Rationality Quotes November 2012
Here's the new thread for posting quotes, with the usual rules:
- Please post all quotes separately, so that they can be voted up/down separately. (If they are strongly related, reply to your own comments. If strongly ordered, then go ahead and post them together.)
- Do not quote yourself
- Do not quote comments/posts on LW/OB
- No more than 5 quotes per person per monthly thread, please.
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Comments (898)
Sean Thomason
I think people tell you that when you aren't as good at the inside the box things as your competitors and need to take a risk to set yourself apart. Thinking outside the box is a gamble, which may be the only shot for someone in a losing position. Of course, that's from a business perspective, where I've tended to hear it more. For a science/truth seeking perspective I'd say "Don't forget to look at the box from outside from time to time."
Everything is always better with fucking.
Anzai & Simon
(This version is from Wikipedia.)
Previously approximated here.
I still habitually complete this joke with:
Though I'm now tempted to add:
"Hmph," snorts the cognitive psychologist. "Such presumption. An event occurred that we experienced as the perception of a black sheep, only one side of which was visible, standing on what we believed to be a field in Scotland."
I've heard a version in which after the mathematician speaks, the shepherd yells “Snowy White [the name of the sheep]! Stop rolling in the mud!”
Best version, in my snap judgment. The story, told this way, is about the different modes of thinking of astronomers, physicists, mathematicians, and shepherds. (and there are other variations about the approaches of stage magicians and cognitive psychologists, each of which has a characteristic interest. As a pure and careful thinker, the mathematician comes up with something similar to the practical approach of the stage magician, or the more-carefully-specified approach of the cognitive psychologist.)
But the shepherd is living in a different realm, very connected to reality, and comes up with something, from knowledge, not from thinking and careful analysis, that the sheep isn't black at all. The cognitive psychologist allowed for this, distinguishing the possibility of perceptual error, but still could not speak with authority about the sheep itself.
But this version doesn't mention the cognitive psychologist. The shepherd essentially confirms the conceptual space of the cognitive psychologist.
"Bah", says the thermodynamicist. "All I know is that your brain is in a configuration that makes you say you saw a black sheep a minute ago."
Add in another scoffing thermodynamicist, and we can round out the joke with an infinite regress.
"Meh", says the trivialist. "Scottish sheep are black. Scottish sheep are white. Scottish sheep are black and white. Scottish sheep are purple octopuses. And I don't even need to look out the window."
While everyone else is arguing the pragmatist has googled "Scottish Sheep varieties"
And Robin Hanson sets up a prediction market in Scottish sheep colors.
And Paul Graham is making money off of startups that try to profit from the recent boom in Scottish sheep color economies. Oh wait...
Cloned white and black True ScotsSheep with lifetime color warranties are marketed, free shipping worldwide.
Neil deGrasse Tyson
What percentage of your philosophy? If your philosophy is completely unsettled daily, you're probably insane.
That's certainly true. I think the point isn't that you should be constantly changing everything you believe, but that you should actively seek out new knowledge—especially knowledge that has a high probability of shifting the way you think (in a positive direction, of course).
Sure. I'm saying I'd prefer a wording that points out the diminishing returns of philosophical unsettlement, and the unavoidability thereof.
You're right, but the quote still makes sense. Humans are built so that they either live in ignorance or in perpetual wonder as they discover and rediscover that their intuitions don't accurately model reality. You might consider this as proof that humans are insane, and I'm inclined to agree, but the quote is still true and has a useful message.
An unspoken criterion for LW rationality quotes -- AFAICT -- is most truth in least space. This quote could have more truth in the same space. Even with just a "somewhat" before the "unsettled."
Shush, I'm obligated to defend Neil deGrasse Tyson. This is the internet.
The quote's lack of precision doesn't bother me because most powerful quotes lack precision. Also, adding somewhat means that the quote will be longer.
