouraging this approach, rather than having suicidal people kill themselves in ways that damage their bodies for this purpose, and then spend effort and money trying to bring them back.
Once a certain number of people is reached, though, there might be a degree of overabundance of organs compared to the needs, and unless you want to make the jurisdiction that allows this some sort of exporter of literal human resources, you should probably stop there.
Charles Mackay from "Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds"
Charles Babbage
Robert Anton Wilson
Sting
-- A dialogue by Philip Gasper
Hilarious. It reminded me of Dennett's "Superficiality vs. Hysterical Realism" (which is much more serious and academic, though).
“Must a name mean something?" Alice asked doubtfully.
Of course it must," Humpty Dumpty said with a short laugh; "my name means the shape I am - and a good handsome shape it is, too. With a name like yours, you might be any shape, almost.”
Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass
I have as much authority as the Pope, I just don't have as many people who believe it. -George Carlin
"I have the same height as the Empire State Building, I just don't tower as many feet from the ground."
The first entry Google gives me for authority is "the power or right to give orders", which is presented as a single definition but which is clearly two very different concepts lumped together. Carlin's quote and your parody each seem to be focusing on only one or the other half of that definition, but he does so in a way intended to highlight the distinction whereas you seem to be doing so in a way which hides it.
Interpreting Carlin charitably, he is talking about moral or rational authority, not about authority in the sense of power over others.
You could replace "Pope" with "President" in that quote, and it's still true.
Paul Valéry
Thomas Huxley
-Sennett Forell, Foundation and Empire
David Deutsch, The Beginning of Infinity
I think he vastly overestimates the affect of optimism on technological development, vs say population size, disease levels and food supply.
And yet they couldn't even defeat the Spartans or keep Savonarola from taking power.
To be fair, with a general like Napoleon, how could the Spartans lose?
H.L. Mencken
"Some magic bullets from the past"
I'm not sure what you mean to imply with your comment, but since someone had downvoted lukeprog's quote, I guess at least that person might have taken it to undermine Mencken's words. However, all Mencken is saying is that
p(easy,neat,plausible,wrong) > 0
which in no way contradicts
p(easy,neat,plausible,right) > 0.
Of course the essence of the quote is that a solution's being easy, neat and plausible doesn't imply it's right which often seems to be forgotten in public discourse.
Something Positive
Source: Andrew Sullivan in an otherwise fairly bland political post
More often than not it hits you first.
Not for all aspects of reality. Some require very extreme conditions (like large, complex physics experiments like the LHC) to hit.
Teachings of Diogenes
"Once, Chuang Tzu was fishing the P’u River when the King of Ch’u sent two of his ministers to announce that he wished to entrust to Chuang Tzu the care of his entire domain.
Chuang Tzu held his fishing pole and, without turning his head, said: 'I have heard that Ch’u possesses a sacred tortoise which has been dead for three thousand years and which the king keeps wrapped up in a box and stored in his ancestral temple. Is this tortoise better off dead and with its bones venerated, or would it be better off alive with its tail dragging in the mud?'
'It would be better off alive and dragging its tail in the mud,' the two ministers replied.
'Then go away!' said Chuang Tzu, 'and I will drag my tail in the mud!'"
The real irony of the story is a historical context I think most readers these days miss: that when the real Plato paid court to a 'king' - Dionysius II, tyrant of Syracuse - it went very poorly. Plato was arrested, and barely managed to arrange his freedom & return to Athens.
Twice.
And supposedly Plato was sold into slavery by the previous tyrant.
Another from the same site — on free will:
This works until the king sends armed men to confiscate your vegetables.
New Yorker article on David Deutsch
(I saw this on Scott Aaronson's blog)
--Neal Stephenson, In the Beginning Was... the Commandline
From "Richard Feynman and The Connection Machine"
I would like to upvote the Feynman quote. I am not interested in upvoting the Stephenson quote. I think it would be better if these quotes were in separate comments, as recommended in the post.
I would like to upvote the Stephenson quote, and not the Feynman quote.
I would like to abstain from voting on them, but to do so in separate posts.
You two talk between yourselves so that only one of you upvote the entire comment.
