Rationality Quotes November 2012
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"His mother had often said, When you choose an action, you choose the consequences of that action. She had emphasized the corollary of this axiom even more vehemently: when you desired a consequence you had damned well better take the action that would create it." - Lois McMaster Bujold, writer (b. 1949)
When I am speaking to people about rationality or AI, and they ask something incomprehensibly bizarre and incoherent, I am often tempted to give the reply that Charles Babbage gave to those who asked him whether a machine that was given bad data would produce the right answers anyway:
But instead I say, "Yes, that's an important question..." and then I steel-man their question, or I replace it with a question on an entirely different subject that happens to share some of the words from their original question, and I answer that question instead.
What does this mean?
Steel man
See also.
Thank you!
http://forums.catholic.com/showpost.php?s=911f001b47b040ac5997321714c0244b&p=7081969&postcount=8
“It was designed to look like one” does sound like a connection to me.
On the level of an abstraction, yes. But as a physical object or basic function? No. I think that what this quote is getting at, though I'm not sure what the point is as I find all this extremely self evident.
-Epicurus
I need help on this: I'm torn between finding this argument to be preposterous, and being unable to deny the premises or call the argument invalid.
Death should still concern you very much. Even though you should not necessarily 'care' about your own death, certainly you should try to eliminate those horrible occasions of your loved ones dying.
At the very least, even assuming there's no reason to worry about your own death, you would probably still care about the deaths of others -- at least your friends and family. Given a group of people who mutually value having each other in their lives, death should still be a subject of enormous concern. I don't grant the premise that we shouldn't be concerned about death even for ourselves, but I don't think that premise is enough to justify Epicurus's attitude here.
Of course, for most of human history, there genuinely wasn't much of anything that could be done about death, and there's value in recognizing that death doesn't render life meaningless, even if it's a tragedy. But today, when there actually are solutions on the table, this quote sounds more in complacency than acceptance. Upvoted though, because it points to an important cluster of questions that's worth untangling.
You are allowed to have preferences about things that don't coexist with you.
Fair enough, but I think Epicurus' point might be rephrased thus:
-not really Epicurus
If that's right, it's not so much a question of being concerned about things you don't coexist with. He's saying that it's irrational to be concerned about things which are impossible and inconceivable.
That's stupid, of course. Of course, people die. But I have a hard time seeing where the argument actually goes wrong. I am regrettably susceptible to philosophical nonsense of every kind.
This argument implicitly assumes that we can't meaningfully talk about things not in the present.
The argument asserts that 'death' (which we might taboo as 'a change, the result of which is not existing') is an incoherent concept. It's not claiming that death is always in the future, it's claiming that there is just no such thing as death.
I wasn't referring to death not being in the present. Rather, the problem with the statement
is that it assumes that because the person doesn't exist in the present, it isn't meaningful to talk about that person existing at all.
Ahh, I see, that's a very good point. So you would say that Socrates, despite being dead, nevertheless exists now as someone who is dead.
I suppose if we've got a block-time view of things anyway, existence wouldn't have much of anything to do with presentness.
I like that answer.
It's linguistic trickery, like saying prisoners can't escape because if they escape they're not really prisoners now are they?
That's a good point, but it's not a solution (so much as a repitition) of the problem. How is it possible that prisoners can escape? Or that ships can sink?
I'm not saying I actually doubt that ships can sink, prisoners can escape, and people can die. That would be insane. My problem is that I have a hard time denying the force of the argument.
I don't think that's the kind of linguistic trickery it is. It's more like:
The dead person's body exists, but the dead person's mind/consciousness no longer does. If you equivocate by calling both of those things "the person", then they seem to simultaneously be dead and not dead. If you stop equivocating, the problem goes away.
Try this one:
EDIT: Changed some details because they were distracting.
Yes, I think I also just deny premise 2. Some words work like that: former presidents, for example, are not presidents.
The problem is in #2. Imaginary cheese is not a kind of cheese.
Edit: I'm not entirely sure this is where I saw it first, but this forum post (ironically, on a Catholic forum of some sort, apparently discussing whether certain games such as Magic are evil...) makes the argument excellently.
Edit2: In fact, I daresay an excerpt from said post is good enough to post as a rationality quote on its own, which I will now do.