Yes, but the additional accuracy afforded by the extra word more than excuses its intrusion.
What degree of imprecision would bother you?
I'm not sure. I would need to see a bunch of examples on a sliding scale of precision. This isn't feasible because I'm willing to accept less precision in exchange for more impact, which means that different quotes would receive distorted results.
I want this to exist in real life for all communication.
With extra points for communication which is precisely more than one different thing?
I don't understand the question. Can you rephrase?
I'm trying to figure out what "somewhat" adds. Seems to me it takes something away. It makes a powerful statement into a wimpy one. Sure, if you take "unsettled" to mean something like "check yourself into a psychiatric unit," and take "daily" literally, obviously there would be a problem.
But "unsettled" means just that. Unsettled. Not fixed. In question.
How much in question? What's the ideal level of "unsettled"? And, "Who is asking?" is the question I've been taught to ask. If I ask the question, I'm uncomfortable with "unsettled" and want to be assured that it will only be a little, so that I can continue with "my" philosophy without any significant transformation.
Pretty standard survival thinking.
The rest of the statement makes it clear. It implies a value to "all the universe has to offer." When? Every day.
What philosophy? Part of it? No, the whole thing. Look, I should be so lucky that the whole complex constructed mess disappears. Doesn't happen that way. If it did, the chance of a day with no established philosophy at all would be amazing. Where do I sign up?
(No, if this was an amnesia drug that simply wiped it, I'd refuse. Rather, "unsettled" is just right, up to the point where it isn't attached at all, it's just sitting there, floating, not controlling, visible, available and useful if needed, seen for what it is, a pile of memories and patterns.)
For a philosophy to be worth paying attention to, it has to constrain expectations. It has to make accurate observations about the universe works. Therefore a philosophy that is the least unsettled by a daily examination of experience is preferable.
EDIT: More succinctly...
Indeed. One should have an open mind but a very judicious customs agent at the gate.
See here and here for why you should prefer the stronger version of the injunction, even if it seems paradoxical.
Each morning I go through all my beliefs and randomly flip their truth values, guaranteeing maximal surprise
I used to agree, but that part of my philosophy recently became unsettled.
Paul Graham
Thomas Sowell
False.
I mean, grain of truth, yes, literally true, no. You can shock the hell out of people and distinguish yourselves quite well by doing rational things.
Paul Krugman says something similar
(Very close to the end of Ricardo's Difficult Idea] )
Well, it is similar insofar as "reciting the contents of a standard textbook" and "doing rational things" are similar.
Mileage varies.
Krugman's talking about Ricardo's Law in particular, very basic, very old, not disputed so far as I know, and not known to the general populace.
You can shock many people by doing some rational things - those preselected for not being done by most people already, and also those that are explicitly counter to important irrational things that many people do. And these specific rational actions have an availability bias. Conversely, once something is "normal", it's not a highly available mental example of "especially rational".
But can you really shock many people by doing a randomly selected rational thing? By giving the right answer on a test? By choosing the deal that gains you the most money? By choosing a profession, a friend, a place to live, based on expectations of happiness? By choosing medical treatment based on scientific evidence? By doing something because it's fun?
It might shock people that the choice is in fact rational; they may disagree that the deal you chose will earn you the most money. But when people agree about predictions, why would they be shocked by most rational choices? I think a random (but doable) irrational act is much more shocking than a random rational one.
You are correct, but I just want to point out that the original quote talks about distinguishing yourself, not shocking people. And I think most of what you said still applies.
Sometimes, yes, but only along certain dimensions. If your group performs rituals, they can't be rational because then they will be the same as other groups'. For example, the Jewish practice of eating flat bread on Passover is arbitrary [1], but it only works because it is arbitrary.
[1] It's not entirely arbitrary if you believe the story of Passover, but that's a somewhat different point. Actually, it may be interesting to examine whether it's rational in that case—I can see arguments for both sides.
