Open problems are clearly defined problems1 that have not been solved. In older fields, such as Mathematics, the list is rather intimidating. Rationality, on the other, seems to have no list.
While we have all of us here together to crunch on problems, let's shoot higher than trying to think of solutions and then finding problems that match the solution. What things are unsolved questions? Is it reasonable to assume those questions have concrete, absolute answers?
The catch is that these problems cannot be inherently fuzzy problems. "How do I become less wrong?" is not a problem that can be clearly defined. As such, it does not have a concrete, absolute answer. Does Rationality have a set of problems that can be clearly defined? If not, how do we work toward getting our problems clearly defined?
See also: Open problems at LW:Wiki
1: "Clearly defined" essentially means a formal, unambiguous definition. "Solving" such a problem would constitute a formal proof.
There are a fair number of formal analyses of Newcomb's problem. I particularly like this one:
D.H. Wolpert and G. Benford, What does Newcomb's paradox teach us? (showing that the standard approaches to the paradox encode fundamentally different - and inconsistent - views about the nature of the decision problem, and clearing up a number of other confusions.)