Wonder what the author of that post was banned for.
I'm not sure I like this phrasing although the essential point is correct. I'd say rather that generally when one uses a word one implicitly has "actual" or "real" in front of it. Adding the word "actual" at the relevant points in the argument makes the problem more clear.
What is the position of imaginary cheese in thingspace, relative to the position of the cheese similarity cluster?
Along most dimensions (those relating to physical properties, most causal properties, etc.), imaginary cheese is quite far removed from actual cheeses. Along a couple of dimensions (verbal description, perhaps something like "what sorts of neutral firings are involved in perceiving it"), imaginary cheese is closer to actual cheeses.
To take a two-dimensional example, perhaps gouda is at (4,6), cheddar is (5,3), mozarella is (3,7), provolone is (3,5)... and imaginary cheese is, say, (100,4). Within the cluster if you look only at the y dimension, quite distant from it if you look at all dimensions. And if we actually plotted cheese and imaginary cheese in some suitably higher-dimensional space, there'd be a lot of dimensions like x in my toy example (along which imaginary cheese is far from actual cheeses), and few like y (along which imaginary cheese is close to actual cheeses). Out of those dimensions in which cheeses form a cluster, most would be like x, few like y.
Edit: the basic issue is that things cluster in thingspace; categories into which we place things are reflections of that clustering. What things do not, in fact, do is fall neatly into classes and subclasses that might seem natural to us, like objects in Java, where if you have e.g. ImaginaryCheese extends Cheese (i.e. the ImaginaryCheese class is a subclass of the Cheese class), then ImaginaryCheese is guaranteed to inherit any and all properties of its superclass Cheese. All we really have is approximations of this behavior, to a lesser or greater extent, e.g.:
GoudaCheese behaves more or less like a subclass of Cheese; most relevant properties of Cheese (that is, properties shared by all things within the main body of the Cheese similarity cluster) are in fact inherited by GoudaCheese... because, of course, GoudaCheese is within the main body of the Cheese similarity cluster.
Conversely, ImaginaryCheese is not within the main body of the Cheese similarity cluster, so we shouldn't expect it to behave like a subclass of Cheese... and it doesn't.
So an alternate response to the logic in the great-grandparent (Nisan's comment) might be:
Yes, some cheese is imaginary. You can't get it anywhere because, unlike most cheeses, imaginary cheese isn't "a thing you can get". This is not a problem because reality doesn't (apparently!) feature strict class hierarchies.
In fact, the problem with the reasoning is that while you could construct a strict class hierarchy, the properties you could assign to the Cheese superclass would be only those shared by all cheeses... and if you're drawing the boundary around the similarity cluster such that ImaginaryCheese is within the boundary, then "existence outside of minds, and therefore ability to be 'gotten'" would not be one of those shared properties.
In your imagination.
Look! I made a pretty picture to help!
As I said here, imaginary cheese doesn't belong in the Cheese circle. Imaginary cheese is not a kind of cheese.
Try playing Taboo.
So 'ceasing to exist' would replace 'dying'. The argument would then be that nothing can cease to exist, and an implicit premise would be that the referent of the subject of a true sentence must exist. Is that true?
I guess the reason it's tempting to think it's true in the case of death is that dying is a change in which some particular thing goes from existing to not existing. Yet in the moment the change is complete, there is nothing undergoing any change. So as long as the changing thing (and thus the change) exists, it has not yet died, and if it has died, there is neither a changing thing nor a change.
At the very least, this makes death a very weird kind of change.
It's pretty much correct, as far as I can see. One should avoid death because s/he values life, rather than cling to life because s/he fears death.
Doing the latter helps sustain ability to do the former.
I can think of two possible things Epicurus could have meant, one correct and the other incorrect. We don't need to fear the experience of being dead, because there's no experience of being dead. But if we care about saving wild geese, then we should avoid dying, because our dying leads to fewer saved geese.
Which of those ('no experience' or 'wild geese') is correct, and which is incorrect? Both seem plausible to me.
Yeah, sorry, my comment was poorly written. Both statements seem correct to me, but the second one contradicts a certain interpretation of the Epicurus quote, thus making that interpretation incorrect.