Partial duplicate
I think it's still worth leaving up, because the previous post left off the second half of the quote. The quote I posted is more comprehensive.
Nietzsche, The Gay Science
-- Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History
On the bottom line(http://lesswrong.com/lw/js/thebottomline/)/[politics as a mindkiller:
Source: Bill Clinton, in an appearance on The Daily Show with Jon Stewart (episode date: September 20, 2012). The quoted material appears at about the 6:50 mark.
Duplicate
So it is. I guess I didn't check thoroughly enough. Thanks.
On the error of failing to appreciate your opponents' three-dimensionality:
Source: Milton Friedman, "Schools at Chicago," from The Indispensable Milton Friedman
H/T David Henderson at EconLog
Note: The final sentence of the passage, as presented by Henderson, is missing closing quotation marks. I have added them.
Source: The Economist's "Babbage" blog, in a post on exoplanets
(Of course, science advances when reality agrees with models too.)
Edited to remove "emphasis added" from the quotation, which I had added originally but have since decided against.
-- The Science of Discworld, Terry Pratchett, Ian Stewart and Jack Cohen
Yes, yes it does. Otherwise, what would be the point? There's an infinity of ways to get things wrong; you don't want to spend your life catalouging them.
The word "right" (without the use of modifiers such as “exactly”) might sound too weak and easily satisfiable, but I think the idea is the following: Theories that may seem complete and robust today might be found to be incomplete or wrong in the future. You cannot claim certainty in them, although you can probably claim high confidence under certain conditions.
You can't ever claim absolute certainty in anything. There's no 1.0 probability in predictions about the universe. But science can create claims of being "right" as strong and justified as any other known process. Saying "science doesn't claim to get things right" is false, unless you go on to say "nothing can (correctly) claim to get things right, it's epistemologically impossible".
Sean Davis discussing political polling.
Specifically, as part of the recent conservative criticism of Nate Silver.
I'd like everyone to be far more skeptical of those who are instinctively skeptical of math.
Yes, and one of the best ways to do this is to reduce the perception among those with low math skills that people with strong math skills use math to intimidate.
Davis' statement was not a generalised admonition concerning reasoning, but a statement made with the bottom line written (he was justifying ignoring Nate Silver). It's not entirely accurate to characterise it in general terms.
I suggest we put this debate on hold, until say November, 6. ;)
It seems like calling into salience the notion of "those who use math to intimidate" would tend to increase the perception among those with low math skills that people with strong math skills use math to intimidate.
If we increase the social penalty on people who use math to intimidate we will decrease the number of people who use math to intimidate and so on net might reduce the perception among those with low math skills that people with strong math skills use math to intimidate.
Doesn't the wisdom of this depend on whether those using math to win status conflicts are right on the merits?
If being good at math is sufficiently likely to make one win status arguments because one is right, the incentive on people to become better at math is probably worth the cost from people using high math skills to win arguments despite being wrong on the merits.
Changing the underlying reality seems like a rather roundabout and unreliable method of changing people's perceptions.
In LessWrong terms, this is about the most horrible thing you can say about a society. It reads like an introductory quote to some hyper-Machiavellian book on advertising or political campaigning. Up-voted!
Therefore, the first and most important duty of philosophy is to test impressions, choosing between them and only deploying those that have passed the test. You know how, with money--an area where we believe our interest to be at stake--we have developed the art of assaying, and considerable ingenuity has gone into developing a way to test if coins are counterfeit, involving our senses of sight, smell, hearing, and touch. The assayer will let the denarius drop and listen intently to its ring; and he is not satisfied to listen just once: after repeated listenings he practically acquires a musician's subtle ear. It is a measure of the effort we are prepared to expend to guard against deception when accuracy is at a premium.
When it comes to our poor mind, however, we can't be bothered; we are satisfied accepting any and all impressions, because here the loss we suffer is not obvious. If you want to know just how little concerned you are about things good and bad, and how serious about things indifferent, compare your attitude to going blind with your attitude about being mentally in the dark. You will realize, I think, how inappropriate your values really are.