This reminds of how two high school classmates of mine eluded the prohibition from voting for themselves as class representatives by voting for each other.
Or, you both downvote the conglomerate and each write a comment expressing objection to the combination, approval of the desired quote and indifference to the other.
(I downvoted the conglomerate on the principle "I wish to see less quote-comments that people believe should be separate, especially when said quotes are verbose anyway". There is an implied "...and would upvote both comments if they were split to encourage trivial improvements in response to feedback".)
Teachings of Diogenes
-Aristosophy. I like to think this is about the Robot's Rebellion.
"
well shit that didn't work."
"Reality Injection Attack" would make a great name for a mathcore band.
--Bertrand Russell, "Philosophy's Ulterior Motives". (The context is Descartes' philosophy and the obviously fallacious proofs he offers of the existence of God and the external world.)
Or laziness, or lack of time, or honest error. Multiple causes can have the same effect, and hanlons razor comes into play/
I think men whose reasoning powers are that good are few and far between. (Women too, I'm not trying to be some sort of sexist here.)
I've encountered the phenomena described in this quote and used it as a signal in the game of Mafia. It's quite effective but I think has limited general application.
--Prime Function Aki Zeta-Five, Sid Meier's Alpha Centauri
Removing all those glands and hormones (assuming they are pars pro toto for our evolved urges), what would be left? A frontal lobe staring at the wall?
Alex Tabarrok
In which Winnie-the-Pooh tests a hypothesis about the animal tracks that he is following through the woods:
-Descartes, Discourse on method part 6.
-John Maynard Keynes
William Blake
That's Blake again. Tim Freeman is the author of the quote before the Blake quotes on this page.
William Blake
Freeman? That's one of my favorite lines from Blake's "Proverbs of Hell"...
On the error of failing to appreciate your opponents' three-dimensionality:
Source: Milton Friedman, "Schools at Chicago," from The Indispensable Milton Friedman
H/T David Henderson at EconLog
Note: The final sentence of the passage, as presented by Henderson, is missing closing quotation marks. I have added them.
Therefore, the first and most important duty of philosophy is to test impressions, choosing between them and only deploying those that have passed the test. You know how, with money--an area where we believe our interest to be at stake--we have developed the art of assaying, and considerable ingenuity has gone into developing a way to test if coins are counterfeit, involving our senses of sight, smell, hearing, and touch. The assayer will let the denarius drop and listen intently to its ring; and he is not satisfied to listen just once: after repeated listenings he practically acquires a musician's subtle ear. It is a measure of the effort we are prepared to expend to guard against deception when accuracy is at a premium.
When it comes to our poor mind, however, we can't be bothered; we are satisfied accepting any and all impressions, because here the loss we suffer is not obvious. If you want to know just how little concerned you are about things good and bad, and how serious about things indifferent, compare your attitude to going blind with your attitude about being mentally in the dark. You will realize, I think, how inappropriate your values really are.
Epictetus, Discourses I.20.7-12 (pages 51-52 of this edition) (original Greek, with alternate translations at the link)
Edited to correct a typo.
Sean Thomason
Everything is always better with fucking.
I think people tell you that when you aren't as good at the inside the box things as your competitors and need to take a risk to set yourself apart. Thinking outside the box is a gamble, which may be the only shot for someone in a losing position. Of course, that's from a business perspective, where I've tended to hear it more. For a science/truth seeking perspective I'd say "Don't forget to look at the box from outside from time to time."
On confirmation bias
If a man objects to truths that are all too evident, it is no easy task finding arguments that will change his mind. This is proof neither of his own strength nor of his teacher's weakness. When someone caught in an argument hardens to stone, there is just no more reasoning with them.
Epictetus, Discourses I.5.1-2 (page 15 of this edition) (original Greek, with alternate translations at the link)
Quote from Peter Watts' Blindsight.
About the prospects of a fight against a superintelligence:
-- Adam Savage
If this were true, the ancient Greeks would've had science.
The people in this thread should read The Forgotten Revolution: How Science Was Born in 300 BC and Why it Had to Be Reborn by Lucio Russo.
They did. Look up Thales, Aristotle, Democritus, and Archimedes just for a start. Particularly Archimedes.