Doctor Who
Anonymous
-- John Allen Paulos(from Beyond Numeracy)
--David Eagleman
The final sentence of that quote is true whether the first two sentences are there or not. Thus, I could make the same assertion by saying:
CrimethInc (Not exactly a bastion of rationality, but they do have some good stuff now and again.)
Cliff Pervocracy
While I think there's some truth to this, it's easy for me to come up with examples of things I've done that never made sense to myself.
Fair point. I can't really think of anything I've done that didn't make at least some sort of sense at the time, but I can think of at least one thing I've done where I seriously have to strain to see how it ever could have made sense to me (though I remember feeling like it did). Looking back on it, I feel like I was carrying the idiot ball.
-- George Weinberg commenting on Mencius Moldbug, “The magic of symmetric sovereignty”
(Not that I think that's a valid general principle, but I do feel that way about many of the thought experiments I see proposed on LW.)
-- Yvain, “Why I Hate Your Freedom”
Transitional species, Winston Rowntree
I couldn't just quote a part of this, as any one good quote would drag half the comic with it. It deserves reading, though.
Misclicking like a madman today, Transitional species, Winston Rowntree is one massive, awesome quote. Only one part wouldn't do it justice, unfortunately.
--Carl Sagan
The Last Psychiatrist bats another one out of the park:
the meaning or source of the $ amounts if very unclear to me. Is there more on it somewhere?
John Maynard Keynes
Previously quoted on LW, but not in a quotes thread. I was reminded of it by this exchange.
Hasok Chang, Inventing Temperature: Measurement and Scientific Progress
Jason Brennan, Libertarianism: What Everyone Needs to Know
The Dialogues Between Bokonon and Koheleth
Why would you judge your morality by the quality of it's coding?
If we're using "humanity" to mean human values, this quote seems simply false (presuming that value stability is a solved problem by then).
If we're using the word to mean the architecture of baseline humans, it seems somewhere between false and irrelevant depending on what features of that architecture we care about.
If we're using it to mean some kind of metaphysical quality of human nature, it seems entirely unverifiable.
I found the quote amusing specifically because of this ambiguity (modulus your first point - the question of values seems tangential to me).
I found the mix of optimism (ie. the assumptions that no extinction type events will occur, and that there will be a continuous descendant type relationship between generations far into our future, etc...) and pessimism (ie, the assumption that, on a large enough time scale, most architectural components traceable to now-humans will become obsolete) poignant.
That seems like the presumption that the quote is challenging.
Even if that's true (which I'm not convinced it is; as I implied, "humanity" covers a lot of ground before it stops working in context), I'm uncomfortable with the implications of the quote. It seems to be treating value stability less as a (difficult) problem and more as an insurmountable obstacle, the sort where the only way to win is not to play. Then there's the "alas, Babylon" overtones.
Suppose I should expect as much from someone taking the name of a Kurt Vonnegut character, though.
Even if you think the essence of the quote is wrong, that "we" would be better off if all the poets and street performers were making good livings in the white economy, don't you think the quote is valuable for pointing up an important question that many of us working on coding intelligence may need to answer some day?
Wait, what? I was talking about self-modification, not social normativity. It might be a point about the latter in context, but it isn't out of context; I was responding to the words you presented, not the ones in the source.
And my objection isn't that it raises the wrong question, but that it closes that question with a wrong answer.
What's the quote have to do with whether we want to be street performers? Do you think that self-modifying humans would try to make themselves want to work in offices instead of street performance, or something?
You can make a lot more money per unit time working in an office rather than as a street performer.
Is that what you would do if you could self-modify better? Do you use your limited capacity to change how your mind functions to make yourself into a more efficient money-making machine? I don't.
Is the point of being a street performer to make money or artistic fulfillment? It seems like there are better ways to achieve either one of these goals.
Do you do any instrumental things? Like say, eat? Practice? Learn? Self modify?
Making more money happens to be a very effective way to achieve most goals.
You should use your "limited capacity to change how your mind functions " to become more capable of doing whatever it is you want to do, in the most effective way possible.
If you find that making money is not instrumental to your goals, say so, but don't just make fun of it and imply that the people who do (try to make money) are doing something wrong.
yeah. Sorry. The tone I was using was totally wrong for the kind of discussions we want to have here.