Epictetus, Discourses I.20.7-12 (pages 51-52 of this edition) (original Greek, with alternate translations at the link)
Edited to correct a typo.
It is somewhat amazing to me that there are people who much less concerned about their ability to recognize false reasoning than their ability to recognize counterfeit currency. It seems pathetically obvious to me that sloppiness in the former, meta level would tend to be expensive at the latter, object level - for example, you end up with people placing their trust in tools like iodine pens to detect counterfeit notes when almost no evidence exists that such a measure is effective.
Currency is binary, either genuine or counterfeit. Ideas are on a continuum, some less wrong than others. Generally, bad ideas are dangerous because there's some truth or utility to them; few people are seduced by palpable nonsense. Parsing mixed ideas is a big part of rationality, and it's harder than spotting fake money.
-- Adam Savage
If this were true, the ancient Greeks would've had science.
They came impressively close considering they didn't have any giant shoulders to stand on.
Well, all of classical and medieval Europe had writing, and yet science was created much later than writing. There were many other pieces to the puzzle: naturalism, for instance.
Naturalism came after science, not before it. Most if not all of the key figures of the Scientific Revolution were devout theists.
Many scientists today are also theists. The actors of the Scientific Revolution successfully compartmentalized their theism. If they had really thought God was likely to modify the results of their experiments to differ from established physical law just to mess around, or that there weren't any regular physical laws, they wouldn't have bothered with science.
True, but I don't think "naturalism" is the right name for that. "Determinism" seems closer to it; though perhaps many of them believed that humans had souls that were exempt from the physical laws of nature--so, "physical determinism"?
I also don't think "successfully compartmentalized their theism" is a good description of what they did. Many of them would have insisted there the lawfulness of Nature was tied to the existence of a Lawgiver, and that theism and science fit together harmoniously in a unified worldview, not in separate mental boxes. From today's standpoint we can say that the implications of the scientific way of thinking that they launched lead, when fully developed, to an incompatibility or at least a strong tension with theism. But I'd say it is anachronistic to say read that back some hundreds of years and say that the early scientists were compartmentalizing.
Science is also possible in a non-deterministic universe, one in which the evolution of physical systems has a random component and the future is not fully predictable from a full knowledge of the present. All science needs are natural laws, repeated regularities; they don't have to be entirely deterministic. And in fact scientists did not have a strong reason to think the universe is deterministic until they had what looked like a complete set of the laws of physics, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
On the other hand, a god that does miracles is incompatible with natural law as we know it, because we presumably can't put an upper limit on the probability of a miracle occurring. An intelligent god can selectively cause miracles to disrupt particular experiments or to lead scientists to a false conclusion. Science pretty much assumes that won't happen.
"Many" is ambiguous. What place and time are we talking about? I would expect that until, say, the 19th century, the majority of scientists everywhere were conventionally religious.
Twentieth? If you're talking about the first couple decades of it, yeah, but I'm pretty sure that, after quantum mechanics became widely accepted and before the relative state interpretation and similar were proposed, most scientists were not determinists, and many still aren't today (see the third column of this table).
I don't know the math of quantum mechanics. My layman's understanding includes the belief that quanum state evolution is deterministic (described by the Shrodinger equation). I may well be wrong about this.
Either way, my point was that before Maxwell's equations for electromagnetism, and the understanding that light was a form of EM, science didn't have anything like a complete description of physics. So it was hard to say whether physics was deterministic, even though the existing Newtonian law of gravity was. Once there was an attempt at a Law of Everything, even though it was refined over time, there was at least strong evidence for determinism.
If this is to be believed, “Traditionalists” (i.e. Catholics) were originally already “compartimentalized” (to use your word, which I'm not sure is the best one -- see Alejandro1's reply) to begin with, and it's “Moderns” (i.e. Protestants) who decompartimentalized.