We shouldn't edit humanity to remove depression, anxiety, schizophrenia, and other mental illness?
No thanks - instead, let's avoiding totally pointless wasting of human capability.
I think the questions relevant to the quote would be should we avoid editing out crying at cute kitten videos, sitting with your grandmother while she tells you the same story for the 21st time, wearing a "kiss me I'm Polish" pin on st. patrick's day, laughing at three stooges movies, and swooning when a nice boy writes you doggerel or gives you an "Oh Henry" candy bar.
In rewriting the part of the code that evolution put in, all sorts of idiosyncratic behavior will be written out. The fact that the root idio means self, personal, private will not make it any easier to replace the evolved code with rationalized, readable, maintainable code without losing all sorts of behaviors whos purpose is nearly unknowable when looking at the existing code.
Since anxiety, depression, and especially schizophrenia are features of humanity which exist to a negative degree only in some of us, it will probably be possible to fix these by writing patches that operate on the relevant minds that have these features, and will not reqiure touching the evoluion-written code.
You shouldn't carelessly think you are necessarily wise enough to edit humanity without destroying it in the process. Things like "depression" "anxiety" "schizophrenia" are probably not neatly packed away in tidy little boxes you can remove from your brain without any side-effects at all.
This has been somewhat discussed at Devil's offers
I'm not saying that disentangling what we want to preserve will be easy. But the quote speaks in absolutes - fixing the code that causes schizophrenia or Capgras syndrone is prohibited because that would destroy our humanity.
It's conflating the problem of Hidden Complexity of Wishes with Justification-for-being-hit-on-the-head-every-day.
The quote neither speaks in absolutes nor does it prohibit anything.
Quotes must be compact and pithy to be quotable. If a quote refers to "advanced humans of the future," it is quite reasonable to expect they are talking about healthy, typical humans, and not referring to the repair of defects that only occur in some humans.
The quote expresses a wistful sense of loss at a choice to clean out the evelved code that makes up our kernel. It doesn't prohibit anything.
DBZ Abridged on the lack of consequence concerning death in the series. Tien's supposed to be the only serious character in the series. That's the joke.
Edit: Perhaps I should explain this quote... I simply thought that Yamcha served as a good representation of most people's reactions... and Tien as a representation of "Um. It's no biggie." The rest of this series finale went off without a hitch as all characters realized "Wait. There are almost no consequences here. There may never be? What's the use in grieving!"
--Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn
Rationality challenge: Understand why I posted it here.
Bonsu Rationality Challenge: Reinvent the meaning of "God" I used to ironman the position. Start by ironmaning it yourself.
For decision-theoric reasons, the dark lords of the matrix give superhumanly good advice about social organization to religious people in ways that look from inside the simulation like supernatural revelations; non-religious people don't have access to these revelations so when they try to do social organization it ends in disaster.
Obviously.
Seems legit.
In abandoning one's religion, one also abandons an ethical system. If this lacuna is not filled in by another ethical system that works at least passably well, the consequences for personal and political behaviour can be dire.
Bonus challenge accepted, blind mode - no peeking at comments, take my word.
"God" = the objectively present, difficult-to-disentangle historical trends of the West, and the memetic strains that caused those trends, chiefly Universalism and its Christianity section. So here, a Universalist culture has violated Universalism's own naturally-evolved barriers and safety measures, and suffered for it by landing in a shallow circle of Hell. But Solzhenitsyn wasn't very Universalist, I'd say - not like Zizek and Moldbug and yours truly take it - so he couldn't see that Universalism can only stay alive while moving ever onwards and unfolding itself.
Also: this quote should be way way up there! And the Obamas of today shouldn't be quoted so much - all is dust, and all will be dust. But history will sort its Right and Left... in due course.
(help help will newsome is taking me over with his computational theology konkvistador you know you saw it help)
Meta-level point: It is possible to steel-man someone's position into an argument that they would not actually endorse. I think that might be what you are doing here.
I'm trying to be more whimsical in my posting on LW, but I'm not sure that "rationality," "optimization," or any other special virtue in this community is advanced by this provocative post or its religious-language framing.
For a more detailed discussion go here.
A key of Marxist thought is the rejection of the idea of God. The Marxist morality that drove the Russian revolutionaries was different than Christian morality.
I don't the an inherent problem with blaming the Russian revolution on that change in morality. It's a bit like putting the blame that the crusades happened on Christianity.
I'd say that's like putting the blame for the battle of Normandy on democracy.
Very, very well put! (FYI, Eugine_Nier appears to be pro-democracy)
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^ looks just right in rot13, too! Black Speech!
I can't tell whether you understood my point, or completely misunderstood it. I don't see where I was "thinking like a Marxist".
Not in this comment specifically - just a general thing about your view of economics' relation to social structures having similar focus (determinism etc) to the Marxist view. TimS has called you out on it recently, no?
But still, "moral fashion doesn't ever cause revolutions on its own" is a statement any Marxist would sign under. So in this regard you ironically proved closer to Marxism than the view you kinda-opposed as insufficiently strongly worded ("causal link about as evident as for crusades and Christianity"). See?
TGGP defends economic determinism here.
Heh! Cool, thanks.
Ok, so you did misunderstand my intent.
My point, was mainly that the Crusades are not a good example of "religion causes people to do something evil".
Wait, why are the Crusades not a good example of religion causing people to do evil things? Do you think they weren't evil, or that religion wasn't to blame?
That depends on what you mean by those terms. Was the battle of Normandy a good thing?
I'm confused. Yes, D-Day was a good thing. Yes, D-Day was violence in service of democracy.
What does this have to do with whether (1) the Crusades were a good thing, or (2) whether religion (particularly Catholicism) was a substantial cause of the Crusades?
That religion wasn't to blame. Read the grandparents, most notably this.
EDIT: Wait, no. I had that backwards.
Was it really? For example, "the meek shall inherit the earth" transfers basically unchanged.
In Christianity the meek somehow inherent the earth while staying meek. In Marxism they do it through running a revolution and overthrowing the old order.
That sounds like an empirical prediction, not a moral claim.
In Marxism there's no difference between empirical predictions about the far future and moral claims. Marx basically got the idea that you can make empirical predictions about how moral standards will be at the end of history. According to Marx all actions that move the world in the direction of being more in line with the moral standards at the end of history are morally good.
That's not completely relevant, as "the meek shall inherit the earth" was a Christian claim.
You're making a category error. Historical materialism just doesn't have anything to say on the subject of morality, certainly nothing so silly as that. At the end of history the universe will be dirt and dust, but I haven't seen any Marxist who cares (though I think I did once encounter someone who concluded from this and Aristotelian teleology that morality is whatever maximizes entropy, lol.)
More generally, even if we can make reasonable claims about what Marxists' and Christians' effective moralities, asking whether these are the same moralities or not is a confused question, for entirely different reasons.
I've seen several compelling arguments along similar lines.
Compelling? Do you mean compelled to reject the premises or compelled to accept the conclusion?
Mostly, I was compelled to author the grandparent comment. So not very compelling.
You're misreading the Marxist "end of history". To Marx, history is the story of class struggle, and so once there are no more classes there is no more history.
You might both be confusing Marxist and Marxian thought.
I'm certainly not confused, but those trying to make that distinction might be. His political and sociological theories followed directly from his economic theories - refuting the labor theory of value is really sufficient to defeat Marx entirely, or at least eliminate anything that wasn't already said better by Hegel.
OK, sorry for the superfluous advice then. I have only had a cursory glance at your discussion.
Marx burrowed the idea of history from Hegel.
For Marx history is the process of social changes. When that process of changes reaches it's end, you have Marx's end of history. For Marx that's a communist society in which all workers get equal pay and life happily ever after. Afterwards there are no social changes, therefore there's no history.
Marx makes a prediction that this communist society will come about. Things that move the world closer to that prediction are morally good for Marx.
Did the (nominal) Christians who did violent and terrible things forget God too?
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn doesn't speak about "why people do violent things?" in the quote but about why the Russian revolution happened.
"Men have forgotten God" -> "Men have lost certain beliefs and practices that strengthened social stability, and thus provided (despite their actual falsehood or even ridiculousness) a certain local optimum." ?