That's a fair description. Even earlier Traditionalists were not yet compartmentalized, and so couldn't do Science. Compartmentalization helped them. Then "Moderns" decompartmentalized again, with the result that some of them moved towards either atheism or a completely lawful (non-interfering) concept of God, and could do science; while others moved towards fundamentalism, and ended up rejecting the lawfulness of nature and therefore science.
Er, yeah, “originally” was the wrong word -- look at what happened to Galileo.
They didn't screw around, and/or they didn't write about that, because contradicting the Aristotelian/Christian worldview was Evil.
Yep. If nothing of what Archimedes did counts as ‘science’, you're using an overly narrow definition IMO.
My impression was that it was the screwing around that was lacking.
Yes, in MythBusters context, sitting around talking about stuff doesn't qualify as screwing around. It is, at best, the thing you do to prepare for screwing around.
My understanding is that they had the screwing-around, despite some philosophers not doing it. They didn't have the concept that the results of screwing-around was more virtuous than the philosophy.
"Virtue" has a specific meaning in the ancient Greek world which doesn't seem like it's all that relevant here.
The way I would put it is that a clever Greek interested in the natural world became an engineer, and a clever Greek interested in the social world became an active citizen, which is a sort of combination of landlord, lawyer, and philosopher. Archimedes made his living by basically being the iron-punk hero of Syracuse; Plato and Aristotle made their living by teaching young rich folks how to be effective rich adults. A broad-minded citizen should be curious about the natural world, but curiosity is just a hobby, not a calling.
To say that the Greeks didn't have correct scientific theories is obviously true. To say that they had a methodology that departs from ours is somewhat true. To say that they were merely making stuff up without reference to any observation is to merely make stuff up without reference to any observation.
I could do someone significant bodily harm by hitting them with Aristotle's collected empirical works on the anatomies, reproductive systems, social habits, and forms of locomotion of animals. And I'm not a huge dude.
-Galen, a Roman doctor/philosopher, on Asclepiades's unwillingness to admit that the kidneys processed urine - despite Galen demonstrating the function of the kidneys to Asclepiades by, well, cutting open a live animal and pointing to the urine flowing from its kidneys to its bladder (search the page for "ligatures" to find Galen's experiment described), among other things.
They... did? If you want to make a distinction between Greek natural philosophy and modern science, which understands more about theories, hypotheses, and causality, and is rich enough to support an entire class of professional investigators into the natural world, then sure, the Greeks only had natural philosophy, and Savage is being too broad with his definition of 'science.' I think I side with Savage's approach of normalizing science- I would rather describe science as "deliberate curiosity" than something more rigorous and restrictive.
On confirmation bias
If a man objects to truths that are all too evident, it is no easy task finding arguments that will change his mind. This is proof neither of his own strength nor of his teacher's weakness. When someone caught in an argument hardens to stone, there is just no more reasoning with them.
Epictetus, Discourses I.5.1-2 (page 15 of this edition) (original Greek, with alternate translations at the link)
Quote from Peter Watts' Blindsight.
About the prospects of a fight against a superintelligence:
Great book, it's freely available here, in plain html.
Can you recommend similar novels?
Unfortunately, I can’t: this kind of (strangely refreshing) cynicism is, in my limited experience, unique to Peter Watts, and the use of interesting “starfish aliens” seems to be quite rare.
There are, however, other short stories (not novels) of Peter Watts that have a somewhat similar mood , such as Ambassador, but you probably are already aware of them.
How about R. Scott Bakker's Disciple of the Dog and Neuropath? YMMV on his Second Apocalypse books.
I thought this book was really good up until the ending, which was beyond predictable-- yet I had the impression it was meant to be quite the surprise.