It's an example of how even absurd amounts of research can fail to move a religious thought. I think too many people will fail to get the joke and the potential for abuse is too high.
--Mencius Moldbug on an experiment that has interesting results
Henry David Thoreau
--Michael Gazzaniga
--Michael Gazzaniga
Regarding brain architecture.
I like these. Has he written papers or books that might be of particular interest or value if I'm interested in the gritty bits of what-we-don't-know about neurobiology, brain architecture and general brain-related stuffs?
You may be interested in chapter 14 by Christof Koch (the one and only) in an anthology on Consciousness, the whole chapter is available for free at google books here.
In general, Koch's the go-to guy for these kinds of questions.
I have these from the youtube lectures he has given, very accessible and interesting(thanks to lukeprog for the tip):
-Paul Graham in The Lies We Tell Kids
This sounds like a challenge. Would you prefer your children to not swear; and if yes, why?
My reasoning would be that I want my children to be successful (for both altruistic and selfish reasons), and I believe that a habit of swearing is on average harmful to social skills.
Disclaimer: There are situations where swearing is the right thing to do, so it would be optimal to swear exactly in these situations. But it would be difficult for a child to determine these situations precisely; and from the simple strategies, "never swear" (which often develops towards "don't swear in presence of adult people or someone who would inform them") seems very good.
I'm almost sure this is mainly a status thing. Frequent swearing is perceived as crass, a lower-class practice, and so aspirational parents encourage their children not to. This intent then proceeds to backfire when children develop their own social networks: status relations among children and young teenagers are quite different from adult ones, and swearing in this context is often a marker of independence and perceived maturity. This gradually unwinds during the teenage years as swearing in the presence of adults becomes more socially acceptable and adult-style status relations start to assert themselves.
The only thing that confuses me about this model is the lack of countersignaling, but perhaps children of that age can't reliably parse signaling at that level of indirection. Or maybe I just don't remember enough childhood social dynamics.
I like to be around people who don't constantly emphasize their every word, making it hard to tell when something is actually important. Since swearing is a verbal marker of importance, its casual overuse is like shouting all the time; it's very wearying. And, lest I be accused of rationalising, I do not only apply this to children, but have also asked my wife to cut back on swearing.
As a side note, Americans are very loud, both in the literal sense of putting more decibels behind their voices, and in their over-reliance on swearing. I think you've fallen into the bad equilibrium that comes about when everyone has an incentive to be a little louder than the next guy, and there's no cost to being so.
Thank you for this. I've been wondering reflectively why I've been swearing more frequently lately, and I just realized that it's to make sure my voice is heard. I'll try to attack the root of this and instead get my attention-validation from having good things to say rather than saying them most crassly.
Or you could, y'know, try to think of a better way.
That you know what a policy of punishing swearing develops into ("don't swear in presence of adult people or someone who would inform them") shows that you have the ability to think forwards into the consequences, but also hints at some sort of stopping, perhaps motivated (because hey, finding better solutions is hard).
Clearly, you also have the ability to reason a bit further: What sort of microsociety does the above behavior encourage once they get into high school, where the majority of their perceivable world is a miniature scheduled wildland?
When I was six and used swear words in front of my school principal (hey, when you spend half the day in the principal's office for the 13th time, you kinda get used to someone), he later brought it up with my parents (though I vaguely recall it wasn't in any negative manner). My parents immediately started reprimanding me, naturally, but he stopped them, and afterwards they changed strategies based on his advice and some insight they gained from reading more research and books on related topics.
I'm certainly glad they did, in retrospect, because in the twisted social environment that high schools are, a good swearing strategy can be extremely effective. I don't know how widely this'd work, YMMV and all that, but a "leave me alone" usually didn't get prospective bullies off my back. If I then followed up with a steady gaze and a "leave me the fuck alone" (yes, I know, but that's how 14-year-olds talked when I was there), now suddenly they'd grow much more cautious and start re-evaluating whether they should still try to play their little status game and get their cheap fun, when someone who rarely ever swears had just signaled to them that shit got serious.
All in all, "never swear" seems to me like it never actually works, and takes much more effort to attempt (by punishing every single instance of swearing that you can find, even though you know you can only find a small fraction of them) than other strategies like teaching "swearing gets less useful and powerful each time you use it, so if you always keep it as a reserve it'll be that much more effective".