-John Maynard Keynes
Alex Tabarrok
In which Winnie-the-Pooh tests a hypothesis about the animal tracks that he is following through the woods:
William Blake
Freeman? That's one of my favorite lines from Blake's "Proverbs of Hell"...
William Blake
That's Blake again. Tim Freeman is the author of the quote before the Blake quotes on this page.
Thanks, fixed.
--Bertrand Russell, "Philosophy's Ulterior Motives". (The context is Descartes' philosophy and the obviously fallacious proofs he offers of the existence of God and the external world.)
I think men whose reasoning powers are that good are few and far between. (Women too, I'm not trying to be some sort of sexist here.)
I've encountered the phenomena described in this quote and used it as a signal in the game of Mafia. It's quite effective but I think has limited general application.
Or laziness, or lack of time, or honest error. Multiple causes can have the same effect, and hanlons razor comes into play/
-Descartes, Discourse on method part 6.
--Prime Function Aki Zeta-Five, Sid Meier's Alpha Centauri
Removing all those glands and hormones (assuming they are pars pro toto for our evolved urges), what would be left? A frontal lobe staring at the wall?
-Aristosophy. I like to think this is about the Robot's Rebellion.
"Reality Injection Attack" would make a great name for a mathcore band.
"
-- Siderea
(Hat-tip to Nancy Lebovitz.)
Train self to perceive the word "but" as an alarm bell. When tempted to use it in an argument, immediately abort sentence and reflect on whether to swap the clauses before and after it, or even save the latter for a more appropriate time. (I imagine a lot of people here already do that.)
Meh. 'But' is just 'and' with a case of incongruity. That's what it is, so I don't see a problem with using it for that... though of course dark arts applications would be problematic.
It's even more dark artsy to not even mention contrary evidence.
Unless you know they'll run across it and want to control their exposure to it.
K.C. Cole
If you're consistently in your right mind you can safely create the means of your own extinction, with the knowledge that you are sufficiently sane not to use it to extinguish yourself. This can come in handy when the means of your own extinction has significant non-extinction related uses.
This is true in theory, but do you think it's an accurate description of our real world?
(Nuclear power is potentially great, but with a bit more patience and care, we could stretch our non-nuclear resources quite a bit further, which would have given us more time to build stable(r) political systems.)
No, I was responding to the "no one in their right mind" bit. It seems to me that when you are in your right mind is precisely the time to build artifacts that could destroy your civilization, and it doesn't seem to me that you could conclude from building such artifacts that you are not in your right mind.
Rather, I think there's other evidence that humanity can't be trusted with e.g. nuclear weaponry, and this suggests that we should not build it. lukeprog's quote seems to me to be of the form "Humanity can't be trusted with nuclear weapons, yet builds them anyway, so it must be crazy, so it can't be trusted with nuclear weapons."
I think you set a false dichotomy here - we can generate relatively safe nuclear power (thorium reactors) without existential risk, and without creating the byproducts necessary to create nuclear weapons. This is not an argument against the root comment, however.
Sure, thorium reactors do not appear to immediately allow nuclear weapons - but the scientific and technological advances that lead to thorium reactors are definitely "dual-use".
I'm not entirely convinced of either the feasibility or the ethics of the "physicists should never have told politicians how to build a nuke" argument that's been made multiple times on LW (and in HPMOR), but the existence of thorium reactors doesn't really constitute a valid argument against it - an industry capable of building thorium reactors is very likely able to think up, and eventually build, nukes.
Fallacy of Composition? "We" didn't create advanced weapons, for example, tiny fractions of "we" did. And if half of humanity nukes the other half to extinction, but not before the other half fires off the nukes that wipe out the first half, then is it really fair to say that "we" committed suicide? The outcome is the same but you can't begin to understand the problem by oversimplifying it.
I dislike this quote because it obscures the true nature of the dilemma, namely the tension between individual and collective action. Being "not in one's right mind" is a red herring in this context. Each individual action can be perfectly sensible for the individual, while still leading to a socially terrible outcome.
The real problem is not that some genius invents nuclear weapons and then idiotically decides to incite global nuclear war, "shooting from the hip" to his own detriment. The real problem is that incentives can be aligned so that it is in everyone's interest every step along the way, to do their part in their own ultimate destruction.
Of course, if "right mind" was defined to mean "socially optimal mind," fine, we aren't in our right mind. But I don't think that's the default interpretation.
--Neal Stephenson, In the Beginning Was... the Commandline
From "Richard Feynman and The Connection Machine"
I would like to upvote the Feynman quote. I am not interested in upvoting the Stephenson quote. I think it would be better if these quotes were in separate comments, as recommended in the post.
I would like to upvote the Stephenson quote, and not the Feynman quote.
I would like to abstain from voting on them, but to do so in separate posts.
You two talk between yourselves so that only one of you upvote the entire comment.
Or, you both downvote the conglomerate and each write a comment expressing objection to the combination, approval of the desired quote and indifference to the other.
(I downvoted the conglomerate on the principle "I wish to see less quote-comments that people believe should be separate, especially when said quotes are verbose anyway". There is an implied "...and would upvote both comments if they were split to encourage trivial improvements in response to feedback".)
This reminds of how two high school classmates of mine eluded the prohibition from voting for themselves as class representatives by voting for each other.
New Yorker article on David Deutsch
(I saw this on Scott Aaronson's blog)
Teachings of Diogenes
Another from the same site — on free will:
The real irony of the story is a historical context I think most readers these days miss: that when the real Plato paid court to a 'king' - Dionysius II, tyrant of Syracuse - it went very poorly. Plato was arrested, and barely managed to arrange his freedom & return to Athens.
Twice.
And supposedly Plato was sold into slavery by the previous tyrant.
This works until the king sends armed men to confiscate your vegetables.
What king ever sent armed men to confiscate the vegetables of one poor dude?
Damn near every one of them through the systemical implementation of taxation?
You can't get blood from a stone. So sometimes it pays to be a stone.
EDIT: Anyway, this is missing the point. Diogenes is preaching self-sufficiency and a variant of keeping your identity small. Sycophancy isn't a reliable way to hold onto one's vegetables and one's dignity.
But you can destroy the stone, and put something you can get blood from in its place.
Depends on the size of the stone. You might not even notice it if it's small enough.
You can dynamite stones as an example to other would be stones.
They still won't give you any blood. They're stones. No blood up in 'em.
Teachings of Diogenes
Something Positive
See also: http://lesswrong.com/lw/12s/the_strangest_thing_an_ai_could_tell_you/.
Source: Andrew Sullivan in an otherwise fairly bland political post
More often than not it hits you first.
H.L. Mencken
"Some magic bullets from the past"
I'm not sure what you mean to imply with your comment, but since someone had downvoted lukeprog's quote, I guess at least that person might have taken it to undermine Mencken's words. However, all Mencken is saying is that
p(easy,neat,plausible,wrong) > 0
which in no way contradicts
p(easy,neat,plausible,right) > 0.
Of course the essence of the quote is that a solution's being easy, neat and plausible doesn't imply it's right which often seems to be forgotten in public discourse.
David Deutsch, The Beginning of Infinity
And yet they couldn't even defeat the Spartans or keep Savonarola from taking power.
To be fair, with a general like Napoleon, how could the Spartans lose?
Fixed typo.
-Sennett Forell, Foundation and Empire
Thomas Huxley
Paul Valéry
Robert Anton Wilson
-- A dialogue by Philip Gasper
Hilarious. It reminded me of Dennett's "Superficiality vs. Hysterical Realism" (which is much more serious and academic, though).