Oh, I was not specific enough. What I wanted to write is that a habit of swearing is harmful to your social skills after you leave the school. Imagine a person at a job interview saying: "Yeah, I know the fucking Java, but NetBeans is gay, and if you ain't doing unit tests like all the time, you are seriously retarded, man." ;-)
Probably no one would do this intentionally, but the problem is, if you get a habit of swearing, then sometimes a word or two slips through, often unnoticed (by you; but your audience is shocked). At some moment this happened to me (no, not at a job interview, at least I think so), and after getting a feedback I decided to be extra careful. Which I would want to teach my children. I was very lucky to get that feedback, because most people assume that others are well aware of all the words they use.
Since I don't have nor plan on having children I actually haven't given it much thought. I posted this because it gives a good example of rationalization in action.
-related by Richard Dawkins in The God Delusion
Like I was standing still and the earth was rotating.
Versions of this quote have been posted twice before; the best version of the quote includes the friend's reply to Wittgenstein: http://lesswrong.com/lw/94r/rationality_quotes_january_2012/5kib
Thanks; I thought it was likely to have been posted, but I tried to search for it and didn't find it.
Mm. If you had googled for 'wittgenstein earth', which seems to me to be the most obvious search phrase, you would've found 2 links on the first page...
Yes, clearly my Google-fu is lacking. I think I searched for phrases like "sun went around the Earth," which fails because your quote has "sun went round the Earth."
There's your problem, you got overly specific. When you're formulating a search, you want to balance how many hits you get - the broader your formulation, the more likely the hits will include your target (if it exists) but the more hits you'll return.
In this case, my reasoning would go something like this, laid out explicitly: '"Wittgenstein" is almost guaranteed to be on the same page as any instance of this quote, since the quote is about Wittgenstein; LW, however, doesn't discuss Wittgenstein very much, so there won't be many hits in the first place; to find this quote, I only need to narrow down those hits a little, and after "Wittgenstein", the most fundamental core word to this quote is "Earth" or "sun", so I'll toss one of them in and... ah, there's the quote.'
If I were searching the general Internet, my reasoning would go more like "'Wittgenstein' will be on like a million websites; I need to narrow that down a lot more to hope to find it; so maybe 'Wittgenstein' and 'Earth' and 'Sun'... nope nothing on the first page, toss in 'goes around' OR 'go around', ah there it is!"
(Actually, for the general Internet, just 'Wittgenstein earth sun' turns up a first page mostly about this quote, several of which include all the details one could need aside from Dawkins's truncated version.)
Nick Cooney, Change of Heart
http://www.theonion.com/articles/loved-ones-recall-local-mans-cowardly-battle-with,772/
I find both the ironic and straightforward meaning of this quote to be meaningful.
Keith E. Stanovich, How to Think Straight About Psychology, 10th ed. (2013), 14.
ETA: Should have included the subsequent paragraph:
Lazarsfeld is also discussed here under http://lesswrong.com/lw/im/hindsight_devalues_science/
These aren't exactly opposed - 'out of sight, out of mind' is generally applied to things and problems, not, say, warm relationships.
Some of the others aren't exactly opposed either - I've generally heard not crossing a bridge before you get to it referring to trying to solve a problem you anticipate before it's possible to actually start solving the problem.
Really? I've seen it used twice for non-relationship contexts, but too many times to care to count (on the order of 50-80) in the context of long-distance relationships, usually as a warning that a couple should not hope to remain steady and trust eachother if they become far apart for a long period of time (months or more) for the first time since entering a relationship.
In fiction, this either turns into a self-fulfilling prophecy or becomes the whole reason the main character can complete the main quest.
In reality, the causal influence doesn't seem to be there, but anecdotally I observe that the drifting-apart usually happens regardless of whether any such prediction was made. Knowledge of this leads a significant fraction of couples to break-up preemptively when they're about to enter such a situation.
That's interesting. I'd more seen it used with annoyances. Maybe because I haven't seen much of LD relationships, and those that I did see, worked. And it was clear they were going to work from the outset because they were really serious about each other.