Ta-Nehisi Coates
Given that Coates is complaining about a pundit who disdains polls in favor of personal impressions (or worse, secondhand accounts thereof), it seems like a better conclusion would be "there is an objective world; and your feelings about how the world is, are not the world itself; you actually have to go and measure in a systematic fashion if you want to know what the world is like". I'm not sure why he concludes that the objective world is not real. Besides, if there's no objective world, then the notion of some attempts to represent that world being more or less flawed, seems incoherent...
P.S. You've got the hyphen in Coates' name placed wrong; it should be "Ta-Nehisi Coates".
I think he means that none of the stuff in a mind is going to be a perfect representation, but if that's what he meant, then there were probably better ways of saying it.
In any case, the location of the hyphen in his name is about as objective as you can get, and I've corrected it.
Yes, to be fair, that seems like a reasonable charitable interpretation. Coates' writing (that I've seen linked from here, anyway) is consistently insightful and clear-headed, so I was actually somewhat surprised to read a "there is no reality" line from him.
Perhaps the real rationality takeaway here is that sometimes the people who talk about the "objective world" and "looking at reality" and so forth are the ones who are engaging in woo and irrational nonsense, which baits their opponents into this strange arguing-against-objective-reality position. The lesson, then, is that we should look at how people actually derive their beliefs, not how objective they claim they're being.
--Borderlands 2
I have as much authority as the Pope, I just don't have as many people who believe it. -George Carlin
“Must a name mean something?" Alice asked doubtfully.
Of course it must," Humpty Dumpty said with a short laugh; "my name means the shape I am - and a good handsome shape it is, too. With a name like yours, you might be any shape, almost.”
Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass
"There are these two young fish swimming along and they happen to meet an older fish swimming the other way, who nods at them and says "Morning, boys. How's the water?" And the two young fish swim on for a bit, and then eventually one of them looks over at the other and goes "What the hell is water?"
"The real value of an education has almost nothing to do with knowledge, and everything to do with simple awareness; awareness of what is so real and essential, so hidden in plain sight all around us, all the time, that we have to keep reminding ourselves over and over:
"This is water."
--- David Foster Wallace in his commencement speech to Kenyon College, This is Water. I highly recommend reading the whole thing.
Duplicate.
My mistake, I searched but didn't see it.
Charles Mackay from "Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds"
Sting
Charles Babbage
I suppose we don't know if this is true, since it doesn't yet exist. BTW, what has this to do with rationality?
Computers have revolutionized most fields of science. I take it as a general "yay science/engineer/computers" quote.
It was a fairly audacious prediction, that turns out to have been true. I think it's fair to allow Babbage to describe as an analytical engine what we would nowadays call a "computer".
--xkcd.
What is he alluding to? (I don't watch lots of mass media these day, let alone American mass media.)
I assume he is referring to the tendency of the media to call a persistent but small lead "too close to call." It's confusing the margin of lead with the likelihood of winning.
Either that, or the tendency of partisan commentators to make predictions for their side that were totally unconnected to state-by-state polling results.
Traditional pundits are intimidated and frightened by Nate Silver's quantitative analysis. They see their comfy job pandering to the beliefs-as-attire market, with no expectation of accuracy, disappearing if pundits who can actually predict things take over.
edit: This comment, further down the page, explains well.
Exactly. Here is an excellent article elaborating further. (Only quibble is that is was not just Silver; other data-based analysts like Sam Wang and Josh Putnam made essentially the same predictions):
If you look at the picture it seems to be: Numbers are better than fancy visualsations.
Many Republican pundits had elaborate theories about how polls were understating Romney's chances in the recent US presidential election, but the results turned out to match polls quite well.
— Neal Stephenson, The Diamond Age
see also
Of course it's easy to say one has no morals at all when the morals in question are so much more complicated - they'll seem permissive by your ability to manipulate them in contrived edge cases. This complication, though, is for adaptation to the real world - they have something useful to say about very real cases that Victorian morality completely chokes and dies on.
But that's not really in conflict with the point of the quote, is it?
--Saturday Morning Breakfast Cereal